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ABSTRACT
The Hoover Papers at West Branch, Iowa, recentlyopened to scholars, contain invaluable material on politics,
policies, and personalities of the 1930's.

Through an exten

sive examination of the ex-President's papers and those of
his chief lieutenants, Ogden Mills and John Callan 0

'Laugh-

lin, I have attempted to reconstruct Hoover's political
activities during the period, 1933-1940.
Although Hoover's correspondence,

speeches, and

publications underline his devotion to the ideology of
American Individualism, they also expose a man of political
sensitivity, motivation, partisanship, and ambition.

Hoover

spent the entire decade of the 1 9 3 0 's embroiled in opposi
tionist politics.
The ex-President's retirement in Palo Alto was a
screen which permitted him time to study issues, evaluate
personalities,

and plot strategy.

He opened an extensive

correspondence, advised supporters, dabbled in local politic
and maneuvered for control of the Republican Party organiza
tion.
As his lieutenants pointed to accumulating "evidence"
of New Deal tyranny and the need for a more aggressive role
from their "Chief," Hoover restated his ideas concerning

government in society in The challenge To Liberty.

He

denounced what he saw as an abridgement of individual
liberties,

an increasing bureaucratization,

and regimentation

of society.
In his efforts to rally a dispirited party and to
vindicate his own record, Hoover returned to the political
stump and lambasted the New Deal.

Too often, he ignored the

harsh realities of the time and dwelt on ideas.
gained conservative support.

Yet, he

He accelerated local activity

through grass roots conventions and the enrollment of young
Republicans.

Although the GOP rejected his suggestions for

a statement of principles, he was making a political come
back.
In 1936, anxious for vindication and a chance to
"debate the issues," Hoover hoped a deadlocked convention
would turn to him.

He maintained an active schedule,

denounced the New Deal,

and delivered one of the best speeches

of his career at the GOP Convention.

The party, however,

nominated a more available candidate and, as Hoover expected,
lost the election.
Convinced that his party must exert a more aggressive
role and defend its record, Hoover attempted to reorganize
it in 1937.

He allied with conservatives in organizing a

Program committee to draw up a statement of principles and
outline policies.

He developed a close working relationship

with the National Chairman and the Executive Committee and
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encouraged opposition to the New Deal.

Despite the defeat

of his mid-term convention proposal, Hoover's drive for
party leadership was widely recognized as serious.
1938 was the crucial year for Hoover's political
comeback.

Despite his own activity and increased following,

his lieutenants lost key positions inside the party organi
zation.

Only the Republican Party's sweeping congressional

victories kept alive his glimmering hopes.
Sadly, Hoover exhausted the last of his political
strength in a futile effort to capture the 1940 presidential
nomination.

He openly courted delegates and advertised his

willingness to run.

He ignored reality.

He failed even to

endorse a more available candidate of his own views.

1940

was his political curtain call.

Defeat,

decimated his political legion.

The only door left open was

that of elder statesman.

age, and death had

Reluctantly, he looked toward it.

INTRODUCTION
Herbert Hoover was a man with strong psychological
needs.

Early in life he developed a set of principles which

he categorized as "American Individualism.1'

Throughout his

professional and political careers he reaffirmed his devotion
to that ideology.

Not even the greatest depression in

American history undercut his faith in his ideas.
office, discredited, maligned,

On leaving

and heartsick, he felt need

for vindication— both for his ideas and himself.
This dissertation is not a biography,
complete record of his career,

it is not a

it is not a study of the New

Deal, nor is it an effort to show any continuity or relation
ship between the Hoover Administration and the New Deal.

It

is primarily an examination of Herbert Hoover's political
activity and his opposition tactics to the New Deal during
the 1 9 3 0 's.
did.

It is an attempt to show why Hoover acted as he

It focuses on his personal correspondence, his publica

tions, and his speeches, all of which aimed at persuading
the public to reject the New Deal.

It is only one piece of

a gigantic puzzle.
The New Deal of the 1 9 3 0 's challenged many of Hoover's
basic ideas concerning the role of government in the economy
and society.

With sincerity and with bitterness, he
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returned to the political arena after 193 2 in an effort to
halt "the challenge to liberty."

In his mental framework,

the New Deal became synonymous with evil.

Hence, his

charges were dipped in extreme emotional and political
hyperbole.

At times his accusations and his failure to even

admit the possible sincerity of his opponents are unreason
able.

Although he was often misquoted, often misled, and

often misunderstood, he was his own worst enemy.

He rarely

exercised restraint in his analysis of the New Deal.
Erroneous New Deal methods hardly proved conspiracy,
un-Americanism, or totalitarian motives on the part of his
opponents.

Nor did the failure of certain New Deal policies

invalidate their humane objectives or prove the soundness of
his American System.

His ideas, after all, had been

thoroughly tested in his own administration.
ing, his speeches,

Notwithstand

articles, and books evoked constructive

debate and uncovered genuine flaws, potential dangers, and
inefficient methods.

Too, some of his charges were proven

true in the long run.
Despite the ex-President's blemished reputation, he
commanded a significant following throughout the 1930's.
made the most of his influence.

He

Of all the New Deal's

critics, he alone held a national audience, he alone was
consistent in opposition, and he was the most sincere
opponent.

Other men would have arrived at many of his con

clusions concerning the inefficiency, unconstitutionality,
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and revolutionary nature of the N e w Deal, but it was Hoover
who first saw,

first denounced,

and first demanded termina

tion of many of the new proposals.
He was a self-appointed "conscience '1 for the nation.
At times he underlined a tragic as well as negative element
of the 1930’s.

He sincerely thought that an alien philoso

p h y was destroying American traditions and values.
the afternoon of life overtook him.

Perhaps

He was a seasoned actor

who remained onstage long after the play had ended.

He read

his lines with a remarkable consistency and overrated his
experience.
leading.

He never realized that experience can be mis

He was a minority spokesman, an individualist in a

rapidly advancing collective society, a conservative during
a cataclysmic era,

an abstract thinker and an ideologue who

saw an image and denied reality.

He predicted numerous

trends but ignored the harshness of his times.

Tragically,

he refused the role of elder statesman and, in an effort to
gain vindication,

turned to political activity.

drank deeply from the cup of bitterness.

ix

Again he

CHAPTER I
SHAPING OF AN AMERICAN INDIVIDUALIST
Thoreau once said:

"If a man does not keep pace with

his companions, perhaps it is because he hears a different
drummer.

Let him step to the music he hears, however me a 

sured or far a w a y . H e r b e r t Hoover attuned his senses to
the theme of American Individualism in his early youth and
professional training.

It was then he formed a social and

political creed which he continually saw fulfilled in his
own professional successes.

In any evaluation of Hoover,

these ideas and some related character traits are essentials
to grasp.

What forces, therefore— familial, environmental,

educational,

and professional— shaped Herbert Hoover?

The thirty-first President was born on August 10, 1874,
in a two-room cottage at West Branch,

Iowa.

His father

Jesse Clark Hoover, was the village blacksmith.
Huldah Minthorn Hoover,

His

mother,

an ardent prohibitionist, was a

frequent speaker at the community's Quaker meetings.^

1

Henry Davxd Thoreau, Walden:
N e w York, 1961), 272.

Or, Life xn the Woods

2will Irwin, Herbert Hoover (New York, 1920), 1-10.
Hereinafter cited as Irwin, Hoover. Harris G. Warren,
Herbert Hoover and the Great Depression (Oxford, 1959), 1920. Hereinafter cited as Warren, Great Depression. Herbert
Hoover, A Boyhood in Iowa (New York, 1931), 3-5.
Hereinafter
cited as Hoover, Boyhood.
1

Hoover's recollections of his parents were misty.

Although

remembering few childhood experiences, he did recall a "stern
but kindly discipline."

The loss of his parents at an early

age constrained his personality so that he tended "to hold
things in, to resist displays of emotion in himself, or
others.
Environment and religion played a major role in
shaping Hoover's character.

5

Always conscious of his own

experiences, Hoover recalled that nineteenth-century Iowans
conquered a vast domain through individual initiative and
enterprise.

As a youth, he performed a variety of menial

chores and observed that most farm families were largely
self-sufficient.
essentials.®

The Hoovers bought only a few outside

Despite the hard work, Hoover often escaped to

O
^Herbert Hoover, Memoirs of Herbert Hoover (New York,
1951) , X, 1. Hereinafter cited as Hoover, Memoirs. Claude
R. Cook, "Herbert Hoover's Notable Career," Annals of Iowa,
XXXII (October, 1954), 460-69. Walter F. Dexter, Herbert
Hoover and American Individualism (New York, 1932), 3, sees
an impoverished youth, a humble origin, and a village environ
ment as shaping the attitudes of a young, impressionable
Hoover.
^Erwin C. Hargrove, Presidential Leadership:
Person
ality and Political Style (New York, 1966), 98. Hereinafter
cited as Hargrove, Presidential Leadership.
5 Hoover, Memoirs, I, 1; Dexter, American Individualism,
3; David Hinshaw, Herbert Hooveri
American Quaker (New York,
1950).
Hereinafter cited as Hinshaw, American Quaker.

^Hoover, Memoirs, I, 5-6; Hoover, Boyhood, 23-24;
Claude R. Cook, "Herbert Hoover's Notable Career," Annals of
Iowa, XXXII (October, 1954), 460-469.
Hoover recalled "the
dime was hard to come by." Memoirs, I, 3.

3
the virgin forest or to the swimming hole by the willows,
where he stalked pigeons, tracked rabbits,

fished, or swam.

7

In maturity, he frequently returned to such natural scenes.
Possibly he sensed certain spiritual values in the wilder
ness.

Certainly, he spoke of enriching the soul through this

8
me d i u m .
Hoover's intelligent and loquacious mother impressed
her idealism on the young boy.

After her death, relatives

saw that Hoover retained her religious ideas.

A fellow

Quaker noted that religion was a key ingredient in H o o v e r 1s
character and that his "most distinctive qualities and traits"
were spiritual, moral,

and mental.^®

One recent student of

politics believes that Hoover's religion explained his dis
taste for exhibitionism, his need for harmony, his desire to
serve the public, his basic trust in man's goodness,

and his

insistence on cooperative e f f o r t H o o v e r parted at times
from the peripheral signs of his faith, but he kept the deep
spiritual and moral tone.

His religion accentuated his

7Hoover, Boyhood, 3; Hoover, Me m o i r s , I, 2.
Soul

^Herbert Hoover, Fishing For Fun and to Wash Your
(New York, 1964).
^Irwin, H o o v e r , 21; Hoover, Boyhood, 16, 17, 25.
"'"^Hinshaw, American Quaker, vii,

5, 34.

-'--''Hargrove, Presidential Leadership. 98, notes that all
of these characteristics greatly influenced H. H . ’s political
values and leadership techniques.
David Hinshaw discusses
the same traits and their relation to Hoover's Quaker reli
gion.
Hinshaw, American Quaker, 35-38.

optimism,

individualism,

and stubbornness.

12

Hoover's religion stressed the use of "plain language"
and a reliance on logic rather than emotion in attempts to
persuade others to accept facts. J
sought consensus and harmony.

Quakers continually

If they could not act in

unison they postponed decisions until everyone had an "oppor
tunity to search their hearts for the right answer.
Quakers frequently reiterated their devotion to certain
sacred principles.

They carried their extreme religious

individualism over into the economic sphere.
a Quaker emphasis on education, thrift,

Hoover recalled

and individual enter

prise, but he could not remember an example of Quaker
poverty.^®

This would be significant for a future politician

who judged all mankind by his own experiences.
Following their mother's death in 1883, the Hoover
children were parceled out among the relatives.

This marked

l^Ibid.. 3 9 . Hoover's religion gave him an air of
moral superiority which he constantly displayed in his
political career.
l^Hoover, Memoirs,

I,

8

; Hinshaw, American Quaker, 39.

^Dexter, American Individualism. 43-44. This Quaker
trait was a decisive political weakness in Hoover's career,
for he continually displayed difficulty in making key deci
sions if his advisers disagreed.
■*-5 Ibid., 46. Hoover, M emoirs. I, 9. Hoover not only
reiterated certain principles throughout his post-presiden
tial career, but he also defined each issue in moral terms
and overused such words as principle, service, justice,
'truth-, and r i g h t r r " — -v -~
^ H o o v e r , M e m oirs. I,

8

.

5
an abrupt break with old associations.

For three years,

Hoover "was passed on from relative to relative, " always
working for his bread.

17

By the close of 1885, he arrived

in Newbe.rg, Oregon, where his maternal uncle. Doctor Henry
John Minthorn, headed Pacific Academy, a Quaker school.
religious heritage, his self-reliance,
bloomed in his new Oregon home.

His

and his independence

Under the strain of hard

work, the orphan learned the lessons of industry, thrift,
1 ft

and determination. °

The doctor also preached many homilies

to his young nephew, but the most often repeated one was:
"Turn your other cheek once, but if he smites it, then punch
h i m . ,|19
When Doctor Minthorn entered the real estate business
in 1888, Hoover ran the Salem office, kept books, typed, and
promoted sales . 2 0

aiso enrolled in night sessions of the

local business school and read the classics in his spare
time.

At the office Hoover debated political issues b u t ’

-^Warren,
foreword.

Great Depression. 20; Hoover,

Boyhood,

■*-%oover, Memoirs, I, 10-11; Irwin, H o o v e r , 29-35.
H.H. recalled saving the money for a long time.
Memoirs, I,
10 - 1 1 .
1 9 I b i d .. 1 2

.

20Ibid.; Drew Pearson, Washington Merry-Go-Round (New
York, 1931), 62-63, states that H.H. was a born promoter.
As his uncle's sales declined, he "conceived the idea of
meeting newcomers at the station, settling them in private
boarding houses, thus giving his uncle's salesmen an oppor
tunity to talk to them without competition . 11 H.H. used his
commission for renting the rooms to help finance his college
education.

21

noted "the obstinacy and low intelligence of his opponents."*

In 1890, Hoover gained conditional admittance to Stanford University.

Throughout his tenure in Palo Alto, he held

down numerous jobs in offices,
routes.

and had laundry and newspaper

He acquired summer employment with the U. S. Geo

logical S u r v e y . ^
mination,

At college, he displayed an energy, deter

and ability that would assure future success.

He

also developed organizational skills and a knack of inspiring
loyalty and service among his colleagues.^3
Like most college students of the late nineteenth
century. Hoover was probably exposed to the ideas of the
Social Darwinists. 24.

Due to his personal experiences, his

religion, and his fierce individualism, he was an ideal con
vert for Conservative Darwinism.

Herbert Spencer's applica

tion of the biological scheme of evolution to society, with
its note of inevitability,

individualism,

and cooperation,

^ H o o v e r , Memoirs, I, 13-14.
^^Harold Wolfe, Herbert Hoover, Public Servant and
Leader of the Loyal Opposition (New York, 1956), 17-19. H e r e 
inafter cited as Wolfe, H o o v e r . Hoover, Me m o i r s , I, 15-18,
18-19.
^ W o l f e , Ho o v er. 17-18; Irwin, Hoover. 62-67; Joseph
S. Davis, "Herbert Hoover, 1874-1964:
Another Appraisal,"
South Atlantic Quarterly, LXVIII (Summer, 1969), 296. Will
Irwin, a Stanford contemporary, notes Hoover's organiza
tional talent and his ability to inspire loyalty.
Hargrove,
Presidential Leadership, 99.
24^arren, Great Depression. 33.
Richard Hofstadter,
Social Darwinism in American Thought (Philadelphia, 1944),
8.

pc

explained mu c h in Hoover's own p a s t / 3

William Graham

Sumner of Yale was even more influential.

It was Sumner who

saw the Protestant ideal in the persevering, thrifty, deter
mined individual who inevitably rose to the top in a free
competitive order.

To Sumner, the progress of civilization

depended on the selective process of "nature" and hence he
preached unrestricted competition.
as inevitable.

He defended inequality

Yet, he thought that progress was possible. a

It was the influence of Conservative Darwinism,

as advocated

by Spencer and Sumner, that Herbert Hoover reflected and
espoused throughout his career.

^ I b i d .j 21, 25-29, 35; Eric F. Goldman, Rendezvous
With Destiny {New York, 1956), 90-93, contains the most
succinct explanation of Conservative Darwinism.
Henry
Steele Commager, The American Mind (New Haven, 1950), 86-90,
shows h o w Spencer's ideas blended w i t h progress, individual
ism, defense of the existing order, and with natural or
divine law.
^^Hofstadter, Social Darwinism, 37-38, 43, 44-49.
Sidney Fine, Laissez Faire and the General-Weifare State
(Ann Arbor, 1956), 81-91, discusses Sumner's belief that
everyone was entitled to a chance (to Hoover, this meant
equality of opportunity) , that the man of industry, frugality
and patience would succeed, that natural law must take its
course, and that the 11forgotten man" inevitably paid for the
hasty mistakes of reformers who interferred with natural law.
On the latter point, see Goldman, Rendezvous With Destiny,
91. Also see Commager, The American M i n d , 201-202.
Although
Reform Darwinism was in the air by the 1 8 9 0 's, HoOver escaped
its influence or else rejected it.
The great spokesman for
Reform Darwinism, Lester Frank Ward, promoted the idea of a
planned society.
To Ward, man was a social engineer who
could regulate much of his environment, direct and mold
progress, and affect change through experimentation.
Ralph
Henry Gabriel, The Course of American Democratic Thought (New
York, 1940), 204-209.
Goldman, Rendezvous With Destiny, 9397. Commager, The American M i n d . 212-216.
Hofstadter,
Social Darwi n i s m , 52-58.

8
Upon graduation from Stanford in 1895, amidst the
worst depression of the nineteenth century, Hoover took a
“pick and shovel" job at two dollars a day in the Sierra
Nevada mines.^7

jn the following months, Hoover ascended

the ladder to a clerical post, to mine scout, and to “tech
nical adviser" for the Chinese Engineering and Mining Company.
28
In the Orient, he fashioned a brilliant engineering career.
On a stateside visit in 1899, he married Lou Henry— his col
lege sweetheart.

Accompanied by his bride, Hoover returned

to China to supervise the construction of harbors, railroads,
and mines.

During the Boxer Rebellion of 1900, he helped to

provision the beleaguered foreign colony and its refugees. ^
In 1902, he became a partner and General Manager of the newlycreated Oriental Syndicate .3 8
As a free-lancing, international engineer, Hoover was
a globetrotter.

He acquired an extensive knowledge of

foreign governments, their economies, and histories.

He

became obsessed with efficiency and organization as the keys
to their critical economic and political problems.

Too, he

^ H oover, Memoirs, I, 25-28; Warren, Great Depression,

20.
3 8 Ibid.;

Hoover, Memoirs, I, 25-34; Wolfe, Hoover,

20-25.
29

Hoover, Memoirs, I, 35-72; Warren,

21-22.
3 0 Ibid., 2 1

.

Great Depression,

-ai

concluded that the American way was uniquely superior. ^

,

The Great War, beginning in 1914, opened new doors to
Hoover's creative talents, and his organizational,
trative, diplomatic,
tested.

adminis

and judicial abilities were severely

Many of his ideas crystallized during his war

experience.

It was then that he thought through his ideology

of "American Individualism."

Although he did not formalize

his views until his publication of American Individualism in
1922, his ordeal as diplomat and food administrator in World
War I confirmed his basic beliefs.
From his London headquarters,

in 1914, Hoover assumed

responsibility for repatriating stranded tourists and, at
the request of the American Ambassador Walter Hines Page, he
organized a Commission for the Relief of Belgium.

Hoover

exhibited diplomatic and organizational talents in securing
permission to send supplies through the blockade of the
belligerents .3 3

He rose steadily in the rank of Wilson's

3lHoover, M e m oirs, I, 75-125? Herbert Hoover, The
Ordeal of Woodrow Wilson (New York, 1958), v; Herbert Hoover,
American Individualism (Garden City, 1922), 7-8.
Herein
after cited as Hoover, American Individualism.
3 ^Hargrove,

Presidential Leadership, 100.

3 3 Hoover, Memoirs. I, 141-148; Burton J. Hendrick,
The Life and Letters of Walter Hines Page (3 vols.; New York,
1925), II, 311; Warren, Great Depression, 22. Hoover's
administrative methods maximized voluntary cooperation, and
his successes reinforced his idea that all goals could be
obtained with moral m ethods.

10
advisers.^
During the war years, Hoover embellished and elabo
rated his ideology of individualism without changing its
basic tenets.

His wartime experience turned h i m toward

public service.

When the United States entered the war in

April, 1917, Hoover became chief of the United States Food
Administration.35
As Food Administrator, Hoover exercised direct control
of food production,

of farm policies,

rationing, processing,
United States.36

and of prices,

and distribution of foodstuffs in the

Hoover defended these extraordinary powers

34william A. Williams, The Contours of American Hi s 
tory (New York, i=>61) , 427.
Several of H.H.'s wartime
associates noted his penchant for seeing the dark side of
every problem.
Bernard Baruch, Public Years (New York, 1960),
88-89, 232-233; William White, Autobiography (New York, 1946),
515; Charles Seymour (ed.). The Intimate Papers of Colonel
House (New York, 1928), IV, 268; Arno Mayer, Politics and
Diplomacy of Peace Making (New York, 1967), 21, 24-27.
Here
inafter cited as Mayer, Politics and Diplomacy.
35gong. R e c ., 65 Cong., 1 Sess. (May, 1917), 49474950; Hoover, M e m o i r s . I, 240-25-.
Davis, "Hoover:
Another
Appraisal," 305, depicts Hoover's "genius for recruiting
competent men and women . . . during and after the war, and
[winning] their devoted loyalty." The war-relief activities
led to life-time friendships with Edgar Rickard, Mark Requa,
Lewis Strauss, Robert A. Taft, Ben S. Allen, Ray Lyman
Wilbur, Vernon Kellogg, and Lawrence Richey.
Hoover, M e m o i r s .
I, 253, 295. Thereafter, these men served as part of
Hoover's political "inner circle" and affectionately referred
to him as "Chief."
36ibid., 240-250; Cong. R e c ., 65 Cong., 1 Sess. (May,
1917), 4947-4950; Editorial, "How Hoover Will Help Win,"
Literary Di g e s t , L (June 2, 1917), 1689.
See William C.
Mullendore, History of the United States Food Administration
(Stanford, 1941), 7-19, 27-34, 77-79, 115-117, 131-194,
226-359.

11
by citing their emergency and temporary nature.

Each agency

that he created in order to implement his ideas stressed the
cooperative and voluntary nature of his program.

His unparal

leled successes in economizing, accelerating production, and
curtailing waste only reinforced his i d e o l o g y . ^
As a result of his relief experience, Hoover was
named head of the American Relief Administration in post-war
Europe.^®

President Wilson elevated him to an advisory role

at the Versailles Conference.
and political advice.

Hoover responded with economic

Although deeply disillusioned with the
*5 Q

final peace treaty. Hoover promised to support it publicly.
The war had crystallized his ideas.

Xt was time to formalize

the beliefs that his familial, environmental, educational,
and professional experiences had created.
For Hoover,

ideas, values,

supremely important.

and experience were

His heritage had included an inculcation

^ I b i d .; Irwin, H o o v e r . 189-244.
Also see Louis
Filler (ed.), The President Speaks (Hew York, 1964), 178;
Hoover, M e m o i r s , I, 240-244.
^®H. H. Fisher, The American Relief Administration in
Russia, 1921-1923 (Washington, 1943), 3-27; Hoover, Wils o n ,
75-76, 8 8 ; and Hoover, Me m o i r s , I, 334-352; Papers Relating
to the Foreicrn Relations of the United States, 1919 (Paris
Peace Conference), II, 627-728, contains the diplomatic
details involved in food relief implementation and explains
Hoover's disillusionment with the Allies' obstruction; Mayer,
Politics and Diplomacy. 266-273, 474-485, 510-514.
^ H o o v e r , M e m o i r s , I, 334-352; Hoover, W i l s o n . 75, 8389, 183-184; 234; and Woodrow Wilson, War and Peace Presi
dential Messages, Addresses and Public Papers, 1917-1924 (New
York, 1927), I, 635.
See N e w York T i m e s . February 24, 1920,
1 .

12
of concepts lauding the self-made man, opportunity,
reliance,

self-

thrift, mobility, and the sacredness of tradition.

His ideology involved an indiscriminate mixture of ideas
while appealing to deep emotions and promoting an assortment
of values.

Because of his religion he rationalized all

issues in moral terms.

Although he embellished and elabo

rated his views during the presidency and the years that
followed, he articulated the basic premise of his creed in
1922,

in a small book entitled American Individualism. ^
Hoover possessed complete confidence in what he

called American traditions, American individualism, the
"American system,

11

and America's future.

He believed in the

uniqueness of the American way with its emphasis on "equality
of opportunity."^-*-

By this doctrine, he meant the right of

equal opportunity "to pursue happiness" in the Jeffersonian

^ T h e New York Times. December 17, 1922, 1, praised
H.H.'s personal interpretation of America's economic, social,
and political system as "among the few great formulations of
American political theory." Other observers found it less
momentuous. Robert H. Ferrell, American Diplomacy In The
Great Depression (Hew Haven, 1957), 10, castigates Hoover's
prescription for success as a collection of "homely maxims
inculcated in countless nineteenth century Americans."
^ H e r b e r t Hoover, American Individualism (Garden City,
1922) , 7-8. Hereinafter cited as Hoover, Individualism.
Myers, State Papers, I, 1, 398.
Boyd C. Shafer, "The Ameri
can Heritage of Hope, 1855-1940," Mississippi Valley Histori
cal R e v i e w , XXXVII (December, 1950), 425-450, says that
Hoover looked beyond the distant horizons to a time when
poverty would end and all men would enjoy the abundant life.
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s e n s e .

42

g y

insuring equality of opportunity, the American

system allowed individual initiative to take one to "that
position in society to which his intelligence, character,
ability and ambition entitled h i m . 11
proved this to his own satisfaction.

Hoover's own experience
Too, he thought the

system minimized class structure, stimulated motivation,
enlarged the sense of responsibility,

and forced man to

"stand up to the emery wheel of competition."^
Individualism was more than legalistic justice based
on contracts, property, and political equality.

By the

1 9 2 0 's, America had "long since abandoned the laissez faire

4^Edward 0. Guerrant, Herbert Hoover, Franklin p .
Roosevelt: Comparisons and Contrasts (Cleveland, 1960), 6 .
Hereinafter cited as Guerrant, Comparisons and Contrasts.
Hoover often expressed admiration of Jefferson's views on
individual rights.
43noover, Individualism, 9. In a modified Puritan
ethic, he assimilated equality of opportunity and the service
state.
To H . H . , individual initiative operated in the
humanities, business, and politics. Milton Viorst, Fall From
Grace; The Republican Party and the Puritan Ethic (New
York, 1968), 8 , 165-166, describes Hoover as "the Puritan
larger-than-life," a man of conviction, fidelity, and
orthodoxy. Hoover wanted a "higher order of society for the
United States" and believed in the Puritan ethic as God's
blessing on those who helped themselves.
Even the depres
sion did not alter his conviction that it was each man's
duty to make himself secure.
See Mayer, The Republicans,
411; and Albert U. Romasco, The Poverty of Abundance: Hoover,
The Nation, The Depression (New York, 1965), 12. Herein
after cited as Romasco, Poverty of Abundance. Hargrove,
Presidential Leadership, 100, notes that Hoover saw federal
power as a constant threat and a limit to individual liberty.
Hence, he championed voluntary restraint or a minimum of
local and state regulation.
After construing a system in
his mind, he attempted to shape society by his intellectual
model.
As Commager, The American M i n d , 344, notes, Hoover
followed the Sumnerian example of constructing an abstract
set of principles and "deducing from them some ideal course of
action."
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o f the eighteenth century— the notion that it [was] every man
for himself and the devil take the hindmost."

The nation's

laws reflected that abandonment and Hoover was aware of the
f a c t .

^

concerning national wealth, he wrote in 1922 that

Americans had "learned that fair division can only be obtained
b y certain restrictions on the strong and dominant."

Ameri

cans had developed a social conscience and embraced "service
a n d responsibility to others as part of individualism."1^®
Hoover stressed the uniqueness of the American system
b y describing it as "not capitalism or socialism, or syndi
calism, nor a cross breed of them."

It was more enduring,

since it sprang "from the one source of human progress— that
ea c h individual shall be given the chance and stimulation
for development of the best with which he has been endowed
in heart and mind."

To Hoover, the "sole source of progress"

w a s American individualism.^®
What was the motivating factor in this American

^ H o o v e r , Individualism, 10. Herbert Hoover, Chal
lenge to Liberty (New York, 1934), 49. Hereinafter cited as
Hoover, Challenge to Liberty. Carl N. Degler, "The Ordeal
o f Herbert Hoover," Yale Review. LII (Summer, 1963), 564,
n o t e d the departure from laissez-faire and the "capitalism
o f Adam Smith." See also Mayer, The Republicans. 411.
^ H o o v e r , individualism, 10-11.
By 1934, in Challenge
to Liberty, 49, Hoover pointed to public education, public
health, public works, public stimulation of scientific
research, and even public action to combat depressions.
^ H o o v e r , Individualism, 12-13. He described American
individualism as a "special social system." For the simi
larity between Hoover's creed and that of William Graham
Sumner, see Fine, Laissez-Faire. 81-91.
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system?

"Intelligence, character, courage, and the divine

Sj_ ark of the human soul are alone the property of individ
uals."

Each individual must be individually moved.

most potent force in society is its i d e a l s . F o r

"The
Hoover,

ideas would always impede his perception of reality at the
very time that they gave it shape and meaning.
To Hoover, great ideas could be realized only through
education,

freedom, humaneness, service, and a reduction of

individual selfishness:
The w i l l - o ’-the wisp of all breeds of socialism is
that they contemplate a motivation of human animals
by altruism alone.
It necessitates a bureaucracy
of the entire population, in which, having obliterated
the economic stimulation of each member, the fine
gradations of character and ability are to be arranged
in relative authority.49
Hoover concluded that only fools thought men were equal in
ability, character, intelligence,

and ambition.

ment, however, could insure "li. ^rty,

justice,

The govern
intellectual

welfare, equality of opportunity and stimulation to
service.

& crucial responsibility of government was to

guarantee competition and the right of individuals to achieve
their destinies.

Economic freedom was as important as the

4?Hoover, Individualism, 14, 16. Hoover's creed pr o 
vided an opportunity for individual planning.
4 8 Ibid.,

16-17.

t 17>

5 0 Ibid., 19.
Shafer, "Heritage of Hope," 444, notes
that to H . H . , biological inequality made economic equality
impossible; thus competition was natural.
Spencer's bio
logical emphasis with its promotion of inevitability and
inequality is obvious.
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other freedoms.^
Leadership was another important principle in the
American system.

Here quality found expression through a

"free rise of ability, character, and intelligence."

Hence,

"progress of the nation [was] the sum of progress in its
individuals . ll^ 2

jn contrast to the individual. Hoover char

acterized the mass as emotional, mindless,
"It destroys, it consumes,
never builds."53

it hates,

and credulous.

and it dreams but it

paradoxically, Hoover was to reject this

idea of an emotional electorate in his political career.
American Individualism possessed a spiritual side,
for "men do not live by bread alone."

Individualism admitted

"the universal divine inspiration of every human soul."
placed a premium on service to one's fellow man.
spiritual progress depended on each individual.
was only one phase of American individualism.

It

Permanent
Economics

It also aimed

at providing "opportunity for self-expression spiritually."
Unlike European individualism, the American variety was
selfless.
Concerning property, Hoover noted an increasing
tendency on the part of Americans to see the "right of

^Hoover,
5 2 Ibid.,

Individualism. 19.
23-24.

53jbid.

S^Ibid., 7-8, 26-28, 31. To Hoover, all progress
depended on individual self-expression and creativity.
55ibid., 37-38.
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property not as an object in itself, but in the light of a
useful and necessary instrument in stimulation of initiative
to the individual.”

Equality of opportunity checked unre

strained c a p i t a l . ^

Sensible taxation reduced "excessive

individual accumulat ions."^

Too,

in Hoover's mind,

the

people were beginning to dominate the economy through stock
investments,

thus promoting the "spirit of community respon

sibility. "5S
Cooperation,

another key factor, was evidenced within

the business community and in public acceptance of service
and responsibility.

These qualities,

if added to construeC Q

tive leadership, would assure pr ogress.
recognized with dismay,

Yet,

as Hoover

"the Government [by 1922, had]

become through its relations to economic life, the most
potent force for the maintenance or destruction" of his
American individualism .8 8

8 8 Ibid.
Romasco, Poverty of Abundance, 12, demon
strates H.H.'s optimism that America was virtually classless,
that labor possessed social and economic mobility, and that
labor and capital had achieved harmony in a "concert of
interests."

^Hoover,
5 8 I b i d ..

Individualism. 39.
40.

5 9 I b i d ..

43-47.

8 8 I b i d .. 52.
Guerrant, Comparisons and Contrasts. 8 ,
notes Hoover's cautious ideas about government-business rela
tions.
To H.H., there were three options: unregulated
business or true laissez-faire, which had long been dis
carded; government regulation of business, which was the
"American system" and Hoover's course of action; and finally,
government-dictated business direction or involvement.
To
H.H. the N e w Deal took the third road.
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Hoover admitted past mistakes, especially the concen
tration of power in monopolies.

But regulatory legislation

had preserved equality of opportunity.

Thus, he accepted

some regulation as necessary but warned against government
participation within the economy at the productive or
distributive end.61

He was optimistic about progress,

education, public opinion, business morality, and public con
science.^

Yet, he admitted the need for certain reforms.

He condemned long work days, the uncertainty of employment,
inequality in bargaining power, child labor, and unfair
competition.63

He reaffirmed his belief in the inevitability

of progress which was attained through a traditional American
effort.

’’Progress must come from the steady lift of the

individual.”6 ^

As he expressed it in 1922,

"The failures

and unsolved problems of economic and social life can be
corrected:

they can be solved within our social theme and

under no other system . ” 66

SlHoover, Individualism, 52-54.
Guerrant, Comparisons
and Contrasts, 9, 18, notes H.H.'s acceptance of limited
regulation and his warning that the "laws of economics" were
as "inexorable as Newton's law of gravitation." Warren,
Great Depression, 34-35, speaks of Hoover's willingness to
regulate in order "to preserve individual competition, con
serve natural resources, prevent abuses, and protect
liberties.” Federal regulation should occur, however, only
where state and local governments could no longer protect
public interest.
See Romasco, Poverty of Abundance, 13, 16.
^Hoover,
6 3 I b i d .,

Individualism, 58,
59.

-6 5 Ibid., 71.

64.1bid., 60-67.
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Hoover's smorgasbord of ideas encompassed the tradi
tional American values:
individualism, energy,

efficiency, enterprise, opportunity,
success,

what he believed and why.

and progress .6 6

He knew

His credo was based on certain

fundamental ideas about the nature of man.

American indi

vidualism was, to him, time tested and proven.

To Hoover,

there was a certain sacredness, even a mysticism, permeating
it.

Moreover, he rationalized the contradictions or failures

within his system as atypical, abnormal or temporary.
always arrived at the same conclusion:

He

the American system,

with its emphasis on individualism, equality of opportunity,
freedom, and service, explained America's greatness.

This

idea of individualism became the driving force that shaped
his course as long as he lived.
During the 1920's, as a member of the Harding cabinet,
Hoover demonstrated the potential of his ideas.

He spurred

the Commerce Department to a course of fuller participation
in the American economy.

He advised business concerning its

domestic and international opportunities.

The federal

government.served business by reporting on the stability,
resources, needs, and requests of foreign

g o v e r n m e n t s . ^ " ?

^Guerrant, comparisons and Contrasts, 2. Richard
Hofstadter, The American Political Tradition (New York, 1948),
286. Hereinafter cited as Hofstadter, American Political
Tradition.
67Herbert Feis, The Diplomacy of the Dollar, 19191932 (Baltimore, 1950), 6-18.
Joseph Brandes, Herbert Hoover
and Economic Diplomacy, 1921-1928 (Pittsburgh, 1962), 7-15,
42. Hereinafter cited as Brandes, Economic Diplomacy.
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Hoover,

seeing expansion as essential for continued pros

perity, championed business interests.

To him, each invest

ment accelerated the opportunity for individuals to improve
their living standards . ® 8
As Commerce Secretary, Hoover fostered trade associa
tions and fair trade codes.
cooperation,

voluntarism,

He emphasized a maximum of

and local initiative.

Although he

endorsed the right of the federal government to umpire,
regulate,

stimulate, and even coerce, he preferred muted

actions, by degrees,

and his was a modified laissez-faire

policy.®®

His attitude was manifested in his views on unem

ployment.

Typically,

in the recession of 1921-1922, he

called a series of conferences, prodded and mobilized local
and state agencies, urged public works,

and pleaded with the

business community to maintain, even expand, production
levels.

He thought state and local governments could

encourage business-labor accord and minimize federal bureau
cratization.^®

The pattern that Hoover followed in 1922 was

®8William A. Williams, The Tracredv of American Diplo
macy (Cleveland, 1959), 58-59. William A. Williams, "LatinAmerica:
Laboratory of American Foreign Policy in the
Nineteen-Twenties," Inter-American Economic Affairs, II
(1957), 3-30.
Brandes, Economic Diplomacy, 65, 214-215.
See Eugene O. Golob, The "Isms”; A History and Evaluation
(New York, 1954), 119-120.
Hereinafter cited as Golob, The
"Isms."
®®Brandes, Economic Diplomacy, 217-220; Hoover,
American Individualism, 9-12; Warren, Great Depression.
34-35.
7®Warren,

II, 46.

Great Depression, 26-27; Hoover, M e m o i r s ,

one he would adhere to the rest of his life.
As a dominant and active cabinet member, Hoover prac
tically became ”a folk hero, the embodiment of the national
values of prosperity and efficiency .'1

As in the past, he

trained his subordinates "to dramatize their activities,"
consequently reflecting credit on their c h i e f 71
.Throughout
the 1 9 2 0 ’s, he basked in the sunshine of a friendly news
media.^

Convinced of the rightness of his ideology,

determined to advance the nation to a "new day,

11

and

the

philosopher of American individualism decided to seek the
presidency.

On August 2, 1927, when President Coolidge

issued his famous

”1

7 *3

do not choose to run,"'

the flood

gates were opened.

^ M a y e r , Republicans, 402-403.
American Political Tradition, 291.

See also Hofstadter,

72claire Nelsen, "The Image of Herbert Hoover as
Reflected in the American Press" (unpublished Doctor's disser
tation, Stanford University, 1956)', 199, 205. Hereinafter
cited as Nelsen, "Hoover Press Image."
73New York T i m e s . August 3, 1927, 1.

CHAPTER IX
POLITICS AND POWER
Throughout his political career, Herbert Hoover
encouraged the myth that he was "above politics."

His heavy

correspondence consistently reflects his sincerity in think
ing he was apolitical.
this b e l i e f .1

His lieutenants encouraged him in

Too, his political mistakes seemed to under-^

line his disinterest.

Much of his erroneous political judg

ment, however, was due to the inflexibility of his ideas.
He preferred defeat to a compromise on his principles.
Although he had a natural aversion to politics, never learning
to enjoy it, he displayed on occasions a knowledge of the
fundamental rules and even maneuvered for political advantage.
At politics. Hoover was an anachronism:
to criticism,

shy,

sensitive

addicted to worry, unable to admit an error, and

■^■Subsequent chapters will verify this contention.
The
Herbert Hoover Papers, Post Presidential Individual Pile,
Herbert Hoover Presidential Library, West Branch, Iowa,
abound in such references.
^Hicks, Republican Ascendancy, 217.
Hofstadter, Ameri
can Political Tradition, 293, describes Hoover as "a prisoner
of his economic views [who was] handicapped by his philosophy."
Rexford G. Tugwell, "The Protagonists:
Roosevelt and Hoover,"
Antioch Review, XIII (December, 1953), 421, sees Hoover im
mersed "in an ideology completely immune to events."
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• weighted by a "vein of arrogance."

3

.
. . .
His political liabili

ties would greatly affect his record as President.^

He

would never become an astute politician, partly because he
viewed politics as of secondary importance.

Ideas molded

his course.
One contemporary charges Hoover with nursing presi
dential ambitions "for over a decade" before 1928.^

At

least by 1920, his political aspirations and liabilities
surfaced.

As beneficiary of an extensive press promotion, he

emerged from World War I as a legendary hero.^

Consequently,

^Hofstadter, American Political Tradition, 293-294;
Moley, After 7 Y e a r s , 26; and Moos, The Republicans, 383.
Lippmann, "The Peculiar Weakness of Mr. Hoover," 3, sees
Hoover's distaste for "politicians and their countless accom
modations." Too, he was indecisive, especially in contro
versial matters.
Drew Pearson, Merry-Go-Round, 57-59, 63,
70, thought that Hoover was cold, vacillating, indecisive,
autocratic, and unforgiving.
^Davis, "Hoover:
Another Appraisal," 295; William
Allen White, Selected Letters of William Allen White (New
York, 1947), 293. White, L e t t e r s , 311-312, discusses H.H.'s
liabilities and concludes that every President must recog
nize politics even if it is "one of the minor branches of
harlotry."
See White, Autobiography. 634-635, and Burton K.
Wheeler, Yankee From The West (Garden City, 1962), 275, for
additional recognitions of Hoover's political inability.
As
Thomas A. Bailey, Presidential Greatness, 218, 317, notes,
"If a man cannot lead his party he cannot lead his people."
^George Creel, Rebel At Large

(New York, 1947),

266.

^Lippmann, "The Peculiar Weakness of Mr. Hoover," 1,
calls H . H . ’s reputation a "work of art." He was overpublicized, over-idealized, and over-sold.
As examples of
H.H.'s press coverage, see Edward E. Hunt, "Herbert Hoover,”
New Republic, VIII (September 30, 1916), 213-215; Editorial,
New York W o r l d . September 2, 1919; Editorial, "Herbert
Hoover, Master of Efficiency," Independent, LXXXIX (March 19,
1917), 447; and Editorial, "How Hoover Will Help Win,"
Literary Di g e s t . LIX (June 2, 1917), 1689.
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both major political parties were forced to recognize his
a v a i l a b i l i t y A f t e r months of indecision, he announced his
GOP leanings and faded to favorite-son status.^

Hoover,

desiring a cabinet post, permitted the boom to run its course
in order to maximize his bargaining powers after the elecQ
tion.
He utilized this political maneuver time and again
during the 1 9 2 0 ’s and 1930's.
From his 1920 e:xperience, Hoover learned that "an
amateur organization, led by close friends, was no match for
the professionals."

Too, he concluded that his independence

worried party politicians.'*'®

He decided to construct a base

^Louis B. Wehle, Hidden Threads of History (New York,
1953), 81-86, discusses the support of a Hoover-Roosevelt
ticket and the popularity of the Food Administrator within
Democratic circles.
Paul Glad, "Progressives and the Busi
ness culture of the 1920's," Journal of American History,
LIII (June, 1966}, 75-89, says that Hoover, like most poli
ticians, used the progressives' rhetoric and gained their
support because "he talked like one of them."
See H.H's
Memoirs, II, 40-56.
^C. H. Cramer, Newton D. Baker (Cleveland, 1961), 213,
notes Baker's depiction of H.H. as "a political schizophrenic"
who barely decided which party to join.
^Warren, Great Depression, 25.
1 ®Davis, "Hoover:
Another Appraisal," 303.
French
Strother, "Herbert Hoover," World's W o r k . XXXIX (1920), 578,
notes that the loyalty of Hoover's lieutenants was "almost a
form of worship." This loyalty would be significant in the
future. Walter E. Edge, A Jerseyman's Journal (Princeton,
1948), 121, 145, notes that H.H. represented the "independent
voters." Alice Roosevelt Longworth, Crowded Hours (New York,
1933), 306, 377, recalls that "no big league politician"
supported him because of his irregularity and his League
views.
Theodore Burton, an Ohio Republican leader, admired
H.H. because of his apolitical stance. Forrest Crissey,
Theodore E. Burton: American Statesman (Cleveland, 1956), 325.
Warren, Great Depression, 25, 256, points to the opposition of
Watson, Fess, and other Old Guard politicians.
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in the center of the party for his future operations .^
one veteran observer recalls,

As

"it was probably not chance

that placed so many enthusiastic backers in the gallery" in
1920.12
"Unlike most defeated candidates,

[Hoover] revived

his political availability by serving in the Harding and
Coolidge cabinets."
press.Aside

13

He continued to enjoy a popular

from his activist role as Secretary of Com

merce, Hoover gained invaluable publicity through the efforts
of George Akerson, an astute political reporter who served as
his private secretary.

Akerson embellished the Hoover image

and aided in the construction of a personal machine.
this latter effort, Walter F. Brown,

In

"the former Toledo

political boss" and Bull Mooser, who served under Hoover in
the Commerce Department, emerged as a permanent ally.

1R

With President Coolidge's August statement, the

■^Davis, "Hoover:
Another Appraisal," 306-307, empha
sizes H . H . ’s middle position.
Warren, Great Depression, viii,
labels H.H. a "terrapin Progressive" who was "too progressive
for the conservatives and too conservative for the radicals.”
For similar conclusions, see Moos, Republicans. 382, and
David Burner, The Politics of Provincialism (New York, 1967),
193-197.
-^Warren,

Great Depression, 25.

James W. Davis, Presidential Primaries (New York,
1967), 100-101.
For Hoover's maneuvers to gain a cabinet
post, see Shannon, Between the W a r s , 34-38; Selig Adler, The
Uncertain Giant (New York, 1965), 48; Murray, The Harding
E r a , 98-99; and H. H . , himself, in Memoirs, II, 36.
l^Nelsen,

"Hoover Press Image," 199-205.

-*■^Warren, Great Depression, 31.
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coterie of Hoover disciples burst into public activity.
Brown and Theodore Burton of Ohio, Ogden Mills, Edgar Rickard,
and Alan Fox of N e w York, and Mark Requa of California
mobilized Hoover forces at the state l e vel . ^
like Colonel R. G. Creager of Texas,

Professionals

as well as Perry Howard,

the Negro boss in Mississippi, and national committeeman Ben
J. Davis of Georgia,

all played key roles.

C. Bascom Slemp

of Virginia, a onetime Coolidge secretary brought blocs of
Southern delegates into the Hoover camp.

17

Although Old

Guard leaders attempted to impede the Hoover drive,

it was

l^Hoover, M e m oirs, IX, 191. With the exception of
Burton, all these war-relief associates remained close to
their Chief throughout their lives.
•^Moos, The Republicans, 370-371; Mayer, The Repub
licans. 404.
Hoover's Southern strategy attempted to softpedal his Negro support and win the endorsement of Democratic
dissidents who resented Al Smith's urban, "wet,” and Catholic
associations.
Paul Lewinson, Race, Class and Party (New
York, 1932), 154-175, credits Hoover with objectively work
ing both sides of the street.
Hoover, as a moderate, urged
a lowering of white primary restrictions and fully recog
nized the "black and tan" organizations in dispensing
patronage.
Yet, not content with Negro support alone, he
tried to broaden the base of the Dixie GOP. William E.
Leuchtenburg, Franklin p. Roosevelt And The New Deal, 19321940 (New York, 1963), 185, points to H.H.'s popularity with
Negro voters and his maintenance of their support even in
1932.
Ernest M. Collins, "Cincinnati Negroes and Presiden
tial Politics," Journal of Negro Hi s t o r y . XLI (April, 1956),
132-133, shows that H.H.'s totals in Negro districts swelled
to a record h igh of seventy-one per cent in 193 2.
See
Elbert Lee Tatum, The Changed Political Thought of the Negro,
1915-1940 (New York, 1951), 101-104.
Other observers have
castigated Hoover's 1928 strategy because it sacrificed the
Negro on the political altar.
Viorst, Puritan E t h i c . 164166; Schlesinger, Old O r d e r , 427; and Richard L. Watson, Jr.,
"The Defeat of Judge Parker:
A Study in Pressure Groups and
Politics." M V H R . L (September, 1963), 213-234.
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too late .1 8
In spite of the leaders' qualms over Hoover's politi
cal abilities, he adroitly played their game as evidenced by
his belated endorsement from Pennsylvania's "Boss" Vare and
Treasury Secretary Andrew Mellon.1^

Too, Hoover tried to

entice George Norris of Nebraska into the vice-presidential
spot.

When the liberal wing failed to rally around Hoover,

he turned to the conservative Senate cabal and selected
Charles Curtis of Kansas as his running mate . ^ 8

Hoover's

selection of Hubert Work as National Chairman demonstrated
his intention to lead the Party . ^ 1
In his 1928 campaign, Hoover held to the center of
the political spectrum.

It was "neither progressive, nor

l^Mayer, The Republicans, 402, 414; Moos, The Repub
licans , 382; and Degler, "Ordeal of Hoover," 580.
•L^Hicks, Republican Ascendancy, 201. Although H. L.
Mencken, Making A President (New York, 1932), 23-25, exag
gerates H.H.'s political ability, he underlines the can
didate's success in corralling the Negro vote, the support
of the Ohio Gang, the Anti-Saloon League, and the Mellon and
Vare machines.
For V a r e 's role, see William S. Vare, My
Forty Years in Politics (Philadelphia, 1933), 184-186, and
Morton Keller, In Defense of Yesterday (New York, 1958),
123-135, 200.
Thomas L. Stokes, Chip Off My Shoulder
(Princeton, 1940), 224, 291, sees M e l l o n ’s endorsement of
H. H. as the turning point.
Stokes describes H.H. as a
"poor politician" who "swept vainly against the tide.
The
smart politician rides with it." Hereinafter cited as
Stokes, Chip Off My Shoulder.
9f)
Roy V. Peel and Thomas C. Donnelly, The 1928 Cam
paign (New York, 1931), 21-30. Hereinafter cited as Peel
and Donnelly, 1928 C ampaign.
^ M o o s , The Republicans, 373-374. Work, the Secre
tary of Interior, was a minor figure even in Coolidge's
undistinguished cabinet.

28
np
conservative."^

Although Hoover's campaign included the

usual chicanery and ambivalence,

at times he revealed a sur

prising candor concerning his beliefs and intentions.

His

"New Day" addresses promised constructive legislation on the
tariff, agriculture, conservation,

and public works.

Sig

nificantly, he reaffirmed his devotion to "American Individ
ualism . " 23
On June 14, 1928, at the Republican National Conven
tion, Hoover spoke optimistically of the future.
for moral leadership.
said:

He called

Regarding the role of government he

" [It] is more than administration; it is power for

leadership and cooperation with the forces of business and
cultural life m

the city, town, and countryside." ^

He saw

the Presidency as "the inspiring symbol of all that is
highest in America's purposes and ideals . ” 2 5
In a most revealing speech at West Branch, Iowa, the
Republican nominee said:

"We must accept what is inevitable

in the changes that have taken place.

It is fortunate indeed

that the principles upon which our government was founded
require no alteration to meet these changes . " 2 5

Despite this

^ E d g a r E. Robinson, The Roosevelt leadership, 19331945 (Philadelphia, 1955), 36-37.
See Glad, "Progressives
and the Business Culture of the 1920's," 87-89.
^^Warren, Great Depression, 43; Robinson, Roosevelt
Leadership, 36-37, 53-54; and Herbert Hoover, The New Day
(Stanford, 1928).
24

Ibid.. 3, 5.

2 5 Hoover,

New D a y , 50-51.

^!5ibid., 43.
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notion. Hoover was not entirely inflexible.

He saw p r o s 

perity and employment as national concerns "which government
m a y contribute to solve."^

por a decade, he had championed

efficiency and economy as means to higher living standards.
He sincerely believed that his program steered a middle
course between business and labor.

28

Hoover expected national progress to be attained "by
voluntary action assisted with co-operation by the govern
ment."

The test of the American system was

cure its own a b u s e s . H o o v e r

"its capacity to

recognized the existence of

abuses and the need for reform in his repeated warnings of
future centralization,

government competition with business,

bureaucratic excesses,

regulation,

and challenges to the

American system.^0

2 ?I b i d . , 64, 182-183.
Hoover thought that the govern
ment could legitimately promote public works, public educa
tion, and assist in the fulfillment of general economic
goals.
He doggedly stuck to these areas during the depres
sion .
2 ^I b i d ., 77-81.
On page twenty-six of his acceptance
speech, H.H. praised labor as a "staunch supporter of Ameri
can individualism and American institutions."
Labor had
"steadfastly opposed subversive doctrines from abroad.”

^ % e w York T i m e s , October 7, 1928, 1.
Even the
depression did not alter H.H.'s belief in this principle.
3 0 Hoover, New D a y , 155-157, 161, 167, 171-178.
H.H.
said that proposals "in the winds" would lead to "state
socialism" w i t h its ensuing economic intervention, marked by
fixed prices, regulated purchases and sales, and the loss of
"equality of opportunity." He warned that an expanding
bureaucracy w o uld "comprise a political machine at the dis
posal of the party" in power.
He also expressed fear that
legislatures might delegate too much power to the executive
branches.

During the 1928 campaign, Hoover enunciated firmly
held convictions regarding the relation of international
economies and social systems to continued prosperity at
home.31

He said:

’’Government co-operation in promoting

foreign trade is even more important for the future than it
has been for the p a s t . ”32

He defined the relation of Ameri

can prosperity to international good times and, characteris
tically,

stated that both were "due to the hard-working

character and increasing efficiency of our people,

and to

sound government policies."33
By the close of the campaign, Hoover's inherent opti
mism was shining brightly'as he spoke of a golden land of
opportunity,

a country "where [men] enjoy the advantages of

wealth, not concentrated in the hands of the few but spread
through the lives of all,” a land where people,

"free from

poverty and fear, have the leisure and impulse to seek a
fuller life.”34

In urging national harmony, he stated,

"We

are a nation of progressives; we differ as to what is the
road to progress."

Only time revealed the degree of

3ii b i d ., 125 ff. Hoover adopted the international
line at Boston, on October 15, 1928.
Throughout the 1 9 3 0 ’s
he would define the depression as global.
3 2 Ibid.

33Ibi d ., 126, 139.

3^Hoover, Hew D a y . 176.
Leadership, 36-37, 47.

See Robinson, Roosevelt

35noover, New D a y , 213.
5, 1928, 1.

See New York T i m e s , November

31
difference dividing the nation in its selection of a means
to progress.
Although Hoover had revealed much in his 1928 campaign,
he had also concealed certain v i e w s .

He showed political

adroitness in skirting the prohibition issue.

Partly,

this

was due to the fact that "his public utterances were in sharp
contrast to strong opinions that he held and expressed in
private."3®

He was a reluctant "dry" and although he labeled

prohibition a "noble experiment," at least in private, he
doubted the effort to legislate morality.

17
'

His public

stance won him the support of Progressive Senators William
E. Borah of Idaho and Smith Brookhart of Iowa.3®

Undoubtedly,

Hoover's equivocation expanded his November victory margin.3®
Although religion influenced many voters in 1928, it
did not determine the final verdict.

Smith's Catholicism

even proved an asset in some urban a r e a s . T h e

3 ®Davis,

"Hoover:

main issues

Another Appraisal," 301.

3 ^Warren, Great Depression, 45-46.
expressions see his New D a y , 29, 104.

For Hoov e r 1s public

38warren, Great Depression, 43.
3®William F. Ogburn and Nell S. Talbot, "A Measurement
of the Factors in the Presidential Election of 1928," Social
Forces, VIII (December, 1929), 175-183.
^ R i c h a r d A. Watson, "Religion and Politics in MidAmerica:
Presidential Voting in Missouri, 1928 and I960,”
Midcontinent-American Studies Journal, V (Spring, 1964), 3355. Watson denies the alleged significance of religion in
the 1928 campaign and proves that religion even helped Smith
in some areas. The Happy Warrior gained 16 per cent in St.
Louis and ran better than his two predecessors, even carrying
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were Hooverism and prosperity.

The majority of the country

was Republican in the 1920's, and a dry, rural, dynamic
Protestant Democrat could not have defeated Hoover in 1928.
To millions of voters, Hoover was the symbol of a new
economic opportunity.

He encouraged this false notion and

momentarily capitalized on it as he crushed Smith by a popular
vote of 21,385,413 to 14,980,778.
to eighty-seven.^-*-

The electoral vote was 444

The election concluded. Hoover prepared

to implement the program he had outlined in his campaign.
In the months ahead his principles would be severely tested.
In his inaugural address, Hoover reiterated his

fundamentalist, supposed anti-Catholic rural Missouri.
V. 0.
Key, Southern Politics {New York, 1949), 318-329, found that
in heavy black areas, Democrats stayed with Smith, and Key
suggests it was from traditional fear of Republicans and
their racial views.
Paul A. Carter, "The Other Catholic
Candidate: The 1928 Presidential Bid of Thomas J. Walsh,"
Pacific Northwest Quarterly, LV (January, 1964), 1-8, denies
the importance of the religious issue by showing that many
Democrats who opposed Smith favored Catholic Tom Walsh for
the nomination.
Carter concludes that Smith's ties with the
city and his "wet" stance alienated many Democrats.
41-Elmer Davis, "Hoover the Medicine Man," Forum
(October, 1930), 198, says that H.H. won "for the same reason
that would have led Americans under the age of ten to elect
Santa Claus."
Samuel Lubell, Revolt of the Moderates (New
York, 1956), 34-35, 40-41, 50, 130, 169, 212; Peel and
Donnelly, Campaicm of 1932. 71, 121-124, review the 1928
issues; Richard Hofstadter, "Could a Protestant Have Beaten
Hoover in 1928?" The Reporter (March 17, 1960), 31-33, says
that religion worked both ways.
To Hofstadter, the fact that
Smith outgained H.H. by a million votes minimizes the impor
tance of the religious issue.
Burner, Politics of Provin
cialism. 193-197, notes that H.H. hogged the middle of the
road.
GOP business policy assured conservative support,
while H.H. appealed to progressives as noted in his public
endorsement by forty-five of the nation's best-known sixtysix social workers.
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determination to maintain the American system, to economize
on public expenditures, to reorganize executive agencies, to
broaden public works,

and to promote equality of opportunity.

He indicated that his administration would seek a middle
path responsive to all economic interests, controlled by
none . ^ 2
Hoover's honeymoon as President was short.
after he assumed the presidency,

Six months

the stock market crashed,

and soon thereafter, business stagnated and unemployment
lines elongated.
its complexity,

The Great Depression was a new problem in
its depth, its duration.

evoked was also new. J

The poverty it

The times demanded an aggressive,

practical politician, whereas Hoover was a cautious,
istic, political neophyte.

ideal

His disdain for politics,

politicians, and the political traditions surfaced at the
very moment he needed the support of his congressional and
party leaders.

He not only refused to recognize the basic

political amenities, he insisted on drafting detailed depres
sion policies and then submitting them to Congress without
even elucidating his own congressional l e a d e r s . ^

4 2 Concf.

R e c ., 71 Cong.,

Spec. Sess.

Possibly

(March 4, 1929),

4-7.
4.3

Romasco, Poverty of Abundance, 3. Harris G.
W a r r e n 's Herbert Hoover And The Great Depression is the best
study on Hoover's depression policies.
^ H a r g r o v e , Presidential Leadership, 98-116.
Har
grove's is a superb analysis of H.H.'s executive assets and
liabilities.
See Viorst, Puritan E thic, 165-170; Warren,

34
his professional training, his years in war relief activi
ties,

and his power as Commerce Secretary had accustomed him

to handing down orders.
Although his ideological framework severely limited
his actions, Hoover pursued what at times must he called an
activist p o l i c y . ^

His legislative proposals invariably

emphasized "voluntary compliance rather than government
coercion" and involved state and local d i r e c t i o n . ^
only offended Congress, he also alienated the press.

He not
Since

he deeply resented criticism, he played favorites among the
reporters and on occasions tried to muzzle various topics.
His efforts to minimize the depression were carried to an
extreme and stirred serious doubts concerning his program.
His failure to mold public opinion proved to be his most

Great Depression, 60-62, notes the GOP division in Congress
and H.H.'s failure to recognize the threat the insurgents
posed for his political control; Dixon Wecter, The Age of the
Great Depression, 1929-1941 {New York, 1948), 40-45, notes
that H.H. lacked "political comaraderie, communicable p e r 
sonal warmth [or] thrilling leadership."
As Hargrove, Presi
dential Leadership, 107-108, says, H.H. refused "to employ a
strategy of manipulative leadership in Congress" because such
action conflicted with his values.
^Hargrove,

Presidential Leadership, 98.

4^Ibid.. 100-101.
See Warren, Great Depression, 53,
114; Victor L. Albjerg, "Hoover: The Presidency in Transi
tion," Current Hist o ry, XXXIX (October, 1960), 213-219, sees
H.H. as gradually moving toward an activist role, expanding
federal power and assuming responsibility for solving the
depression.
To Albjerg, Hoover was "the last of the oldtype chief executives, and the first of the new."

35
serious mistake.

4.7

Even when Hoover found positive solutions to the
nation's problems,

the necessity of political action or an

infringement on his ideology would result in an impasse.

A

typical example was his Research Committee on Social Trends.
As the epitome of his convictions and experience, this group
of distinguished economists,

sociologists, psychologists,

and political scientists me t as a committee, exchanged a
magnitude of information, exhibited a cooperative spirit,
related facts,

and proposed a variety of reforms in their

monumental Recent Social Trends of the United States.

As

their reforms relied on a forceful federal implementation
and would necessitate political action, Hoover neglected to
AO.

capitalize on thexr efforts. °
In a series of conferences, Hoover called on the
nation's economic leaders,
policy advisers.

its agricultural experts,

and its

Despite his energy and his sincerity, his

insistence that all agreements and programs be cemented by a

^ H a r g r o v e , Presidential Leadership. 103-107.
To
Hargrove, H.H.'s inability to dramatize his efforts led to
an inevitable conclusion that he was doing nothing.
He
failed to elicit either party or public loyalty because he
spoke of facts and figures and ignored the emotional or
personal side of the public.
^ B a r r y D. Karl, "Presidential Planning and Social
Science Research:
Mr. Hoover's Experts," Perspectives in
American History, III (1969), 347-409.

*
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voluntary cooperation and self-regulation assured defeat. ^
H o o v e r ’s inflexibility and ideological imprisonment
were repeatedly reflected in his policies.

Since he viewed

the farmer as an individualist who could control his own
destiny with a minimum of federal assistance, Hoover's Agri
cultural Marketing Act of 1929 established a Federal Farm
Board with limited powers, dependent on the voluntary coop
eration of individual farmers.

The Board could purchase

surpluses thus stabilizing prices during abnormal periods.
The fallacy was evident when surpluses continued to mount
and prices continued to fall.

^ H a r g r o v e , Presidential Leadership, 111-112, 115.
As Degler, ’’Hoover Ordeal," 566, 573-575, points out, H.H.
was acting positively in pressing business-labor leaders to
freeze wages, prices, and jobs at existing levels.
The
voluntary codes served as blueprints for the NRA.
On this
latter point, see Wecter, Great Depression, 55; Hargrove,
Presidential Leadership, 112; and Walter Lippmann, "The
Permanent New Deal," Yale Review, XXXV (June, 1935), 649667.
Also see Hofstadter, American Political Tradition,
301; Warren, Great Depression. 118-119; and Paul Conkin, The
N e w Deal (New York, 1967), 28.
SOQuerrant, Comparisons and Contrasts. 32-37; Warren,
Great Depression. 168-172; Wilbur and Hyde, Hoover Policies.
154-157, 167, 182-187; Hargrove, Presidential Leadership.
109-110; Hofstadter, American Political Tradition, 305-306.
Fusfeld, Origins of The N e w Deal, 225, and John D. Hicks and
Theodore Saloutos, Agricultural Discontent in the Middle
West. 1900-1939 (Madison, 1951), 452, 556-557, conclude that
H.H. 's farm program furnished the base for the N e w Deal
agricultural program.
Hoover himself, in State Papers. I,
34, reaffirmed the importance of methods in seeking recovery.
He said that bureaucratic domination of farmers would be a
disaster and that voluntarism was a necessity.
He never
accepted the idea of regulation.
See James H. Shideler,
"Herbert Hoover and the Federal Farm Board Project, " M V H R .
XLII (Fall, 1956), 710-729.
For the rest of his life, H.H.
never deviated from his belief that agriculture was basically
sound.

37Hoover's political liabilities surfaced in the fight
to revise the tariff.

He split his party ranks, lost con

trol of his Congressional majority, and then fell silent at
the crucial moment.

The Hawley-Smoot Tariff Act of June 15,

1930, a most controversial bill, reflected a selfish nation
alism in raising duties on limitless items and negating
international trade to an extent that other countries
followed s u i t . ^

The President ignored the pleas for a veto

and signed the bill.5^

Newspapers began to talk of a "weak

and indecisive" President.
In an effort to expand credit, Hoover approved the
establishment of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation to
loan money to banks, railroads, and insurance companies.
his mind,

In

the RFC's aim was assistance, not substitution,

for private enterprise.
with his philosophy,

Too, the program was consistent

for the loans were to be repaid and it

was assumed they would lubricate the economy through increased
i
___________________

^^-Hargrove, Presidential Leadership, 109-110, ana
Walter Lippmann, "The Peculiar Weakness of Mr. Hoover," 3,
agree that the President was at his worst on the tariff
fight and that he allowed the Old Guard to outmaneuver him.
Also see George E. Mowry, "The Uses of History by Recent
Presidents," MVHR. LII (June, 1966), 8-9; Warren, Great
Depression, 84-97; Wilbur and Hyde, Hoover Policies, 167,
182-187; and Thomas A. Bailey, Presidential Greatness (New
York, 1966), 142, 152.
52jjargrove, Presidential Leadership. 110; Warren,
Great Depression, 88-91.
5^Hargrove, Presidential Leadership, 110.
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works projects, home loans, and agricultural c r e d i t s . ^

The

President also insisted on a reduction in government expencc
ses and a n e w effort to balance the budget. 3 Although
Hoover recommended tax increases and a manufacturing tax.
Congressional amendments negated his p l a n . ^

Reluctantly,

the President stretched his ideology to the point of
approving federal loans to the states for relief purposes.

57

As federal plans began to transgress the invisible lines of
state and local powers,

even on a temporary basis, Hoover

reached the end of his string.

Although he h ad promised

"the aid of every resource of the Federal Government" should

5%)egler, "Hoover Ordeal," 558-573, 582.
Degler notes
the influence of the War Finance Corporation of World War X
in the creation of the RFC.
It should be pointed out that
Hoover saw even the RFC as a temporary establishment which
would pass from the scene with the termination of the
depression.
As Hofstadter, Political Tradition, 303, and
Golob,
The "Isms, " 122, note, H.H. expected the RFC to
facilitate business recovery, but on its own initiative.
The best analysis of the "trickle-down" theory is found in
Warren, Great Depression, 34-37, 67-71, 143-147, 155-158.
Two observers thought the RFC marked the beginning of the
N e w Deal.
Davis, "Hoover:
Another Appraisal," 309, and an
article, "New Deal's Seeds," Literary Digest, CXVII (June 23,
1934), 12.
On the RFC, see Eugene Meyer, "From Laissez
Faire With William Graham Sumner to the RFC," Public P o l i c y ,
V (1954), 3-27, and Gerald Nash, "Herbert Hoover And The
Origins of the RFC," M V H R , XLVI (December, 1959), 455, 468.
Both observers conclude that H.H. reluctantly agreed to the
creation of the RFC.
^5 Degler,

"Hoover Ordeal," 568-569,

5£»I b i d ., 573; Warren,

582.

Great Depression, 158-162.

^ T h e Emergency Relief and Construction Act of 1932
created a fund of $300,000,000 which the RFC loaned to the
states to relieve the unemployed.
Degler, "Hoover Ordeal,"
571-572; Warren, Great Depression, 141-147, 206-207.

the emergency necessitate it, he expressed confidence that
such a day would never come.^

In Hoover's mind,

it never

did.
In the field of labor, Hoover spoke of individuals
searching for their own destiny.

He bitterly opposed "closed

shops" and reluctantly signed the Norris-LaGuardia Act of
1932 which outlawed yellow-dog contracts and curtailed the
power of the courts to issue injunctions in labor disputes.
Yet, he defended the necessity and right to unionize.

He

hoped for a cooperative and classless labor spirit and
praised unions for stabilizing "our institutions in their
fight against red radicalism.
On the positive side. Hoover repeatedly demonstrated
his administrative skills.
were commendable.

His federal court appointments

He effected a thorough reorganization

^®Wilbur and Hyde, Hoover Policies. 376. Concerning
H.H.'s fear of destroying individual initiative, emasculating
state and local agencies, and politics in relief, see
Guerrant, Comparisons and contrasts, 20-24; Degler, "Hoover
Ordeal," 573-575; Wilbur and Hyde, Hoover Policies. 375; and
Hofstadter, Political Tradition, 307.
S^Guerrant, comparisons and Contrasts. 60-64.
See
Wilbur and Hyde, Hoover Policies. 118, 121, and Milton
Derber (ed.), Labor and the Mew Deal (Madison, 1957), 182183, for varying evaluations of H.H.'s labor policy.
Degler,
"Hoover Ordeal," 565, 575, concludes that the New Deal did
not better H.H.'s record since unemployment remained around
ten million while production levels of 1939 were even lower
than in 1929.
^ H a r g r o v e , Presidential Leadership. 115. Arthur B.
Tourtellot, An Anatomy of American Politics (New York, 1950),
140. H.H. appointed Charles Evans Hughes, Benjamin Cordozo,
and Owen Roberts to the Supreme Court.

40
of the White House s e c r e t a r i a t . ^

He elicited cooperative

action by the economic and political elite during the 1930
drought in the S o u t h w e s t . ^

president, Hoover promoted

an international moratorium on war debts.

In a rare moment,

he obtained Congressional approval of his plan.®^

He scored

victories in his conservation policy and his record-breaking
public works programs.

Yet, he refused to move beyond cer

tain b o u n d a r i e s . ^
More and more, he came to play a negative role through
his vetoes, his inflexible opposition to direct relief,

and

his vehement denunciation of public power and social
security.^

As his pique at Congressional insubordination

61-Hargrove, Presidential Leadership, 114-115.

62ibid .
^ % a r r e n , Great Depression, 131-136; Wilbur and Hyde,
Hoover P o licies, 408-410; Davis, "Hoover:
Another Appraisal,”
315-316.
As an internationalist in his economic thinking,
H.H. saw the complexity and interdependency of war debts,
credits, bond issues, and other economic ties.
The m o r a 
torium was to last for one year, July, 1931, to July, 1932.
Congress refused to consider cancellation.
Warren, Great
Depression, 132-136.
64on conservation, see Franklin L. Burdette (ed.),
Readings For Republicans (New York, 1960), 177; Warren, Great
D epression. 63-65; Hicks, Republican Ascendancy, 216; and
Noggle, Teapot D o m e , 209-210.
In Origins of the New D e a l ,
225, Daniel Fusfeld sees H.H. breaking with his philosophy
in pushing the federal government's involvement in conserva
tion.
In public works projects, Hoover spent over two
billion dollars and secured employment for a million men.
Warren, Great Depression, 66-67, and Degler, "Hoover Ordeal,"
566-567.
^Romasco,

poverty of Abundance, 231-232,

229.
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accelerated, he pulled the most unpardonable faux pas and
accused Congress of irresponsibility .8 8

with a careless

disregard for restraint, he attempted to create a psychology
of confidence at the worst possible moment during the depres
sion.^^

Once he lost the public, his admonitions that the

nation's greatest problem was fear passed unheard .8 8

Time

was running out.
Bonus Expeditionary Force veterans of World War I
marched on Washington in the summer of 1932.
their families and unemployed dissidents,

Accompanied by

the veterans poured

into the capital city and insisted on the long-promised
bonus payments.

When Congress refused,

settled in the slummish Anacostia Flats.

some stragglers
Fearful of the

security risk, Hoover decided to remove the temporary resi
dents and sent in federal troops to implement his plan.
army was over-zealous in its task and violence occurred.

The
As

Hoover feared, the incident with its political overtones left

8 8 Hargrove,

Presidential Leadership, 111.

8 ^Davis, "Hoover:
Another Appraisal," 301.
Davis
notes that H.H.'s "public utterances were in sharp contrast
to strong opinions that he held and esqpressed in private."
Warren, Great Depression, 114, agrees.
8 8 Warren, Great Depression, 114; Degler, "Hoover
Ordeal," 575, 589; Hofstadter, Political Tradition, 301.
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a decided bitterness in the minds of many voters.
Although Hoover's attitudes on public power and
social security conformed to his ideology, they did not
increase his political appeal.

Moreover, his insinuations

concerning the patriotism of his opponents added no lustre
to his own image.

In vetoing the Muscle Shoals Bill, he

called it "the negation of the ideals on opportunity upon
70

which our civilization has been b a s e d . " A s
security,

there were "no short cuts."

«

to social

This individual matter

must be resolved "upon a cult of work, not a cult of

6 ^a recent study of the Bonus Army episode and its
political significance, based on manuscript materials,
holds General Douglas MacArthur responsible for the initial
blunder but points to H.H.'s political insensibility as the
cause for the enlargement and detonation of the situation.
Donald J. Lisio, "A Blunder Becomes Catastrophe:
Hoover,
the Legion, and the Bonus Army," Wisconsin Magazine of His
tory, LI (Autumn, 1967) , 37-50.
See Warren, Great Depres
sion, 227-236; Schlesinger, Old O r der, 257-267; Hoover,
Memoirs, III, 225-232.
Douglas MacArthur, Reminiscences
(New York, 1964), 94-97, defends the BEF expulsion, whereas
Paul Y. Anderson bitterly denounces the President in "Tear
Gas, Bayonets, and Votes," Nation, CXXXV (August 17, 1932),
138-139; "Wanted:
Strong Men and Radical Measures," Nation.
CXXXVI (March 15, 1933), 386-387? and "The End of Herbert
Hoover," Nation, CXKXV (November 16, 1932), 470-471.

7°Wilbur and Hyde, Hoover Policies, 317; Davis,
"Hoover:
Another Appraisal," 309; Warren, Great Depression.
72-83. H.H. continually opposed government competition with
business in the area of public power.
The most critical
contemporary article on "Hoover and Power," N a t i o n , CXXXIII
(August 12, 1931), 151-152, by Amos Pinchot, holds the
President with encouraging exploitation of public power
resources.

leisure.The

President had exhausted every traditional

method of checking the slump.

By failing in so many areas,

by proving the inadequacy of his voluntarism and individ
ualism, he had prepared the way for a New Deal.*^

For months

ideas and images, rather than realities, had shaped his
thought and action.
Hoover alienated his party and the public.

Aware of

the President's handicaps, professional politicians exhibited
"low morale, if not m u t i n y . " ^
Only a small clique prepared
1A
to defend him.
Notwithstanding, the President's forces
controlled the Republican Convention which convened in
Chicago in June,

1932.

Convention Chairman.

Senator Simeon Fess of Ohio was the
Senator Lester Dickinson of Iowa was

^ H oover, Memoirs, II, 312-319; Guerrant, Comparisons
and Contrasts, 80-82.
Although Hoover continued to see
social security as an individual matter, his Research Com
mittee on Social Trends outlined most of the 1935 Social
Security Act. Warren, Great Depression, 168.
^ R o m a s c o ,
poverty of Abundance, 229-231-232.
Golob,
The "Isms , 11 122, says Hoover was a trail blazer for the New
Deal.

^ F r a n k Freidel, Franklin D. Roosevelt: The Triumph
(Boston, 1956), 323-325.
See Hargrove, Presidential Leader
ship, 115-117.
74lbid. f 365.
See Henry L. Stimson, On Active Service
In Peace and War {New York, 1948), 284-285; Ogden Mills, "In
Defense of Hoover Policies, 11 Review of Reviews, LXXXVI
(August, 1932), 39-40; Vernon Kellogg, "The President As I
Know H i m , " Atlantic Monthly, CL (July, 1932), 1-12; and Mark
Sullivan, "The Case for the Administration," Fortune, VI
(July, 1932), 34-39, 83-84, 8 6 -8 8 . One observer concludes
that the professionals wanted Hoover to serve as scapegoat
while they gained control of party machinery. Walter Lippmann, Interpretations, 1931-1932 (New York, 1932), 290.
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the keynoter.

Mark Requa, Harrison Spangler, Assistant

Secretary of the N a v y Ernest Jahncke,
Creager,

all Hooverites,

Finally,

six cabinet members,

Walter F. Brown,
tion.

and Colonel R. G.

dominated the National Committee.
including Postmaster General

accentuated the Hoover tone of the conven

They readily renominated the President . ^ 5
Although Hoover had hoped to ignore the campaign,

the

results of the September election in Maine awakened h im to
his precarious p o s i t i o n . ^

Thereafter, he not only defended

his record but launched an aggressive effort to point up the
77

vacillations of his opponent. ''

The 1932 campaign was unusually vituperative.

Both

parties and both candidates exercised little restraint in
their personal attacks.

Roosevelt stigmatized the Presi

dent's record as "The Four Horseman— Destruction, Delay,
Deceit and Despair."^®
sive,

incompetent,

He accused Hoover of being "indeci-

and lacking in leadership."

79

In his most

75

Twentieth Republican National Convention (New York,
1932), 7, 18-20, 226, 327.
For H o o v e r 1s acceptance speech see
pp. 247-263.
H. L. Mencken, Making A President, 45-48, says
Larry Richey guarded the convention for H . H . , while Dickinson,
the Iowa keynoter, "an old-time political hack of the cow
state model, " howled "his canned speech in a loud and hearty
m a n n e r ."
76pr e idel, FDR. The T r i u m p h , 325, 365.
H.H. informed
Stimson that the GOP would lose every state west of the
Alleghenies.
Stimson, On Active Service, 284-285.
^Warren,

Great Depr e s s i o n . 256.

7®Samuel I. Rosenman (ed.), Public Papers and Addresses
of Franklin D. Roosevelt (New York, 1938), I, 831.
79warren,

Great D e p r e s s i o n , 260.

45
ironic speech, FDR denounced Hoover's "novel, radical and
unorthodox economic theories" and promised to reduce federal
expenditures by twenty-five per cent if he were elected.

He

dubbed Hoover's policies as "the most reckless and extrava
gant . . .

of any peacetime Government, anywhere, any

time.
Hoover, remembering his uncle's sagacious advice, had
turned the other cheek and now determined to give as good as
he would receive.

By September his bitterness surfaced when

he denounced the opposition for advocating "a social philosQ]
ophy different from the traditional o n e . H e called FDR
"a chameleon on plaid" and publicly questioned the nominee's
p a t r i o t i s m . F o l l o w i n g his example, Republican orators
said that the "new deal" was a "shuffle," a deal "from the
QO
bottom of the deck," and so many "stacked cards."
Both
candidates would well remember this campaign.
Despite Hoover's warning that the contest was one
"between two philosophies of government" and that his defeat
would lead to the destruction of "the very foundations of

^ R o s e n m a n (ed.), FDR Papers, I, 795-812. H . H . ’s
pique accelerated at the zealous character assassination by
Charley Michelson's well-oiled propaganda machine.
Irwin,
Propaganda And The News (New York, 1936), 290-300? Allen,
Since Yesterday, 31.
^Burns,

Lion and Fo x , 139-145.

S^Moley, After 7 Years. 64.
8 ^Ibid.; peel and Donnelly, 1932 Campaign, 147-148;
Don Lohbeck, Patrick J. Hurley (Chicago, 1956), 127, 133,
136.
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84
our American system,,10^ the voters were more impressed by
their meager pay checks, the soup kitchens,
they yearned for c h a n g e . 8 8
depression,

its incongruity,

was decisive.

To them, Hoover symbolized the
its confusion .8 8

rejection

Only six states with fifty-nine electoral

votes sustained the incumbent President.
popular votes to FDR's 22,815,539.
control of both houses of Congress.
telegram

and bread lines;

He polled 15,759,930

The Democrats gained
87

In his congratulatory

to Roosevelt,

the President promised "every
QD
possible helpful effort."
The Interregnum had begun.
The battle scars of the campaign were deep and open.

84uew York T i m e s , November 1, 1932.
See Fusfeld,
Origins of the N e w D e a l , 249-250.
To H.H., the election
would determine the direction of American society for "over
a century to come." Hoover, M e m o i r s , III, 343.
85Elmer Davis, "Hoover and H u b r i s , " New R e p u b l i c ,
LXXIII (November 16, 1934), 7-9; Wecter, Great D e p r e s s i o n ,
51.
See Walter Lippmann, "A Reckoning:
Twelve Years of
Republican Rule," Yale R e v i e w , XXI (Summer, 1932), 647-660.
As Peel and Donnelly, 1932 C a m p a i g n , 122, 179, note, anyone
could have beaten H.H.
86

1928-1938

Burns, Lion and F o x , 144; Louis Adamic, M y America,
(New York, 1932), 304.

8 ^New York T i m e s . November 9-10, 1932, 1.
E. Francis
Brown, "Roosevelt's Victorious Campaign," Current H i s t o r y .
XXXVII (December, 1932), 257-265; Peel and Donnelly, 1932
C a m p a i g n , 215-225; Samuel Lubell, Future of American Politics
(New York, 1951), 34-35, 42-43, 49-51, 169-170, 176, 212.
Samuel J. Eldersveld, "The Influence of Metropolitan Party
Pluralities in Presidential Elections Since 1920," Political
Science R e v i e w , XLIII (December, 1949), 1189-1206.
Accord
ing to Eldersveld, metropolitan pluralities were the
decisive factor in 1932 and thereafter.
Also see James M.
Cox, Journey Through M y Years (New York, 1946), 340-341.
S^New York T i m e s , November 9, 1932,

1.
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Yet, the President pressed Roosevelt for a conference.
Whether motivated by personal, political, or nationalistic
reasons, the two men met and discussed the nation's prob
lems.

After gaining no satisfaction from the President

elect, Hoover submitted his own program to Congress in
December.

When the Lame Duck Congress failed to act, he

accused it of playing politics.®^1
In January, the nation struck a new nadir.
Duck Congress,

The Lame

inclined toward obstruction, accelerated its

negative action by overriding the President's vetoes and by
forcing publication of the RFC loans.

Roosevelt denounced

the President's sales tax proposals and the second RooseveltHoover conference failed to accomplish anything tangible.
unemployment,

labor strikes,

As

and farm revolts accelerated,

®^Henry Esli Everman, "The Hoover-Roosevelt Interre
gum: November,. 1932-March, 1933" (unpublished Master's
thesis, Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge, 1965), 24,
38-64, 152-153.
Hereinafter cited as Everman, "HooverRoosevelt Interregnum." Hoover hoped to enact hi s antidepression ideas by working through the President-elect.
FDR's noncommittal attitude incensed Hoover. Concerning the
November meeting, see Moley, After 7 Y e a r s , 68-77; Hoover,
M e m o i r s , III, 178-183; N e w York Times, November 13, 15, 18,
and 23, 1932, 1; and T i m e . XX (December 5, 1932), 9-10.
^Everman, "Hoover-Roosevelt Interregnum, 11 64-87,
152-153. For H . H . ’s proposals to Congress, see House Journal,
72 Cong., 2 Sess. (December, 1932), 40-43; Wilbur and Hyde,
Hoover Policies, 338-340; Literary D i g e s t , CXIV (December 17,
1932), 1-2; N e w York T i m e s , December 5-8, 1932, 1; and E.
Pendleton Herring, "Second Session of the Seventy-Second
Congress," American Political Science Review. CCLXXI (1933),
404-421. Also see Hoover, Memoirs. IXX, 185-193; Rosenman
(ed.), FDR Papers, X, 879-884; Timmons, Garner of Texas, 172;
and New York Times, December 21-23, 30-31, 1932, 1.
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the nation approached paralysis.
Before Hoover escaped his ordeal the Senate Finance
Committee's exposure of scandalous banking practices des
troyed the remnant of confidence in financial institutions.
The banking system collapsed and the economy touched
b o t t o m . B o t h Hoover and Roosevelt must share the respon
sibility for the failures of the Interregnum.
like two small boys— selfish,

suspicious,

'’They were

and guilty."

While FDR seemed perfectly willing to allow the nation to
hit bottom, Hoover was equally determined that any recovery
w o u l d be in line with his own ideological views.

As the

President informed Senator Dave Reed, FDR's acquiescence in
the Hoover proposals would have amounted to the ratification
of "the whole major program of the Republican Administra
tion" and assured the abandonment of "90% of the so-called
New Deal.

91

Everman, "Hoover-Roosevelt Interregnum," 76-93, 134.
See Moley, After 7 Y e a r s , 95-96; Ne w York T i m e s , January 1922, 27-28, 1933, 1; Hoover, Me m o i r s , III, 198; and Concr. R e c .,
72 Cong., 2 Sess. (January 4, 1933), 1361-62, 1372.
92Everman, "Hoover-Roosevelt Interregnum," 109, 143,
154-156. N e w York T i mes. February 2-9, 16-26, 1933, 1; c o m 
mercial and Financial Chronicle. February 18, 1933, 1133-1139,
and February 25, 1933, 1244; Moley, After 7 Y e a r s , 140-144;
and Lawrence Sullivan, Prelude to Panic (Washington,1936),
91-117.
9 ^Everman,

"Hoover-Roosevelt Interregnum," 161.

^ H o o v e r to Reed, February 20, 1933, K-107, Herbert
Hoover Papers, Post-Presidential Individual File, Herbert
Hoover Presidential Library, West Branch, Iowa.
Hereinafter
all letters in the Hoover Papers will be designated by box
number.
Only letters outside the Hoover collection will be
designated more fully by paper, and by location.
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Although Congress abetted the national slump,
q r

Hoover's ideology was the greatest handicap.

3

The Presi

dent abandoned many of his own convictions, even if on a
temporary basis, but he would go only so far.
avoided enforcement of most of his policies.

Too, he
Hoover ration

alized his position as the only correct and permissable

The retiring President was in no mood to accept
defeat.

He wanted vindication for his ideas and for his

administration.

At long last he saw the potential utility

of political parties.

The Republican Party "must be a party

of ideals since only exalted purpose can bring great numbers
of people together in united action.
of ideals must be o r g a n i z e d . F o r

But the consummation
the moment he recognized

that all Americans must cooperate with the new Administration
in its depression efforts.

Yet, Republicans had a national

obligation to "subject all proposals to the scrutiny of

9^The recalcitrant legislators, not without guile,
ignored the President's soundest recommendations, refused to
appropriate funds, continued publication of RFC loans, and
later passed many of Hoover's proposals after his departure.
For example:
reduced veteran's benefits, federal pay cuts,
and executive reorganization.
Everman, "Hoover-Roosevelt
Interregnum," 156-159.
96por an analysis of Hoover's violations of his own
credo and his rationalization of such steps, see Schlesinger,
Old Order. 246. Also see Hargrove, Presidential Leadership.
112; Golob, The "Isms," 110-121; Fusfeld, Origins of a New
Deal, 224-227, 255.
^ H o o v e r to Everett Sanders, February 27, 1933, K-108.
Sanders was the Republican National Chairman.
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constructive debate and to oppose" those which, were unwise.^®
As Hoover retired into his sanctuary, he genuinely was
relieved by the escape from political p r e s s u r e s . H o w e v e r ,
for a man with his ideological framework, his endless energy,
and his personal frustration,

sanctuary would provide only a

temporary respite.

98ibid.
99Morison, Turmoil and Tradition. 334, notes that
H . H . , a Quaker, frequently sought "sanctuary for the inner
light." Degler, "Hoover Ordeal,” 578-579, quotes H.H. as
saying:
"All the money in the world could not induce me to
live over the last nine months.
The conditions we have
experienced make this office a compound hell."

CHAPTER III
SANCTUARY
The tension between Hoover's ideas and reality aggra
vated his frustration during the Interregnum and quickened
his irritability and deep-seated resentment.

Yet,

from his

own experience he recognized the gravity of the situation and
determined to give ground, even urging his party to cooperate
with Roosevelt in every effort to promote recovery.

He was

not, however, abdicating the responsibility of a loyal
opposition.l
"Saturday, March 4, dawned gray and bleak.
winter clouds hung over the city.
brought brief gusts of rain."^

Heavy

A chill northwest wind

On Inaugural Day, even the

-*-For example, H.H. wrote Everett Sanders, February 27,
1933, K-108, urging a cooperative policy with the reserva
tion that the New Deal not violate the Constitution, that
credit be maintained, that the currency remain sound, and
that "equality of opportunity" continue.
See New York Times,
February 28, 1933, 1; "President Hoover's Farewell Address,"
Literary Digest, CXV (February 25, 1933), 9; Rexford Tugwell,
The Brains Trust (New York, 1968) , xxii; and Hoover Collec
tion, LXIII, Item 2133.
The latter, consisting of bound
volumes located at the Herbert Hoover Presidential Library,
West Branch, Iowa, includes originals and copies of various
Hoover addresses, telegrams, magazine articles, press state
ments, and newspaper clippings.
^Schlesinger, Old Order, 1.
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weather accentuated the sombre atmosphere that pervaded the
faces of the quiet crowds lining Pennsylvania Avenue.^

For

millions this inauguration was more than a change of adminis
trations.

It was the passing of traditionalism.

Hoover felt m ixed emotions at the surrender of power.
In spite of his alleged relief, he recalled later that
"Democracy {was] not a polite employer.”^
had become accustomed to wielding power.

Hoover,

after all,

His personality

now would require vindication for his discredited policies.
Retirement,

at best, would be difficult.

On leaving Washington, Hoover,
and deeply disappointed,"

5

"neglected,

exhausted,

embarked for Ne w York.

There, he

renewed old ties and recuperated from his depression o r d e a l .®
In accord wi t h his public bipartisan stance,

the former

President urged "whole-hearted support and cooperation of
every citizen" with Roosevelt when the President, on March
issued a proclamation closing all banks.

6

,

Hoover also upheld

the President's March 9 message to Congress concerning Bank

% e w York T i m e s , March 5, 1933, 1.
^Hoover, M e m o i r s . Ill, 344.
1949),

Raymond Moley, 27 Masters of Politics (New York,
25.
Hereinafter cited as Moley, 27 Masters.

^Theodore G. Joslin, Hoover Off The Record (New York,
1934), 366-367. Hereinafter cited as Joslin, Off the R e c o r d .
Hoover acknowledged man's desire to escape from world p r o b 
lems throughout his book, Fishiner For Fun— And To Wash Your
Soul (New York, 1963), 18.
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Rehabilitation.^

Too, H o o v e r ’s own fiscal advisers helped

to draft the Emergency Banking Bill which provided "for
inspection and certification of soundness.”

Although the

act, passed on March 9, probably forestalled creation of a
Q
nationalized banking system,
Hoover privately was "not
reconciled to the present banking program” and endorsed it
solely because he thought there should be "no criticism of
Q
the new administration . ” 3
Following a holiday in New York, Hoover left for his
home in Palo Alto.

On March 21, responding to reporters and

enthusiastic well-wishers, he stated:
political questions I am silent.
future.

"On economic and

I have no plans for the

Hoover, undoubtedly, was at a loss as to what to

do with his new freedom.

His loyal Secretary of State,

Henry Stimson, ably expressed the difficulty in adjusting to
the "sudden cessation of duties” and his "sympathy of how

^Hoover Collections, LXIXX, Items 2136, 2137; and New
York Times, March 7, March 10, 1933, 1. H.H. applauded
Senator Dave Reed's efforts to unite the GOP behind the
Banking Bill and later the Economy Bill. Hoover to Reed,
March 10, 193 3, and Reed to Hoover, March 14, 1933, K-107.
®New York Times, March 10, 1933, 1; and Conkin, New
D e a l , 46. Arthur A. Ballantine, in "When All The Banks
Closed,” Harvard Business Review, XXVI (1948), 138-139,
states that he joined Ogden Mills, and George L. Harrison of
the Federal Reserve in planning the banking bill.
^Hoover to Stimson, March 14, 1933, K-129.
10”Hoover at Home, Wants 'Long Rest,
New York Times,
March 22, 1933, as found in Hoover Collection, LXIII, Item
2139.
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immensely harder it must have been" for the ex-President.-*--*•
Hoover, gradually recovering his "normal equipoise,”
wrote to Stimson, two months after retirement, that "the
Washington combination of Coue— P. T. Barnum— W. J. Bryan—
Carl [sic] Ma r x — Moody and Sankey" was keeping him enter
tained. ^

The former President, perhaps from boredom, had

in truth devoted much of his energy and time to Stanford
University,

the Huntington Library,

institutions.

and other educational

He also dedicated bridges and dams and can

vassed his friends for donations to benevolent organizations.
These activities necessitated trips eastward and swelled his
growing interest in p o l i t i c s . f j £ s travels, coupled with
his extensive correspondence, enabled h i m to keep abreast
of the developments in Washington in spite of his alleged
retirement to Palo Alto.-^

^Stimson to Hoover, April 10, 1933, and M ay 13, 1933,
K-129.
Stimson said:
"X have felt so useless for the past
two months."
■^Hoover to Stimson, Ma y 16, 1933,
Hoover, May 24, 1933, K-129.

and Stimson to

^ N e w York T i mes, July 10, 1933, 1, in the Hoover Col
lection, LXIII, Item 2143; N e w York T i m e s , February 3, 1934;
and Wolfe, Ho o v e r , 359. Also see "How the Former President
Spends His Time," Literary D i o e s t . CXVI (August 5, 1933), 34.
l^Wolfe, H o o v e r , 358-359.
Certain Hoover lieutenants
kept their "Chief" posted on the minutest details of local
political circles.
For example, see Harrison Spangler to
Hoover, October 9, 1933, K-127; Will Irwin to Hoover, October
23, 1933, K-61; Alan Fox to Hoover, July 26, September 17,
and October 3, 1934, K-39.
H.H.'s inner circle, heavily
loaded with relief associates, affectionately called him
"Chief."
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As months passed, the former President gave more and
more time to politics.

At no time in his past career had

Hoover worked so relentlessly in attempting to acquire poli
tical information,

to curry favor, or to construct a phalanx

of support as he did in the spring of 1933.
political news at local, state,

He garnered

and regional levels.

He

corresponded with virtually every geographical, ethnic,
racial,

and economic bloc in American society.

As his cor

respondence of the 1930's so abundantly attests, he was
attempting to justify his position and recover his p r e 
depression s u p p o r t . A l t h o u g h he once stated that former
presidents spent their time "taking pills and dedicating
libraries,"'1'® he obviously h a d more important goals.
During the 1 9 3 0 ‘s and afterwards, his correspondence
fell primarily into two categories;

letters and telegrams

from like-minded individuals wh o expressed dissatisfaction
with the New Deal and praise for Hooverian ideas and values;
and letters from the great coterie of lieutenants,

long-

trained in loyalty to the "Chief, " who often indicated a
certain intellectual submissiveness as much as they did
agreement or understanding.

17

'

l^See H . H . ‘s volumnious personal correspondence in the
Post-Presidential Individual File, 1933-1940.
i ^ B i n Adler, Presidential Wit

{New York, 1966) , 126.

•L^An inveterate Hoover critic, Rexford Tugwell, in
Brains T rust, 499, says that H.H. was "surrounded by unusu
ally sychophantic associates w i t h blunted perceptions" who
kept him "in ignorance" and insensitive to public
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Hoover's correspondence was heavily stacked.
reflected images as well as realities.

It

It failed to present

the whole picture because those who wrote him, generally,
were already in agreement with his basic ideas.

Even the

"inside" information from Washington was distinctly shaped
by an oppositionist frame of mind.

As thousands of letters

accumulated, criticizing the New Deal, Hoover became slack
in his objectivity.

He assumed that all people shared his

disillusionment with the New Deal and its excessive spending,
inefficiency, corruption, regimentation, and dictation.
Thus, he discounted the evidence of its popular appeal.
Having distinct and firm ideas of his own, he readily agreed
with New Jersey Senator Walter Edge that "the new adminis
tration [was] certainly charting new seas,”-1-® and with
Supreme court Justice Harlan F. Stone, who wrote that "to
judge by the rapidity of changing events[,] decades might have
passed.

opinion.
Since H.H. "had withdrawn from those who might
warn him . . . he continued to rely on his own defective
judgment." In his Memoirs. II, 221, Hoover admits:
"I doubt
if any President was ever surrounded by men and women of more
personal loyalty or devotion to public service." As Joseph
Davis, "Hoover:
Another Appraisal," 310, 314, notes, H.H.
"encouraged like-minded advice" and discouraged criticism
and pessimism.
Too, he "was held in such awe by his sub
ordinates that their loyalty to 'the chief' too often curbed
their critical judgment." Thus H.H. collected letters and
articles paying deference, never noticing that the real
public tuned on and off at will.
l8Edge to Hoover, April 25, 1933, K-33.
Former Secre
tary of War, Patrick Hurley, also spoke of a "new era."
Hurley to Hoover, May 26, 1933, K-60.
l9stone to Hoover, May 2, 1933, K-130.
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To Hoover, revolution was transpiring in the spring
of 1933.

As he saw it, suppression was obvious.

tered news incited his greatest fears.
and then sought proof.

The fil

He believed the worst

As his lieutenants begged him to

return to the political arena, it became more and more diffi
cult to maintain silence.

Surprisingly,

for almost two years,

he resisted the temptation to publicly criticize the New

Like their discredited leader, Republican politicos
in Washington remained dormant during the early stages of
the New Deal.

Some politicians adjusted their differences

with one another, while others sought a more centralized
leadership.

All factions of the bitterly divided GOP

admitted disunity and lack of direction.
Hoover and his lieutenants scrutinized every New Deal
policy and stored a fund of information for future use.

Of

all Hoover's advisers, the most indispensable was Odgen
Mills, the former Secretary of Treasury.

The New Yorker was

^ T h e Hoover correspondence of the 1930's abounds in
expressions of revolutionary fears, political advise, and
criticism of the New Deal. Many of H.H.'s colleagues spoke
to him of Roosevelt's "revolution.”
21port to Hoover, May 12, 1933, K-38; Fess to Hoover,
June 9, 1933, K-36; William Allen White to Hoover, May 3,
1934, K-137; Hanford MacNider to Arthur Vandenberg, July 3,
1933, Hanford MacNider Papers, Series 5, Box 73, Herbert
Hoover Presidential Library.
Joslin, Off the Record. 340,
discusses efforts by the Old Guard to reorganize the National
Committee before H.H. even reached California.
The majority
of committee members, however, sided with the retiring Presi
dent.
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the fiscal expert in the Hoover inner circle.^2

a close

friend of Elihu Root and Henry Stimson, Mills, along with
Harlan Stone, provided cautious, restrained advice, often
more realistic than that which Hoover received so abundantly
from his ultra-conservative associates. J
Mills, in touch with Will Woodin, FDR's Secretary of
the Treasury, gleaned valuable "inside" information into New
Deal fiscal measures and readily notified Hoover in advance
of forthcoming changes.

By mid-March, Hoover knew of

Roosevelt's decision to use fully "the extraordinary powers"
which he, himself, had rejected as unconstitutional.^

The

former President, already pessimistic, was agitated at the
probability of inflation and wrote Mills in May that the
current stock market fluctuations confirmed their darkest
forebodings.

Hoover urged a firm stand against devaluation

of the d o l l a r . ^
2

In his preoccupation with inflation, ° Hoover worried

2^See Claude Bowers, Mv Life (New York, 1962), 243,
256; and Tugwell, Brains Trust. 480. Tugwell sees Mills as
"the most agile and intelligent" of H.H.'s advisors, and as
"formidable in the area of federal finance."
^ S e e the Mills-Hoover exchanges,
Stone-Hoover letters, K-130.

k

- 92, and the

24jviills to Hoover, March 13, 1933, and May 2, 1933,
K-92.
Also see Rixey Smith and Norman Beasley, Carter Glass
(New York, 1939), 341-342.
25noover to Mills, May 7, 1933, and Mills to Hoover,
May 2, 1933, K-92.
^ H o o v e r to Brown, April 25, 1933, K-16; Hoover to
Kellogg, October 5, 1933, and Kellogg to Hoover, September
25, and October 25, 1933, K-67.

59
about Republican morale.

On April 21, congressman Bert

Snell of N e w York, Senator Dave Reed of Pennsylvania, and
Senator Frederick Walcott of Connecticut publicized a joint
statement indicting the Inflation Bill then pending in Con
gress.

Press speculation credited Ogden Mills with inspiring

the action and Hoover with sanctioning i t . ^ 7

Whatever the

case, the statement coincided with Hoover's private opinions
that early N e w Deal legislation placed too much power in the
executive office.

Hoover also anticipated a new land boom

resulting from the bill.
to

stifle

Because all inflation bills tended

long-term credit, he assumed the probability of

additional inflation in the future.

He also predicted,

correctly,

the early but temporary benefits for labor and
Op
agrxculture.
During the summer of 1933, Henry Stimson visited

England, conferred with British and American officials
attending the London Economic Conference,

and informed Hoover

of the consternation over America's desertion of the gold

^7N e w York T i m e s , April 22, 1933, 1.
Reed, Pennsyl
vania's Republican leader, was a frequent delegate to
National Conventions from 1924 to 1940, served in the Senate
from 1922-1935, and headed the Mellon machine.
Snell, a New
York Republican, a convention delegate from 1916 to 1940, and
a congressman from 1915-1939, was an arch-defender of
Hoover's record in the House of Representatives during the
1 9 3 0 's. Biographical Directory of the American Congress.
1724, 1838.
^ H o o v e r to Brown, April 25, 1933, K-16.
Hoover
termed the Inflation Bill before Congress the most Jldangerous
proposal [ever] laid before Congress."
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s t a n d a r d . B o t h men agreed that the New Deal was drifting
toward the "far rig h t.”30
In the spring and early summer of 1933, as long-term
credit evaporated,

as the treasury situation remained criti-

cal, and as the recession continued,

OI

x Mills and Hoover

became more certain that the N e w Deal could not effect longrun recovery.

Yet Hoover,

in an optimistic moment, repeated

his belief that "the fundamental forces of recovery estab
lished by [his] administration" might yet take effect.

He

ventured that more attention should be given to the question
of the New Deal as "an Emergency program or a social p r o 
gram. ”

He concluded that FDR lacked the intelligence to form

a social program and must be grandstanding.

Others would

have to remove the cancers.
By autumn, Lewis Strauss,

a lifetime friend and an

2^Stimson to Hoover, July 31, 1933, K-129.
30Hoover to Stimson, October 3, 1933, and Stimson to
Hoover, October 10, 1933, K-129.
Elting E. Morison, Turmoil
and Tradition:
A Study of the Life and Times of Henry L .
Stimson {Boston, 1960), 37 9, credits Stimson with rejecting
H . H . ’s insinuations of a fascist state.
Yet, it was Stimson
who was most candid about FDR's move toward the "far right."
Stimson to Hoover, October 10, 1933, K-129, is specific on
this point.
Only later did Stimson's views on the Ne w Deal
c hange.
3^Mills to Hoover, June 13, 1933, K-92.
33Hoover to Mills, June 23, 1933, K-92.
William Allen
White encouraged such a Hooverian conclusion by criticizing
the lack of direction in Washington.
White said there was
"no plan either concealed or conscious. . . . It is obviously
a case of trial and error."
FDR was "the greatest h itch
hiker, . . . courageous and unintelligent." White to Hoover,
May 3, 1934, K - 1 4 7 .
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associate from the relief work of World War I, revealed to
Hoover that certain New Deal advisers were pressuring FDR to
inflate the currency.33

Hoover's onetime press secretary,

George Akerson, discussed recent changes in Treasury person
nel and the departure of Budget Director "Lew" Douglas as
indications of the forthcoming inflation.34

As expected, FDR

gave ground to the inflationists.
To Hoover, one of the worst aspects of the New Deal
was its agricultural policy.

From the outset, he charged

FDR with discovering a "white rabbit . . .
Belt."35

in the Corn

Arthur Hyde, Hoover's Agricultural Secretary,

pondered the question of whether the "monstrosity"
"of the animal or the vegetable

k i n g d o m . " 3 6

(AAA) was

n e marveled at

Hoover's "kaleidoscope of national affairs" and expressed
shock at the changes in the economic and social structure."
Hyde bemoaned the cost of the "ridiculous" agricultural
experiments.3S

Franklin Fort, a N e w Jersey lawyer, onetime

Congressman, and former GOP National Committee secretary,

33strauss to Hoover, September 20, 1933, K-130.
3^Akerson to Hoover, November 21,

1933, K-2.

^^Hoover to Hyde,

March 25,

1933, K-61.

3^Hyde to Hoover,

March 28,

1933, K-61.

3^Hyde to Hoover, April 19, 1933, K-61. In a letter
of June 4, Hyde expressed horror at the "socialization of
industry," the redistribution of income, the debasement of
currency, and the repudiation of debts. Hyde to Hoover,
June 4, 1933, K-61.
3%jyde to Hoover, December 24, 1933, K-61.
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warned his Chief that "the utter failure of the various
radical farm proposals" insured i n f l a t i o n . ^

Such expres

sions only reassured Hoover that the New Deal was wrecking
the nation and that something must be done to stop it.
Although Hoover devoted much of his time to an
analysis of New Deal policies, he also concentrated on purely
party politics.

During the 1930's the Hoover clique

accelerated the factionalism within the GOP.

Aware of the

movement underfoot to "oust Sanders" as p a r t y chairman,

and

cognizant of the political implications for their Chief's
influence with the National Committee, Hooverites outmaneuvered the Old Guard leaders Charles Hilles of Ne w York,
Daniel Pomeroy of New Jersey,
cut.

and Henry Roraback of Connecti

Hoover thwarted the Old Guard putsch and retained

control of the Republican organization by mobilizing his
lieutenants.^
Hoover called on former Postmaster General Walter F.

39port to Hoover, November 8 , 1933, K-38.
Fort, a
long-time Hoover colleague, served on the Food Administration
staff during World War I. Biographical Directory of the
American Congress. 1173.
^ " N e w s and Comment From the National Capital, "
Literary D i g e s t . CXVI (July 29, 1933), 10.
Brown-Hoover
correspondence, March-December, 1933, K - 1 6 . Of special sig
nificance is Brown to Larry Richey, April 14, 1933, K-16.
Richey, Hoover's personal secretary and an alter ego of
sorts, was H.H.'s most trusted assistant.
Also see Richey
to Brown, April 11, 1933, K-16.
Stokes, Chip Off My
Shoulder, 226, sees Sanders as H.H.'s personal choice for
the national chairmanship in 1932. Conservatives such as
James Beck saw H.H.'s 1932 "rejection as an opportunity for
true conservatives to regain command of their party."
Keller, In Defense of Yesterday, 238.
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Brown, the Ohio leader,

for assistance.41

The Ohioan con

ferred with Mills and other Hoover cohorts in an effort to
invigorate the dormant Republican m a c h i n e . B r o w n reaf
firmed the trustworthiness of Colonel R. G. Creager, the
Texas boss and longtime Hoover ally .4 3

For his part,

Creager informed the party dissidents that only the Execu
tive Committee of the party was empowered to remove Chairman
Sanders .4 4
As summer ripened, many Republicans, perturbed at
Sanders

1

inactivity— even if from illness— and anxious for

an aggressive attack on the New Deal, demanded action.
Colonel John Callan 0

'Laughlin, a rather conservative Hoover

ally and an insider in the party hierarchy, delved into the
intricate frictions at party headquarters, reconnoitered the
strength of various factions, and informed Hoover that, in
spite of fragmentation,

the time was fast approaching when

the majority would demand a change.

Old Guard leaders were

42-Brown to Richey, April 14, 1933, and Richey to
Brown, April 11, 1933, K-16.
42grown to Hoover, May 2, 1933, K-16.
Progressives
like William Allen White urged reorganization along liberal
lines.
See White, "Liberalism for Republicans," Review of
Reviews. LXXXVII (January, 1933), 27.
43Brown to Hoover, May 16, 1933, K-16.
As noted
earlier, Creager organized H . H . ’s forces in the South in
1928 and 1932.
44Creager to Frederick S. Peck, May, 1933, K-16.
45Edge to Hoover, May 6 , 1933, K-33; John C. 0
'Laughlin to Hoover, Ma y 17, 1933, and June 26, 1933, K-101.
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pushing for an autumn showdown.^®

0

'Laughlin expressed the

belief that Senator Edge should become the next chairman.
For his part.
action,

4-7

'

Chairman Sanders promised intensified

a series of regional conferences,

tion by the Old G u a r d . H o o v e r ,

and a new coopera

recognizing the imperman-

ency of the accord, decided that Administration Republicans
mu s t p l a y the decisive role in offering an alternative
/g
chairman when Sanders did resign.
In an eastern trip,
Creager of Texas sounded out conservative reaction and
gained the acquiescence of Ne w York boss Charlie Hilles.
Although Creager suspected Hilles of personally desiring the
office,

the Old Guard leader probably was buying time to
cn

muster his own strength. v
despite past relations,

Whatever the case. Hoover,

recognized Hilles' power and opened

the door to

a future settlement of their differences.

Too,

any hope of

an alliance between the center and progressive

^ I b i d . o 'Laughlin noted that Charles D. Hilles,
the N e w York leader, was instigating the demand for a new
chairman.
47 0

‘Laughlin to Hoover, M a y 17, 1933, K-101.

^^Brown to Hoover, October 10, 1933, K-16.
Pomeroy,
the N e w Jersey boss and Old Guard spokesman, gave a somewhat
dubious endorsement of Sanders' efforts.
^ H o o v e r to Brown, Ma y 17, 1933, K-16.
H.H., noting
"direct and indirect pressures" for Sanders' resignation,
anticipated an early retirement but hoped that it would come
at a more opportune time.
50Brown to Hoover, May 23, 1933, K-16.
Brown informed
H.H. that there was no attractive alternative on the scene,
that a semblance of p arty unity m u s t be maintained, and that
this was the wrong time for a change in the chairmanship.
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wings of the party had evaporated.

e*|

Following a regional meeting of the National Committee
at Chicago, Brown assured Hoover of success.
full report as soon as they could confer. ^

He promised a
Momentarily,

the Hooverites postponed the chairmanship change.
Throughout the long summer of 1933, Hoover's band kept
him informed of party developments.
Eastern dailies at Palo Alto,

He received the major

and various correspondents

enclosed editorials of interest from other papers.

To a

degree, Hoover's public silence was politically advantageous
as it allowed the New Dealers plenty of rope.-^
also worsened the void in GOP leadership.

yet,

it

Gradually, Hoover's

onetime conservative critics began to see him in a n ew light.
Congressman James M. Beck, an ultra-conservative who long
opposed Hoover's moderation, exchanged views with the "Sage
of Palo Alto" regarding the termination of constitutional
government.^

Simeon D. Fess of Ohio, the GOP minority

^ H o o v e r was aware of the attempt of western radicals
to form a new "Progressive Party." Hoover to Brown, Novem
ber 22, 1933, K-16.
^ B r o w n to Hoover, July 15, 1933, K-16.
■^Article, Literary Digest, CXVT

(July 29, 1933), 10.

^ B e c k to Hoover, June 13, and June 28, 1933, Hoover
to Beck, June 19, 1933, K-9.
A month earlier Beck denounced
the New Dealer's adoption of the "gag rule" as "the most
monstrous denial of representative government ever proposed
to an American Congress." C o n g . Re c ., 73 Cong., 1 Sess.
(May 4, 1933), 4196.
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r r

leader in the House of Representatives,

3 told Hoover that

the New Deal was leading to "State Socialism and regimenta
tion."

It was, wrote Fess,

"not a drift to the left wing;

[but] a complete s o m e r s a u l t . F e s s

incorporated Hooverian

analyses in his Senate speeches but allowed his inspiration
to remain a n onymous.^

The two men agreed to stand on their

principles.

They shared indignation at the compromising
CQ
tendencies of disloyal Republicans. °
As his mail reflected a growing dissatisfaction with
the New Deal, Hoover became less cautious and disseminated

his darkest thoughts among lawyers, bankers, oldline Repub
licans, and even newspapermen— once critical of him.
Ironically, he gained popularity in circles previously
hostile.

Symbolically, the dispersion of his ideas compared

to the permeation of money under his RFC— a trickle down
theory: much of his constructive criticism reached only the
elite instead of spreading out to the public, whereas his
shrill,

somewhat ludicrous charges gained currency and

invited the criticism of a later generation.

^ F e s s W as an educator, news editor, congressman, then
Senator from Ohio.
Biographical Directory, 1153.
S^Fess to Hoover, June 27, and June 29, 1933, K-36.
Fess also spoke of "bolshevik poison."
57Fess to Hoover, May 4, 1933, K-36. For Fess'
defense of the American System, American Individualism, and
his attack on regimentation, see C o n g . R e c ., 73Cong., 1
Sess (June 7, 1933), 5273.
^ H o o v e r to Fess, May 9, 1933, K-36.
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Samuel Crowther, a witty writer and news correspondent, became a Hoover favorite because of his denunciation
of ’’The Happiness Boys" and that "circus’1 in Washington.^9
With invective, Crowther lambasted the leaderless, ineffi
cient, disingenuous New Deal, run by a "bunch of children
playing with m a t c h e s . c r o w t h e r ,

recognizing the ancient

and mutual hatred between Hoover and Senators Hiram Johnson
and William E. Borah, wrote to him that once the two Senators
became disillusioned by the New Deal, they would turn on FDR
with "all the fury of frustrated prostitutes."^

Crowther,

meanwhile, cautioned the former President against New Deal
tricks and urged constant vigilance.
The National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933, once
accepted even by industrialists, endorsed by Hoover's former
Secretary of War Patrick Hurley, and allegedly an extension
of Hoover's "voluntary" business codes, became anathema to
Hoover.^

He had championed voluntary codes for industry,

but his emphasis had differed considerably from that of the

^ 9 C r o t h e r

to Hoover, March 5, 1933, K-25.

^^Crowther to Hoover, April 22, 1933, and April 28,
1933, K-25. H.H. replied that Crowther's writing had "punch."
Hoover to Crowther, June 8 , 1933, K-25.
63-Crowther to Hoover, June 13, 1933, K-25.
6 2Crowther to Hoover, June 19, 1933, K-25.
To Crowther,
FDR was making the same mistakes as the European dictators.

®2Hurley to Hoover, December 27, 1933, K-60; "At the
Observation Post," Literary Digest, CXVII (June 23, 1934),
12.

NRA.^

In a bipartisan moment, Hoover signed the consumer's

pledge for the NRA®^ before Mills explained that the NRA
would eventually drive up costs and prices while adversely
affecting c o n s u m p t i o n . N e i t h e r businessmen nor reformers
anticipated the resultant monopoly or the coercion involved
67
in federal supervision of wages, hours, and standards .0
In a dark mood, Hyde wrote to Hoover of the impending
doom that would result from the N R A ’s habit of setting
"neighbors to spying upon one another" and from its aggrava
tion of labor-management discord.^8

^t iast, Hoover's pique
eg
at business regimentation reached an apex.
In a revealing

5 ^Ibid.; Fess to Hoover, November 6 , 1933, K-36,
agreed on the need to impress upon the public the "temporary
nature of the NRA. Charles F. Roos, NRA, Economic Plannincr
(Bloomington, 1937), 7, 27, treats H.H.'s contribution to
the NRA idea, and notes his advocacy of higher wages and
shorter hours.
Hereinafter cited as Roos, N R A .

^ A r t h u r M. Schlesinger, J r . , The Coming of the New
Deal (Boston, 1958), 115.
Hereinafter cited as Schlesinger,
New D e a l .
^ M i l l s to Hoover, July 20, 1933, K-92.
5 7 0tis L. Graham, Jr., An Encore For Reform (New York
1967), 29.
Interestingly, the old progressive reformers
used the same arguments as Hooverites in rejecting the NRA.

®®Hyde to Hoover, August 10, 1933, K-61.
6 ^Fort to Hoover, April 1, and April 12, 1933, K-38.
Fort promised to keep H.H. posted on "the tempo of things."
He was convinced the New Deal was leading the nation toward
economic quicksand and that business opposition to all New
Deal policies would soon crystallize.
Also see Fort to
Hoover, May 12, and June 9, 1933, and Hoover to Fort, June
14, 1933, K-38. Hoover was well informed of N R A activities,
impact, and results.
See Hoover Papers, Box Q-216 and Box
Q-227 for N R A memos, articles, codes, court cases, and other
data.
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letter to Franklin Fort, a New Jersey banker, insurance man,
and GOP stalwart, Hoover stated:
I am not in a position to criticise the code notion
because I have for years advocated building up of
business codes and have, in fact, taken part in the
construction of scores of them; but, of course, X
have no patience with the attempts to control produc
tion and prices . . . it is all a question of degree.70
Hoover soon came to believe that the NRA encouraged
monopoly by its circumvention of the antitrust law, and that
it negated his American Individualism through a dictatorial
fixing of hours and wages, as well as by its regulation of
products, quantities, prices, and distribution.
he said, was "hooked on an artificial fly."71

Business,
Nor could he

accept Hurley's optimistic belief that the NRA legislation
would be amended

s h o r t l y .
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Convinced of the NRA's failure,

Hoover saw it as an impediment to recovery.

7 “3

Charles F.

Roos, N R A Director of Research, concluded that the NRA "must,
as a whole, be regarded as a sincere but ineffective effort
to alleviate the depression."74
As criticism of the NRA mushroomed, Negro journalist

^^Hoover to Fort, September 3, 1933, K-38.
^Hoover, Memoirs, III, 421-427; Hoover to Mills,
July 26, 1933, K-92.
See Roos, N R A , 45-51.
^ H u r l e y to Hoover, December 27, 1933, and Hoover to
Hurley, January 4, 1934, K-60.
^ H o o v e r to Hurley, January 4, 1934, K-60.
H.H. wryly
concluded that New Dealers would credit him with fathering
the N R A as soon as they accepted its failure.
74r o o s , N R A , 472.
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John P. Davis exposed the discrimination involved in the
program.

According to Davis, N R A white workers displaced

Negro industrial workers even while accelerated prices outgained the new wages.
those of whites,

Nor were Negroes' wages as high as

even under N R A codes.

Finally,

as marginal

workers, Negroes were the first to lose their jobs.7^

The

future utility of N R A seemed dubious.
In September, 1933, Ogden Mills analyzed America's
economy for his Chief.

Despite encouraging signs of recovery,

Mills pointed to the lack of capital market,

the stagnation

of the goods industries, the accelerating plight of the
farmer, and credit shortage.

He predicted inflation but

assured Hoover that their silence must be maintained for the
time,

as they would "only be accused of sabotaging the

recovery program by destroying

c o n f i d e n c e . " ^

Hoover readily

incorporated M i l l s ' analysis into his own thinking and
shared it with other associates . 7 7

By October, news analyst

Lawrence Sullivan was publicizing the negative effect of the

7^John P. Davis, "What Price National Recovery?"
Crisis, XL (December, 1933), 271-272.
Roos, NRA, 172-173,
notes the early opposition to N R A by dissatisfied Negroes.
He discusses the preference given whites in the South for
new jobs, the discrimination in wages, and the actual re
placement of Negroes in other jobs.
He estimates that
500,000 Negro workers were effected by the discriminatory
codes.
7®Mills to Hoover, September 19, 1933, K-92.
During
Mills' absence Henry M. Robinson, a Los Angeles banker, had
furnished H.H. with Federal Reserve figures and information.
Robinson to Hoover, March 28, April 8 , June 24, and August
7, 1933, K-92.
77Hoover to Brown, November 16, 1933, K-92.
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NRA and the current paralysis in business.^®

Hoover, anxious

for an acceleration of anti-New Deal articles, pressed Mills
to influence the employment of William Hard as an editor for
the New York Herald Tribune:

"[Hard] badly needs a pulpit

where his unique qualities of humor and satire, his economic
penetration, can have full play.”7®
Although Hoover held a moderate view of the New Deal
throughout much of the summer of 1933, even crediting FDR
with majority support, the rejected recluse steadily moved to
the right.®®

By autumn, he accepted the hard line and

asserted that "behind [New Deal] measures is a determination
to conduct some sort of social r e v o l u t i o n . A s Hoover
moved toward a reconciliation with Eastern conservatives,
including even some Old Guard leaders, he recognized the
demise of the old GOP.

After all, Hiram Johnson and his

colleagues were trying to organize a new "Progressive
p9
Party.”
Too, the nation was moving leftward, destroying
any possibility of Hoover's reunification of the center
support he had once commanded.

Hoover, the centrist, must

7®"New Deal in Command,” Forbes Magazine, October 15,
1933, copy in General Charles Dawes' letter to Hoover,
October 31, 1933, K-27.
7®Hoover to Mills, November 15, 1933, K-92.
®®Hoover to Fess, July 5, 1933, K-36.
®-^Hoover to Fess, November 14, 1933, K-36, showed
little restraint as he discussed the "socialism [which]
seemed to be the aim."
82Hoover to Brown, November 22, 1933, K-16.
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alter his philosophy or seek new allies to the right.
Inevitably, he remained loyal to his ideas.

In seclusion,

he drafted a list of principles for the party and anxiously
urged National Committee members to adopt his fundamental
ideas.

83

Mills and Brown conferred with National Chairman

Ev Sanders,

Senator Dave Reed, and Congressman Bert Snell in

an effort to force a statement of principles by the National
O A

Committee. ^

,

#

As the hopes for a statement of principles

lagged. Hoover wrote Brown that they must assert the impor
tance of ideas and defend the Constitution.

He found a

continuance of the current "socialistic program," with its
disastrous fiscal program,

intolerable.

He expressed agita

tion at S a n ders 1 remark concerning too much "Hoover color to
the National Committee."

85

Finally,

in confidence, he

stated that he had been approached by a potential chairman
who would cooperate and "be a friend of all of us."®®
Hooverian allies such as Simeon Fess informed h im
that the timing was wrong for a statement of principles and
that "the greatest obstacle lies within our own ranks,

. . .

®®Hoover to Brown, October 22, October 23, and Decem
ber 5, 1933, K-16.
H.H. wanted to remain anonymous because
he recognized that certain Congressional leaders would auto
matically oppose anything he supported.
®^Brown to Hoover, October 10, 1933, K-16.
Brown also
told H.H. that Eastern leaders must be wooed concerning the
subject of a new treasurer for the National Committee.
®®Hoover to Brown, October 22, 1933, K-16.

86Ibid.
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P7
where unity on fundamental principles is impossible."0 '
Hoover, in frustration, postponed the expression of his
deepest desire.
He continually tried to goad Ev Sanders and the
National Committee into action.

Failing this, he encouraged

the "gradual erection of committees and organizations to
QO
oppose [New Deal] policies."
Finally, Hoover realized
that Sanders, a lame horse, must be sacrificed.®9
urged Franklin Fort, his reliable Jersey associate,

Hoover
"to

establish friendly relations with Senator Edge," who "could
be made to serve most useful purposes if he had the oppor
tunity as he would appeal to certain groups most strongly.”90
In pursuance of an alliance with Edge, Hoover learned
that the Jersey Republican would accept the Chairmanship
providing a fight could be avoided.

Edge revealed that

Senator Dave Reed and George Moses were collecting votes for
him.

91

Hoover remained friendly to Edge's efforts, hoping

®^Fess to Hoover, November 6 , November 28, December
12, December 22, 1933, and Hoover to Fess, October 24, 1933,
K-36.
°®Hoover to Sanders, July 5, December 11, 1933, and
January 10, 1934, K-117; Hoover to Brown, November 22, 1933,
K-16? and Hoover to Reed, October 23, 1933, K-107.
QQ

Hoover to Brown, December 5, 1933, and Brown to
Hoover, December 15, 1933, K-16.
90Hoover to Fort, November 14, 1933, K-38. Edge was
a former New Jersey Governor, two-time U. S. Senator, Hoover's
ambassador to France, and a perennial delegate to GOP con
ventions from 1916-1948.
Biographical Directory. 1118.
9^-Edge to Hoover, October 30, 1933, K-33.
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to undercut the influence of the uncooperative and reactionary Jersey boss, Daniel Pomeroy.

Although Sanders

balked on Hoover's idea of a "statement of principles" and
refused to include Hoover's defeated congressional supporters
in the party hierarchy,
in the chairmanship.
Hoover's direction,

it was the wrong time for a change

Consequently, Mills, probably at
and with the aid of Frank Knox and

Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg, persuaded the Eastern leaders
to refrain from injecting the chairmanship fight into the
December meeting.

Although the Hooverites again carried the

day, all sides admitted that a change was certain in
Following the Hoover triumph, Edge,

1934

Senator Reed,

.
and

Senator Charles McNary of Oregon conferred in Washington.
McNary,

a long-time Hoover antagonist,

emerged from the

parley and told reporters that Hoover had withdrawn from
politics permanently,

that Ev Sanders was being permitted to

continue as the GOP Chairman,
divided.9^

and that the party was badly

Hoover, understandably, was incensed at McNary's

politics and the effort "to read me out of any form of

to Brown, December 5, 1933, and Brown to
Hoover, December 15, 1933, K-15.
Although Hoover urged Edge
to try for the National Committee, he made no commitment
concerning the chairmanship.
By mid-December, Pomeroy
recovered and thwarted the move to elevate Edge.
9 ^ H o o v e r

^Hoover
10, 1934, K-117.

Sanders, December 11, 1933, and January
Brown to Hoover, December 15, 1933, K-16.

9^Brown to Hoover, December 27, 1933, K-16, related
the version current in New York newspapers.

public l i f e . "9!^
Aside from the intra-party struggles, Hoover was
becoming more and more impatient with New Deal policies.

He

was anxious for an acceleration of constructive criticism
and was considering writing a book on the Ne w D e a l .

As

old Progressives such as Bainbridge Colby and Henry J. Allen
concluded that FDR had "sabotaged" the Constitution, Hoover
determined to expose the New Dealers.9^
Whereas the Hoover Administration had initiated an
investigation of the dishonest political machine of Louisiana
Senator Huey Long for its income tax evasions, Roosevelt
ignored the odor for two years.9®

Too, Hoover was upset by

a memorandum from the U. S. Department of Agriculture

(dated

January 5, 1934, and concerning AAA personnel), stating that
"all additional appointments,

including replacements, may be

made without regard to the Civil Service rules and

9®Hoover to Brown, December 29, 1933, K-16.
H.H.
suspected McNary of "political ambitions," meaning the GOP
presidential nomination of 1936.
9®Hoover to Crowther,
1933, K-25.

September 4, and November 13,

Akerson to Hoover, September 6 , 1933, K-2, informed
H.H. of a conference with Colby.
Allen, the Kansas Senator,
expressed shock at FDR's continuous "trampling on the con
stitution."
Allen to Hoover, November 14, 1933, K-2.
9 ®T. Harry Williams, Huey Long (New York, 1969), 794801, notes that FDR renewed the exposure of Long only after
the "Kingfish" became a thorn in Roosevelt's side.
Hofstadter, Age of Re f o r m, 310, shows Progressive disillusion
ment with FDR's general attitude toward political machines.
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r e g u l a t i o n s . N o w Hoover was certain that New Dealers
were "not interested in reform.”

In fact, they were cutting

out "the heart and nerve center" of the American system.
They were playing politics.100

Dealers were violating

moral and political traditions of the past.

They had

abandoned the communion table of the American System.
As "evidence" of political, economic, and intellectual
dishonesty accumulated, Hoover urged Will Irwin, his life
time friend, biographer, and confidant, to write a book on
"modern methods of propaganda, " revealing how the New Deal
stifled free speech and free criticism.
the sections for a book.

He even outlined

Significantly, he wanted the last

part to concentrate on the NR A and New Deal propaganda with
their "distortion" and "destruction" of true liberalism.

He

thought the New Deal was drifting "more clearly to Fascism
and Nazism than even toward Socialism."101

Enunciating his

darkest fears, Hoover indicted the New Deal as too far to
the right .

^ 2

^Memorandum, U. S. Department of Agriculture,
January 5, 1934, Clause F, Q-213.
^-0°Hoover to Fess, December 18, 1933, and December 27,
1933, K-36.
H.H. blasted the New Deal for prolonging the
depression, abetting the bank panic, and devaluing the
dollar.
He charged FDR with Fascist, Hitlerian tactics.
'^-'-Hoover to Irwin, December 16, 1933, K-62.
i02por m onths Crowther had accused H.H. of too much
restraint.
H.H. dissented by saying, "I would not go as far
as you do." Crowther to Hoover, November 24, 1933, and
Hoover to Crowther, December 1, 1933, K-25.
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To add to Hoover's pessimism, Mills wrote that the
new budget figures were ’’literally,

staggering . 11

He also

noted the alarming proportions of the Civil Works Administra
tion dole,

the failure to balance the budget,

and the high

probability that inflation in the new year would approach
fifty per cent.^®^
Nor could Hoover expect the GOP in Congress to offer
sane alternatives.
analysis,

in a confidential

informed the chief of the fragmentation within the

GOP in Congress,
policy,

Cal 0 'Laughlin,

the lack of leadership,

the absence of a

and the certainty that Senator McNary, working for

an alliance with Progressives, would hold no caucuses and
present no programs because he thought the Democrats should
be given plenty of rope and thus determine the issues.
Samuel Crowther blasted the "craven stupidity of the GOP in
Congress" and warned Hoover to expect nothing from the "nitwits" holding positions of leadership.

inc

Hoover decided that the future of the party and the
nation depended on attracting young men of vision to the

1 0 3 M i n s to Hoover, January 5, 1934, K-92.
104g 'Laughlin to Hoover, December 30, 1933, K-101.
Ashmun Brown described McNary as "unenlightened . 11 A. Brown
to Hoover, January 11, 1934, K-15.
105C r owther to Hoover, January 25, and January 30,
1934, K-25.
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cause.

He asked Henry Allen of Kansas and Arthur Hyde of

Missouri to organize a Young Republican Club in their area.
In suggesting they follow the example of the "Republican
Builders" in New York, he accepted the necessity of educating
the public and winning it to "high ideals.
By the winter of 1933-1934,

senatorial politicians,

probably hoping to embarrass the Hoover Administration,
initiated the Black Investigation, an inquiry into the con
tracts and activities of former Postmaster General Walter F.
Brown.

Hoover,

acting through Larry Richey and Edgar

Rickard, two trusted aides, urged Brown to volunteer as a
witness.

1 no

Hoover and Brown, irritated at the smear

efforts of the Black investigation, agreed that Capitol Hill
was dominated by "popinjays and nitwits . " - ^ 9

Although the

inquiry had scrutinized Brown's activities with reference to

106As early as August, 1933, Hoover had urged the
development of more young Republican clubs. Hoover Collec
tion, LXIII, Item 2145, Hoover to Louis M. Killen, August
26, 1933.
^Hoover to Allen, January 27, February 1, and
February 16, 1934, K-2; Hoover to Hyde, January 27, January
29, March 5, 1934, and Hyde to Hoover, March 13, 1934, K-61.
H.H. pointed to the success of Mills in New York and the
attractive name of the "Republican Builders." On this sub
ject H.H. also wrote to Jay Darling of Iowa. For the affirma
tive reply, see Darling to Hoover, October 25, 1933, K-26.
l°^Edgar Rickard to Hoover, September 30, 1933, K-16.
Rickard, a "close friend and devoted associate" from the
relief activities onward, was trusted with the most confi
dential matters.
Davis, "Hoover: Another Appraisal," 297.
109BrOwn to Hoover, January 31, March 3, March 10,
March 12, and May 9, 1934, and Hoover to Brown, March 5,
March 7, March 13, May 3, and May 14, 1934, K-16.
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mail contracts,

stock holdings, dividends, and other matters,

nothing was u n c o v e r e d . W h e n

Brown failed to follow his

suggestion of a libel suit, Hoover, anxious for vindication,
suggested that Brown at least write a series of articles on
how the Hoover Administration had advanced the aviation
i n d u s t r y . F o l l o w i n g the fruitless investigation of Brown,
Congress turned on Patrick Hurley, the former Secretary of
1 1 O

War, and a firm Hoover supporter. J-^

Again, a Hoover official

was cleared but the ex-President's anger bristled at the
insinuations.
In spite of the temptation to defend his policies and
principles, Hoover maintained his public silence.

When Alan

Fox, a prominent New York Republican, approached him and
asked him to make the Lincoln Day Dinner Address, even the
assurance that it might well be used by others to launch
their presidential aspirations would not move Hoover to
a c c e p t . R e c o g n i z i n g the political implication, he did

llOgtone to Hoover, March 27, 1934, K-130, stated that
FDR had made “a serious mistake in [his] handling of the air
mail contracts." Akerson to Hoover, February 26, 1934, K-l.
lllHoover to Brown, May 3, 1934, K-16.
112Hurley, recognizing H.H.'s frustration and bitter
ness over the politically motivated investigations, tried to
quell his anger. Hurley to Hoover, June 8 , 1934, K-60.
113Ibid.
114Fox
Hoover, January 16, 1934, K-39, wanted
H.H.'s advice regarding the future before "featuring any
such potential candidate" for the 1936 nomination.
Fox also
informed his "Chief" that Mills was too antagonistic a per
sonality to have any political future.
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suggest that Fox choose a Midwesterner such as Arthur Hyde
I I C

as speaker.
sent.^-*^

Too, he promised to help secure Hyde's con-

x3

As anticipated, the Missourian accepted.

Pleased with Hyde's selection and acceptance, Hoover
urged h im to defend their high spiritual and intellectual
principles.

He offered to aid Hyde in writing the speech

and pressed for a condemnation of New Deal regimentation,
fiscal policies,
of Rights.

and the negation of the "spirit’' of the Bill

Hoover,

in advance, assured a wide circulation

of the February 12 A d d r e s s ®
James Beck,

following Hoover's earlier advice,

also

struck a discordant note in launching an aggressive attack
on the N e w Deal.

In Hooverian style, Beck solemnly espoused

"The Mission of the Republican Party."-^O
Henry Fletcher,

Pennsylvania's

the future GOP National Chairman, urged a

more earnest opposition if the party was to survive.^-*-

H ^ H o o v e r to Fox, telegram, January 16, 1934, and
Hoover to Fox, January 19, 1934, K-39.
-Ll^Hoover to Hyde, January 22, 1934, K-3 9.
H ^ F o x to Hoover, January 30, 1934, K-39.
H ^ H o o v e r to Hyde, January 27, January 29, March 5,
and January 30, 1934, K-61.
119New York T imes, February 13, 1934; Hyde to Hoover,
February 23, 1934, K-61.
120ijjew York T imes, February 13, 1934; Beck to Hoover,
January 12, 1934, and February 10, 1934, and Hoover to Beck,
February 20, 1934, K-9.
Beck joined Hyde as a speaker at
the Lincoln Day Dinner.
121pietcher to Hoover, February 22, 1934, K-38.
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Privately, Hoover expressed his belief that the nation was
"recovering some of its critical faculties.,l^-22
By February, 1934, Hoover was obsessed with the money
bill, and the enormous profits speculators were making.

In

a series of letters to Crowther, Hoover unburdened his dis
gust with a policy that encourated investors, already over
extended in stocks, to profit from gold manipulation.

He

also doubted the administration's intention of allowing an
inve stigation.1 2 2
As criticism of the New Deal surfaced, the demand for
a change in the GOP chairmanship accelerated.

0 'Laughlin

informed Hoover of Senator Vandenberg's backstage maneuvers
and the widespread rumor that Sanders was finished.

He

urged his Chief to make a choice and "take steps promptly to
see that the proper man is selected."l2^

o 'Laughlin

repeated that Edge was the front-runner.

Personally, he had

sounded out Hilles on the possibility of Henry Fletcher, but
the New Yorker remained noncommittal.
receptive to a conference with Hoover.

Hilles, however, was
Elsewhere, McNary

l22Hoover to Moses, April 27, 1934, K-9.
l22Crowther to Hoover, January 31, and February 21,
1934, and Hoover to Crowther, February 3, 1934, and February
6 , and February 26, 1934, K-25.
1240 'Laughlin to Hoover, January 20, and January 26,
1934, Box 44, John Callan 0 'Laughlin Papers, Library of
Congress, Washington, D. C.
Permission to use the 0
'Laughlin Papers was granted by Mrs. Dorothy Brown, Washing
ton, D. C.
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favored Senator Dickinson,

and Vandenberg was backing

Hanford MacNider .-*-25
Although 0 'Laughlin and Harrison Spangler, Hoover's
Iowa leader, pressed him for a decision concerning the
chairmanship, Hoover was certain only of the need for a "new
face," preferably from the Midwest.

When Spangler and other

Hooverites failed to draft a list of possibilities. Hoover
reiterated his willingness to accept
the Eastern bloc in his pocket,
E

d

g

e

.

t

o

o

,

E

128

g

e

.

^26

Hilles, with

thwarted the move for

the Jerseyman hardly fulfilled Hoover's con

ditions for a "new face," young blood,
o r i g i n .

d

and a Midwestern

seeing that Congressional leaders would soon

1250 'Laughlin
to Hoover, January 26, 1934, Box 44,
0
'Laughlin Papers, Library of Congress.
As early as July,
Vandenberg h a d worked for the selection of MacNider, the
Commander of the American Legion, former Assistant Secretary
of War, and a prominent financeer.
Charles B. Robbins to
MacNider, July 1, 1933, and MacNider to Vandenberg, July 3,
1933, and MacNider to Charles B. Robbins, July 3, 1933, and
MacNider to Congressman Paul A. Martin, July 13, 1933, Series
5, Box 73, 1933 folder, Hanford MacNider Papers, Herbert
Hoover Presidential Library, West Branch, Iowa.
MacNider
wanted no part of the factional quarrel between the HooverMills clique and the Wadsworth-Hi lies gang.
He thought that
Governor Brucker of Michigan was a potential national chairman.
126spangler to Hoover, November 29, 1933, Hoover to
Spangler, December 28, 1933, K-127; Hoover to 0 'Laughlin,
January 29,
1934, Box 44, 0 'Laughlin Papers.
127 q
'Laughlin to Hoover, February 10, February 27,
and March 17, 1934, Box 44, 0 'Laughlin Papers.
By March,
Hilles was leaning toward Fletcher.
Conrad Joyner sees
Fletcher as the favorite of the Old Guard, an "arch-conserva
tive," and as out of tune with GOP Congressional leadership.
Conrad Joyner, The Republican Dilemma (Tuscon, 1963), 4.
0

128noover to 0
'Laughlin Papers.

'Laughlin, March 5, 1934, Box 44,
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force Sanders' resignation, Hoover asked Brown to discuss a
list of potential successors with the Chairman.

Possible

choices included Hilles, Edge, Senator Dickinson, Fletcher,
and MacNider.129
Although Brown hastily sounded out Hooverites Mills
and California oil executive Mark Requa, each supported a
different candidate.I 2 0

The lack of consensus only com

pounded Hoover's difficulty in endorsing one of the candi
dates.

Although he realized that anyone with as much "Hoover

color" as Spangler was unavailable, Hoover probably preferred
Senator Edge but asked Mills to confer with Henry Fletcher.
Following a March conference with Mills, Fletcher publicly
declined to run for the Pennsylvania Governorship and wrote
TOT

Hoover that the fight for the chairmanship was "in a fog."
In writing Mills, Hoover expressed disappointment over the
lack of cohesion among Hooverites on any topic, the shortage
of campaign funds, and party apathy.-*-32
Franklin Fort, Hoover's Jerseyite leader, agreed to
go to Chicago for the June meeting of the National Committee,

2^Hoover to Brown, February 7, 1934, K-16.
130grown to Hoover, May 9, 1934, K-16.
Mills favored
Governor Garder of Maine, Requa leaned toward Silas Strawn,
the Chicago banker, and Brown urged the selection of Harrison
Spangler of Iowa. Mills to Hoover, April 20, 1934, K-92,
disclosed the impasse following a Hilles, Brown, Requa,
Mills and Roraback conference in New York.
131pietcher to Hoover, March 23, 1934, K-38.
132jjoover to Mills, April 10, and April 24, 1934,

K-92.
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if Hooverites endorsed a candidate for chairman.-*-33

Reveal-

ingly, Hoover admitted that ’’Our trouble is that we do not
know the ideal man for Chairman.1’ However, he reassured
Fort that "if the Republicans attempt to follow the Old
Guard I shall make a public protest. ’'-*-34
Hoover urged Creager, Spangler, and Brown to push for
a statement of principles as well as "a new face” for chair
man.

He noted the availability of ex-Governor Brucker of

Michigan but endorsed no

o n e .

-*-35

the close of the month,

Sanders, as expected, called for a June meeting of the
National

C o m m i t t e e .

On June

6

-*-36

, the National Committee elected Henry

Fletcher chairman.

Hoover praised the new officer as "a

most experienced and courageous leader" and urged him to
create a vigorous party organization,

issue a declaration of

principles, and invite the youth of the party into national
councils.137

133port to Hoover, May, 1934, K-38, informed the
Chief of a meeting with Requa and Walter Newton.
Fort urged
H.H. to remain independent of the Old Guard.
-*-3^Hoover to Fort, May 17, 1934, K-38.
135Creager to Hoover, May 17, 1934, and Hoover to
Creager, May 23, 1934, K-25; Hoover to Spangler, May 9, May
17, and May 23, 1934, and Spangler to Hoover, May 5, May 12,
and May 15, 1934, K-127; Hoover to Brown, May 14, 1934, K16. Hereafter Brown's long illness disrupted the intense
correspondence for months. Hoover to Sanders, May 30, 1934,
K-117, expressed regret at E v 's retirement and applauded his
devotion to the party. Hoover to 0 'Laughlin, May 17, 1934,
Box 44, 0 'Laughlin Papers.
-*-36Spangler to Hoover, May 5, 1934, K-127.
-*-3^Hoover to Fletcher, telegram, June
New York Times, June 7, 1934, 1.

6

, 1934, K-42;
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Men representing the diverse factions of the GOP
applauded Fletcher's election as Chairman.x'JO

Hooverites

commended Fletcher's proposals to revive the party.

Mills

assured the Chief that a forthcoming Committee on Policies
would make positive proposals in the fields of industry,
agriculture,

finance, and foreign relations.

*1 *5 Q

0

'Laughlin

wired Hoover that Fletcher's cooperation was assured and that
Spangler and John D. M. Hamilton would help clean h o u s e . ^
With the elimination of the chairmanship question, and the
satisfactory move to formulate a program in opposition to
the New Deal, Hoover again concentrated on specific policies.
Although Hoover's own Federal Farm Board, in its
financing of farm cooperatives and attempted systematization

■*-^James R. Garfield to Hoover, July 9, 1934, K-42;
Fort to Hoover, June 15, 1934, K-38; Mills to Hoover, June
25, 1934, K-92; Knox to Hoover, July 11, 1934, K-72.
Knox
said, "X like very much the way Henry Fletcher is taking
hold of his job.” Frank Kent, Without Gloves (New York,
1934), 277-279, notes that Fletcher, a 1912 Bull Mooser, was
acceptable to men as different as Senator Dave Reed and
William Allen White.
l ^ M i l l s to Hoover, June 25, 1934, K-92.
!40o 'Laughlin to Hoover, June 25, 1934, Box 44,
0 'Laughlin Papers.
Schlesinger, New D e a l , 481, credits
Hilles and the Old Guard with outmaneuvering the Hooverites
in the selection of Fletcher and the recognition of H i l l e s '
leadership on the policy committee. However, the evidence,
previously treated, shows that the Hooverites, like the Old
Guard, lacked a majority and, at best, could only exercise a
veto on the chairmanship question. As Brown, Mills, 0
'Laughlin, and other Hooverites stated, Fletcher was quite
acceptable.
His inclusion of Spangler and Hamilton as his
chief assistants indicated the congenial relationship
between H.H. and the new chairman. Fletcher was not H.H.'s
first choice, but it is equally doubtful that he was at the
top of the Hilles list either.
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of marketing farm products, had served as the basis for NewDeal agricultural policies, Hoover failed to admit the con
nection,-*-41

Nonetheless, Hoover's perceptive lieutenant

Ogden Mills admitted that agriculture was the one area in
which New Dealers h a d continued and expanded a Hoover pr o 
gram. -*-42

Agricultural leader George N. Peek lambasted FDR's

Agricultural Secretary Henry A. Wallace for implementing and
enforcing a Hoover policy.-*-43
As summer advanced,
and more extreme positions,

as the New Deal moved to newer
as his anxiety mounted,

dence" of corruption, bureaucratic escalation,

as "evi-

inefficiency,

and even negative effects surfaced, Hoover's bitterness
fermented.

The "preposterous" AAA, which Hoover had lamented

earlier, continued in his view to violate one constitutional
principle after

a n o t h e r .

^44

He was incensed at the provoca

tive contract clause that farmers were being forced to sign

1 411*At the Observation Post, ” Literary Digest, CXVTI
(June 23, 1934), 12.
Gilbert c. Fite, "Farmer Opinion and
the Agricultural Adjustment Act, 1933," M V H R , XLVIII (March,
1962), 657-658.
-*-42M i l l s , Seventeen M i l l i o n , 11. Mills tried to dis
tinguish the two administrations by deg r e e : "between govern
ment leadership and government coercion.'' Too, he noted
that H.H.'s innovations were temporary, whereas FDR's were
permanent.
Peek, Why Quit Our Own (New York, 1936) ,
62.
In the past, Peek had opposed H.H. for "restricting
production to the demand of the domestic market."
-*-44jjoover to Mills, July 26, 1933, K-92.
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in order to retain their corn l o a n s . S e n a t o r

Dickinson

and New Hampshire's George Moses questioned the Americanism
of such p o l i c i e s .^

6

cautious commentator,

Even William Allen White, normally a
denounced "the apple-cheeked,

starry-

eyed brain trusters in the Agricultural Department" and the
federal government’s excessive use of p o w e r . ^

Chicago

newspaper magnate and former Bull Mooser Frank Knox,

in

bewilderment, marveled at the "asininity of Roosevelt and
Wallace persisting in the AAA folly when Providence has
taken the necessity for it out of their hands. "148

As f00<a

prices advanced upward, FDR criticized the press for publi
cizing the figures and thus creating fear in the public

14 5 L. W. Ainsworth, Iowa National Committeeman, a
close friend of Senator Dickinson and an agricultural
adviser, kept H.H. informed on agricultural policy, includ
ing this contract clause.
The clause that offended H.H.
read:
"the undersigned agrees . . . in any general plan or
program presented by the Secretary of Agriculture for the
reduction in
acreage of corn and production of hogs for
market in 1 9 3 4 . Copy of contract found in Ainsworth to
Hoover, December 10, 1933, and January 5, 1934, K-2.
146M o S es to Hoover, April 12, and April 18, 1933, K92, had accused the Brain Trust of "undiluted sovietism."
Dickinson to Hoover, September 14, 1933, and January 3, and
February 23, 1934, K-29, secured a list of personnel turn
overs within the AAA as well as the N R A and noted the defec
tions because of conscience.
^47white to Hoover, Ma y 3, 1934, K-147.
As White
joined the chorus indicting the processing tax, the Hoover
council became virtually unanimous in its opinion of New
Deal farm policy.
148Kn0x to Hoover, August 27, 1934, K-72.
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mind.

149

Brown,

But to Hoover,

as well as to correspondent Ashmun

“The food destruction of the past eighteen mon t h s [,]

silhouetted against the drought, " was an explosive topic.150
To many "concerned citizens," New Deal methods were
intolerable.

Reports of corruption were mounting steadily.

CWA jobs reportedly were being allocated by the political
bosses.151

Nepotism, meanwhile,

reaped considerable profits

in the sale of insurance policies to government port author
ities.152
The party situation, despite much optimism,
only slightly.

improved

Hyde, recognizing the vacuum in leadership,

^ ^ A s h m u n Brown, the capital correspondent of the
Providence J o u rnal, wrote H.H. frequently.
Brown explained
the method by w hich FDR was juggling "the item of seignior
age in the Daily Treasury Statement" and thus minimizing the
expanding deficits.
A. Brown to Hoover, August 16, 1934,
K-15.
15®Hoover to A. Brown, August 23, 1934, K-15.
H.H.
noted the growing criticism of AA A by consumers and farmers.
Incensed at the Treasury deceptions, H.H. noted that the
biggest camouflage concerned "General Expenditures" being
transferred to "Emergency Expenditures."
This included
public works, naval construction, and other items.
H.H.
would continually point out this deception in his public
speeches in 1935.
As Brown noted, FDR also listed all "loans
as assets."
"Even a child," said Brown, would know better.
Brown to Hoover, August 30, 1934, K-15.
1 5 1 A. Brown to Hoover, January 11, 1934, K-15, cited
three specific N e w England towns where N ew Deal patronage
through government jobs was dependent on political subser
vience .

‘'-^^Walter Brown noted young James Roosevelt's sales of
insurance policies to New York Port Authorities and to cer
tain ports in the South.
The contracts were unusually high,
and the million-dollar negotiations netted considerable
profits for the salesman.
Brown to Richey, June 1, 1933,
K-16.
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urged the Chief to return to the arena:
only voice that will be heard.
answer Roosevelt."153

"You possess the

. . . You alone can adequately

Charles G. Dawes, the former Vice-

President, voiced the same opinion.^-54

Crowther, tired of

the "jelly-fish" politicians in Washington, pleaded with
Hoover to launch a vigorous

o f f e n s i v e .

^5

Hoover, steeped in literature, correspondence, and
propaganda of the conservative, oppositionist frame, assured
a partisan analysis.

N e w Deal proposals and actions chal

lenged his ideology.

To Hoover, the New Deal consumated his

long prophecized and deepest fears.
and centralization were realities.
second-guessing.

Tyranny, bureaucracy,
There was no time for

He must meet the challenge head-on.

It was

time to forego the tranquility of his sanctuary.

By August,

he wrote Ashmun Brown of his decision to publish:

"My con

science will not stand it any

l o n g e r . "

^-56

•^■^Hyde to Hoover, July, 1934, K-61. Former Kansas
Senator Henry Allen hoped for a Hoover comeback in 1936.
Allen to Hoover, June 5, 1934, K-2.
154j)aWes to Hoover, August 29, 1934, K-27.
Dawes said
that H.H. was "the natural leader of our people" and must
defend their principles.
l ^ C r o w t h e r to Hoover, July 30, 1934, K-25.
156pjoover to A. Brown, August 23, 1934, K-15.

CHAPTER IV
THE CHALLENGE TO LIBERTY
Rexford Tugwell,

a Brains Truster, once described

Hoover as "a man of principle . . . driven by duty."
Although personal and political reasons were influential,
ideas primarily motivated Hoover's emergence from his sanc
tuary.^

During the 1930's, he earned the place of "high

priest and chief theologician of conservative Republicanism,
a sort of St. Thomas Aquinas who reconciled the party's
principles and stated them admirably . " 2
As the ex-President reflected on his ideas of an
"American System" and "rugged individualism," he resisted
government participation in business,
restrictions,

coercion,

and opposed its

and abridgement of individual rights,

and denounced the spread of graft, politics and bureaucracy.

-^-Rexford G. Tugwell, "The Protagonists:
Roosevelt
and Hoover," The Antioch Review, XIII (December, 1953), 419,
426.
Personal vindication and a fragmented political party
only added fat to the fire.
2 Hicks, Republican Ascendancy, 210.
Christopher
Morley saw H.H. as "a scholar, the man of culture, the lover
of books."
John Haverstick (ed.), Saturday Review Treasury
(New York, 1957), 1-8.
2 Hicks,

Republican Ascendancy, 210, 236. Hoover to
A. Brown, April 13, 1934, K-15; Hoover to Fess, Ma y 9, 1933,
K-36.
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Hoover sincerely feared that "corruption of the constitu
tion" was leading to an elimination of individual freedom.
By 1934, the time to protest this "eclipse of liberty" had
arrived.^
Even before Hoover's publication efforts,

financiers,

skeptical of the New Deal, organized a league to defend
their interests.
National Chairman,

John J. Raskob, a former Democratic
joined Jouett Shouse, a Democratic poli

tico, and millionaire Irenee du Pont in founding the Liberty
League.

John W. Davis and Al Smith, the Democratic Presi

dential nominees of 1924 and 1928, respectively, were also
leading figures in the new organization.^
Despite the League's obvious hostility to the New
Deal, its public goal of defending property rights, its
praise of "nineteenth century individualism and liberalism,"
and even its eventual political move to defeat FDR, Hoover
remained its outspoken critic.^

He expressed his contempt

by saying it was "one of the humors of the time."

Too, its

^Hoover, The Challenge to Liberty (New York, 1934), 10.
Hereinafter cited as Hoover, Challenge to Liberty.
^Strawn to Hoover, October 10, 1934, K-13 2; Hoover to
Dawes, September 1, 1934, K-27; Wolfe, Hoover, 361; Schlesinger, New D e a l , 482-487, said that conservative Democrats
panicked and organized the League.
Also see Burns, Lion and
F o x . 206, 208.
6 Ibid.;

Hoover to Dawes, September 1, 1934, K-27.

?Burns, Lion and Fo x , 206.
Frederick Rudolph, "The
American Liberty League, 1934-1940," American Historical
Review, LCI (October, 1950), 20-21, 31-32, sympathetically
treats the League, its ideas, and its goals.
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leadership would increase the President's popularity and
chances of re-election.®

Correspondent Ashmun Brown agreed

with Hoover that the millionaires running the League had
"financed all grouch movements since 1928" and that the
organization was "no place for a real Republican.1,9
Although Hoover clearly enunciated his opposition to
the League,

several of his colleagues cautiously praised it

and hoped it would weaken Roosevelt.
reasoned,

At the least, they

its existence pointed up the division in the

Democratic r a n k s . I t

may have colored New Deal speeches

with conservative hues for a short time.

Yet, Hoover and

Ashmun Brown predicted a move leftward by the administration
following the November election.

11

8 M o o s ,
The Republicans, 401-402. H.H. blamed the
League leaders for the existing chaos.
Hoover to Dawes,
September 1, 1934, K-27. H.H. also said that he was "no more
fond of the Wall Street model of Liberty than [that] of the
Pennsylvania Avenue model." Hoover to Lawrence Sullivan,
August 27, 1934, K-132. H.H. wrote Henry Fletcher that they
must condemn the "Big Business" orientation of the Liberty
League.
Hoover to Fletcher, August 25, 1934, K-38.
Burns,
Lion and F o x . 206, discusses FDR's relief on learning that
the conservative opposition had coalesced and organized the
Liberty League.

®A. Brown to Hoover, September 13, 1934, and A. Brown
to Hoover, November 15, 1934, K - 1 5 . Brown disclosed the
press' growing disillusionment with the Liberty League.
l®Knox to Hoover, September 4, .1934, K-72. Knox hoped
the League would benefit the GOP and make a positive contri
bution to stalling the New Deal.
O 'Laughlin and Silas
Strawn expressed similar sentiments.
0 'Laughlin to Hoover,
September 6 , 1934, Box 44, O 'Laughlin Papers.
Strawn to
Hoover, October 10, 1934, K-132.
■^Hoover to Brown, October 17, and November 23, 1934,
and A. Brown to Hoover, October 25, and December 6 , 1934,
K-15.
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Hoover, recognizing his party's disturbing tendency
for fragmentation and self-destruction, hoped to find a
neutral, unifying ground.

Liberty seemed a perfect issue.

Convinced of New Deal violations of the sacred covenant, he
sincerely and fervently urged a re-evaluation of New Deal
methods.

In a couple of articles for the Saturday Evening

Po s t , anticipating his forthcoming book, he expressed his
first public criticxsm of the New Deal.

17

At once, Arthur

Hyde, a loyal lieutenant, detected "the influence of
[Hoover's] thought in the statements of men on the street,
and in the speeches of those who
p a p e r s . " - ^

Undoubtedly,

[were] quoted in the

in some circles this was the case.

As the publication date for Hoover's The Challenge to
Liberty approached, the C h i e f ’s advisers and well-wishers
became more excited.

They anticipated a tremendous p h ilo

sophical impact from the b o o k . ^

Hoover himself said:

l^uelsen, "Hoover Image," 160; Allen to Hoover, Sep
tember 12, 1934, K-2; Silas Strawn to Hoover, October 10,
1934, K-132, praised the Post articles.
Herbert Clark Hoover,
"Consequences to Liberty of Regimentation," Saturday Evening
P o s t , CCVII (September 15, 1934), 5-7. Herbert Clark Hoover,
"Challenge to Liberty," Saturday Evening P o s t , CCVII (Sep
tember 8 , 1934), 5-7.
'*'^Hyde to Hoover, September 13, 1934, K-61. Hyde
told H.H. that the Post articles were well received, widely
quoted, and very influential.
•^Sullivan to Hoover, August 23, 1934, K-132; Hyde to
Hoover, September 27, 1934, K-39, lauded the thesis and
H . H . ‘s ability to steer a middle course between Wall Street
and Washington.
Fess to Hoover, October 17, 1934, K-36,
liked H.H.'s "grasp of intricate governmental problems" and
his exposure of the corruption of the public mind.
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"The Republican Party has been given the Ark of the Covenant,
if they have sense enough to recognize it; and they alone
can protect it.
As a "voice in the New Deal Wilderness," Hoover
articulated "the anxieties of many Americans with a vigor
and a clarity that he had rarely mustered while holding
*1 /"

power."

He was recalling an older liberalism which had

permitted greater freedom to business and industry.
many adherents to his viewpoint.

Because

He won

"his philosophy

never again represented a majority consensus is not to deny
the devotion it continued to earn in many quarters and the
significant weight it continued to bear in the modification
of national attitudes and policies.'

17

When Hoover went to press, he strove for a muted,
subtle,

attack on the New Deal.

even

He vigorously defended

individual liberty and warned of the ever existent challenges
to it. 18

He was struggling against time,

for his was an age

•^Hoover to Silas Strawn, October 15, 1934, K-132.
Hoover to Theodore Roosevelt, Jr., September 10, 1934, K - 1 1 5 .
In both letters, H.H. pointed to principles and expressed
his belief that Republicans alone could protect liberty.
ISciarke A. Chambers (ed.), The N e w Deal At Home And
Abroad, 1929-1945 (New York, 1965), 103.
Hereinafter cited
as Chambers, N e w Deal.
1 7 Ibid.

Richard S. Kirkendall, "The New Deal As
Watershed," Journal of American H istory. LIV (March, 1968),
849, says that "deep change" under FDR was impossible
"because of the resistance of the opposition."
18Wolfe, Hoover, 361.
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of necessitated experiment.

The trends in America, which he

condemned— toward regimentation, broad executive power,

and

planned economy— were irreversible.
In The Challenge to Liberty, Hoover defined liberty
as the right to choose one's calling, to develop a skill,

to

earn a profit, to accumulate property, and to go as far as
character and ability would allow. ^

To him, liberty was

"an endowment from the Creator . . . upon which no power,
whether economic or political, may encroach,
even the government can deny."
of the state.

and that not

Man was master, not servant

"The sole purpose of government," he said,

"is to nurture and assure these liberties.
Despite the sacredness of liberty, economic blocs on
the "Right," and bureaucracies on the "Left," in their
respective greed for money and power, constantly challenged
individual liberty. x

Hoover thought that revolutions

sparked by any extremist group invariably used similar
tactics.

To him, they all defamed existing institutions,

negated public confidence, and gained office through
demagogic promises.

Revolutionaries fomented emergencies in

- ^ H o o v e r , challenge to Liberty, 2.
Much of his 1934
work was a restatement of his American Individualism.

^Ho o v e r , challenge to Liberty, 3-4. According to
Allan Nevius, "The Battle of 1936 Begins," Saturday Review
of Literature, XI (October 6 , 1934), 168, H.H., in the
Spencerian tradition, saw government as a necessary evil, an
"agency apart from the people."
^^Hoover, Challenge to Liberty, 6.
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which the legislatures delegated extraordinary power to the
executive while judicial independence was circumvented.

To

Hoover, revolutionaries played on the emotions while they
destroyed liberty in its own h o u s e . ^
According to the philosopher of American Individualism,
liberty was implicit in the religious belief and spiritual
aspirations of the founding fathers.

Their unique contribu

tion to liberty was in their establishment of a division of
powers, within the government,

to check encroachments or

imbalances between state and federal authority, or threats
to the independence of the executive, legislative, or judi
cial b r a n c h e s . ^
To Hoover, liberty was the key to progress.
American System,

as he defined it, provided the atmosphere

for the expression of individual instincts,
creativity,

The

change, and success.

impulses,

As he so often stated,

"no

economic equality can survive the working of biological
inequality.”24

njn its wisdom," the American System had

provided "rewards to stimulate the creative instincts” of

77

Ibid., 15-17? Wolfe, H o o v e r , 362.
H.H. was trying
to claim the middle of the road.
He was bending reality to
fit his images and thus ignored his own experience with the
Congress.
That august body rarely relinquished its power
for any great length of time.
Once again H.H. was following
his theories instead o f framing them in his own experience.
2 %oover,

7A

Challenge to Liberty. 18-20.

I b i d ., 23-27.

Wolfe, Hoo v e r . 362.
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m a n . 25

For the rest of his life, he defended economic com

petition as the key to progress.
His System did not allow any group a license to
exploit,

for it had "within itself the forces of corrective

antagonism to oppression of any k i nd.1126

Too, Hoover

credited his system with humaneness, and community spirit.
He thought America's economic freedom explained her gradual
obliteration of social and economic classes, her higher level
of education, and her exemplary quality of justice.27
Hoover's increasing isolation from reality had caused him to
sanctify his own ideas.
Although the Great Depression disclosed certain weak
nesses and abuses in the system. Hoover rationalized that
thoughtful men had long conceded the need for reform and
that this did not invalidate the system.

To the contrary,

he thought that existing problems could be solved within
that frame of government and economy traditionally followed
by Americans.

He often stated that the depression was

atypical of the system and that there was nothing wrong with
the philosophy of i n d i v i d u a l i s m . t o

charges of rampant

individualism or laissez-faire, he explained that such an
attitude ended in America during the nineteenth century.
Only "reactionary souls" still yearned for such a policy.29

25Hoover, Challenge to Liberty. 28.
26ibid., 33-34.

27ibid-/ 40-44.

2 8 Ibid.,

2 9 l£id.,

46-48.

50-53.
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Hoover praised the philosophy of individualism as a
bulwark against tyranny.

In its natural opposition to

"regimentation and National Planning," individualism thwarted
dictatorial grasps at power.

He credited it with frustrating

the state's attempts to consolidate power in the executive
office.

Once the legislature of a state capitulated, he said

that executives invariably enacted a managed currency and
credit, debased the coin, adopted a sales tax, and sponsored
on

government competition with business. u
In one of his more powerful analyses, Hoover warned
against the regimentation of industry and commerce.

He

indicted federal wage and hours codes and collective agree
ments as coercive and unethical means to reach somewhat
plausible goals.

O *1

(

He reaffirmed his devotion to voluntarism

and cooperation between the sectors of the e c o n o m y . T o

30lbid., 60, 70, 76-77,

91.

3 ^Ib i d ., 8-84.
Although H.H. never mentioned the N R A
by name, it was obvious that he dissented from this degree
of regulation.
He admitted the states had the moral power
to enact many of the codes, but he failed to see their
inability to do so. Allan Nevins, Saturday Review of Litera
ture, XI {October 6 , 1934), 169-172, noted H.H.'s strong
arguments against regimentation but charged the ex-President
with creating a straw man, and ignoring reality.

^^Hoover, Challenge to Liberty. 85-86. H.H. was
furious at government suppression of agricultural production.
Nevins pointed to H.H.'s agricultural failure as the best
proof for the enforcement established by the AAA. Too, the
AAA was in the hands of county committees chosen by the
farmers themselves and supposedly responsive to their wishes
and direction.
Allan Nevins, "The Battle of 1936 Begins,"
Saturday Review of Literature, XI (October 6 , 1934), 172.
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Hoover, the greatest sin, however, was government purchasing,
construction, operation,

and sale of products,

in competition

with private enterprise.33
In Hoover's mind, all national planning was national
regimentation.

He warned of shifts in fundamental philo

sophical principles, especially those disguised as emergency
programs.3^

Ironically, he stated:

"No one with a day's

experience in government fails to realize that in all
bureaucracies there are three implacable spirits— self
perpetuation, expansion,
power."33

and an incessant demand for more

Hoover, who had done so much to advance federal

bureaucracy and power— even if on a temporary basis— and who
had laid the foundation for several New Deal programs, was
shocked at the degree of change.
As he looked back,
ualistic, rural,

He beat a hasty retreat.

somewhat nostalgically at the individ

agrarian, Jeffersonian past and compared it

to the regimented, urban,

industrial, mass society of the

leviathan state, he must have felt some guilt.
George Mowry summed it up thusly:

Historian

"If no one is as zealous

33Hoover, Challenge to Liberty, 88. H.H. never con
cealed his lifelong contempt for TVA.
For an analysis of
H.H.'s traditional way of thinking, and its fallacy, see
Commager, The American M i n d , 343-344.
3^Hoover, challenge to Liberty, 104-105, 111, 113-114.
As Commager, The American M i n d , 219-220, notes, H.H. thought
the American System was irreconcilable with "planning."
Like Sumner and the Conservative Darwinists, he charged the
planners with regimentation, bureaucracy and dictatorship.
•^Hoover, Challenge to Liberty, 113.
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as a convert, then perhaps no one conserves what is left of
his ideological inheritance more than the man who has lost
part of i t . m 3 6
To Hoover,

the greatest misfortune of the present was

the increasing conflict in all areas.

He was absorbed by

conflict between management and labor, creditor and debtor,
government and public,
and private enterprise,

executive and legislature, government
and the distinction of c l a s s e s . "

Too, the expansion of federal power, via taxes, business
codes, usurpation of legitimate legislative powers,
bureaucracy,

and

•DQ
assured additional conflict in the future. °

In pleading for proper methods to obtain ideal goals,
Hoover stated his acceptance of reform, change, responsi
bility,

and the need for experimentation.

there was

11as

much danger in haphazard,

However, he said

ill-considered

experiment as in stubborn opposition to all corrective
movement and change."

To him, experimentation must be in

harmony with liberty; thus, certain boundaries were invio
lable . 3 9
He warned of bureaucratic propaganda, one-sided news

1912

O/■
George E . M o w r y , The Era of Theodore Roosevelt,
(New York, 1958), 95.
"Hoover,
3 8 Ibid..

Challenge to Liberty, 119-127,

134.

127, 132-135.

" ibid., 145-146, 152.
Wolfe, Hoover, 361, notes
H.H.'s belief that methods of reform were as important as
the a i m s .

1900-
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coverage, and smear tactics against critics and dissenters:
"Managed Opinion" always accompanied managed economy,
managed agriculture,

and managed government.4°

Hoover denied the failure of his system.

In pointing

to the successful correction of past abuses, he said,

"We do

not need to burn down the house to hill the r a t s .

He

thought that the regulation of the trusts, monopolies, Wall
Street,

and the "robber barons" represented necessary and

wise restrictions of the past.
tended,

Yet,

"in regulation," he con

"there must be the minimum necessary to attain true

public ends."

A9

in this, he ignored the fact that the

regulation he cited as good was necessarily imposed by the
federal government.
Concerning the atypical depression which had raised
so ma n y questions about the American system, Hoover, pro
moting his personal thesis, explained that the aftermath of
World War I and the despotism of Europe were direct causes.
Rampant nationalism throughout the world, he theorized, had
aggravated an international depression.

Once the economy

touched bottom in 1932, everyone began recovering.

Only the

United States, due to an election of a new administration
and the lack of confidence in its intentions, he said, failed
to recover.

Yet, the system was so sound that ninety-two per

cent of all bank deposits were validated,

^Hoover,
4 1 Ibid.,

along with their

Challeng-e to Liberty, 135-136.
154.

4 2 ibid.. 157, 15 9.
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respective banks,

after a brief, unnecessary closing.

To

him, minor reforms and adjustments were all that were
required.43
Although convinced of the soundness of his system,
Hoover was gravely concerned about the abridgement of liberty,
even on a temporary or an emergency basis.

To him, regimen

tation was the greatest danger of modern society.
the breakdown of spiritual values, of the family,
home as an erosion of traditional safeguards.

He saw
and of the

He warned,

"We cannot extend the mastery of government over the daily
life of a people without somewhere making it master of our
souls and thoughts ."44
Men with a variety of viewpoints read Hoover's analy
sis of modern society, with its challenges to liberty.
Reviews of the book were mixed.

The W ashington Daily News

described it as "singularly free from personalities or
bitterness.1,43

The Wall Street Journal praised Hoover's di s 

passionate approach and his lucid analysis of "true liberal
ism."^

The Christian Century termed it "the m o s t powerful,

4 3 I b i d ..

169-171,

177, 184.

Wolfe, H o o v e r , 362.

4 4 Hoover,

Challenge to L iberty, 191, 193, 196, 203.
Even at this late date, H.H. denied a revolution had occurred
within the United States.
He did admit there were individ
uals who wanted to completely alter American society.
^

Nelsen,

W a s h i n g t o n Daily H e w s , August 22, 1934,
"Hoover Image," 160.

4^Wall Street Journal, September 28, 1934.

as cited in

both in tone and argument, that has yet appeared 11 but ques
tioned the former President's ability to accept change.47
New Dealers Donald Richberg and Harold Ickes and cor
respondent Heywood Broun denounced Challenge to Liberty as
representative of a near-anarchist frame of mind and as a
politically-motivated diatribe.4 8

Critic John Chamberlain

said Hoover's "need for self-justification" and his over
flowing bitterness were now undeniable.49
In a third viewpoint, William Allen White said Hoover
c n

was not an enemy of the N e w Deal goals but of its methods. w
Correspondent Wesley Mitchell credited the former President
wi t h a middle view,
tive elements.51

independent of the radical and conserva

Reviewer Allan Nevins categorized Hoover's

book as "high ground," impersonal, restrained, principled,
and a eulogy to "old standards, old aims,

and old tradi

tions ."52
Like the reviewers, politicians reacted diversely to

" M r . Hoover on the New Deal," Christian Century, LI
(October 3, 1934), 1230-1232.

48New York Times, September 6 , 1934; Washington Post,
September 5, 1934, and San Francisco N e w s , September 4, 1934,
as cited by Nelsen, "Hoover Image," 160.
49New York Times, September 28, and October 3, 1934, 1
5 QIbid. ,

September 28, 1934, 1.

5^Wesley Mitchell, "Mr. Hoover's Challenge to Liberty,
Political Science Quarterly, XLIX (1934), 599.
52ftiian Nevins, "The Battle of 1936 Begins," Saturday
Review of Literature, XI (October 6 , 1934), 155-172.
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the controversial booh.

Some Republicans claimed it was a

sacred text which would mobilize men of ’’reason and sanity"
into a resurrection of principles for American s o c i e t y . ^
The irascible James Beck damned the ’’morons" of The Hew
Republic and The Nation for trying to minimize
your m e s s a g e . E a r l

"the value of

Warren, a rising young Republican from

California, wrote his Chief,

"challenge to Liberty will

always be among my most prized possessions.’1^

Mills thought

the Chief's book had stemmed the tide and exposed the New
Deal's lack of principle.

However, he urged a fresh attack

along economic lines, for "the danger of individualism is
too remote to interest the average man, but the economic
failure is close to home."^®
The apolitical nature of the book gained little
acceptance in any quarter.

Spokesmen for the Administration

S^Henry j. Allen to Hoover, October 13, 1934, K-2,
said that he carried it around "like a Mohammedan carries
his Koran."
Silas Strawn to Hoover, October 10, 1934, K-132,
praised the common sense approach of the book.
Ashmun Brown
to Hoover, October 11, 1934, K-15, thanked H.H. for a
"coherent and well reasoned textbook on principles of govern
ment."
Lawrence Sullivan to Hoover, October 23, 1934, K-132,
noted the book was "a sensational success" and that HeraldTribune polls showed it as the top nonfiction seller in
forty-one o f the nation's forty-five largest bookstores.
S^Beck to Hoover, October 23, 1934, K-9.
^ W a r r e n to Hoover, August 23, 1934, K-145.

56
K-92.

Mills to Hoover,

September 7, and October 1, 1934,
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deprecated its v a l u e . E v e n

Republicans scoffed at the

facade of nonpartisanship of the book and noted its loaded
critique of N ew Deal methods and its pre-election timing.
Obviously it was much more than a simple restatement of
Hoover's philosophy of American Individualism.®®

Senator

Borah, with "the Presidential bee in his bonnet," accused
Hoover of firing the opening gun for a 1936 presidential

Surprisingly,

some of Hoover's most faithful lieu

tenants dissented on his analysis of American society.
Justice Harlan Stone softly disagreed by saying that modern
civilization, with all its complexity, made a return to the
ideal Jeffersonian state impossible.®®

Henry Stimson,

5^Donald Richberg, Harold Ickes, and Heywood Broun
wrote articles for various newspapers, condemning the book.
Nelsen, "Hoover Image," 160.
Hoover to Hyde, October 1, and
October 8 , 1934, K-39, and Strauss to Hoover, September 6 ,
1934, K-130, discussed the critical articles and their
sources.
®®"Pawns of the State," New Republic, LXXX (September
26, 1934), 181-182.
Literary Dicrest, CXVIII (August 25,
1934), 14, said that the book marked the return of H.H. to
the political arena.
Mayer, The Republicans, 432, notes
H.H.'s efforts to give the GOP a constitutional issue and
calls it a partisan move.
"Mr. Hoover on the N ew Deal,"
Christian C e n tury, LI (October 3, 1934), 1230-1232, speaks
of the book as "a campaign manual."
Cal 0 'Laughlin praised
the political utility of Challenge to Liberty. 0 'Laughlin
to Hoover, September 6 , 1934, Box 44, 0 'Laughlin Papers.
The N a t i o n , CXXXIX (September 19, 1934), 313-314, noted that
the book would be on the stands one month before the election.
®®Fort to Hoover, November 14, and December 12,
1934, K-38.
®®Cramer, Newton D. B a k e r , 263-264.
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although in complete accord with Hoover's "fundamental dis
tinction between liberalism and all other forms of govern
ment, " disagreed with the Chief on the attitude of the
American public.

Stimson doubted the people ha d "abandoned

the philosophy of their fathers."®-1'
Many lawyers,

journalists,

and politicians recognized

the political nature of Challenge to Liberty and applauded
its "exposure" of dangerous policies and m ethods . ® 2

Too,

the ex-President's intentions, hardly debatable, were under
lined when he urged his friends to write letters to their
newspapers on Challenge to Liberty in order "to irritate the
N e w Dealers."®®
As Hoover and his followers reflected on the chal
lenges to liberty,
loomed ever larger.

the importance of the November election
Too, Republicans throughout the nation

®lstimson to Hoover, July 12, 1934, K-129.
Stimson
was evaluating the draft of Challenge to Liberty which H.H.
had sent him.
® 2 0liver Street to Hoover, Ma y 21, 1934, K-132.
Allen to Hoover, October 13, 1934, K-2.
Beck to Hoover,
October 23, 1934, K-9.
Mills to Hoover, September 7, and
October 1, 1934, K-92.
0 'Laughlin to Hoover, September 6 ,
1934, Box 44, 0 ’Laughlin Papers, Strauss to Hoover,
September 6 , 1934, K-130.
®®Hoover to Allen, October 17, 1934, K-2, urged the
Kansan and his friends to write letters to the editor of
their newspapers concerning the book.
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wrote distressing news to the ex-President.
farm belt,

fiA

Even in the

for months an area of great dissent where agrarians

had denounced federal restrictions, men began to note the
rise in prices and the generous government checks.

The
65

pendulum was clearly swinging in favor of the Democrats. J
Saddened by election polls, Hoover painfully admitted,
don't shoot Santa Claus."^®
wrote:

"you

News correspondent Frank Kent

"The bribery of the nation is so complete and on such

a colossal scale that I can't see any reason the New Deal
should not win everything in sight at the coming

Spangler to Hoover, September 5, 1934, K - 127; Theo
dore Roosevelt, Jr., to Hoover, September 4, 1934, K-15, saw
no hopes of winning the East in November.
Congressman Bert
Snell of N ew York agreed that the East was "in a stupor."
The GOP would have to wait until another election for the
restoration of sanity.
Snell to Hoover, October 17, 1934,
K-126.
Alan Fox to Hoover, September 17, 1934, K-39, con
ceded New York to Democrats and noted that the strongest men
in the party refused to make the sacrifice.
Fox to Hoover,
October 3, 1934, K-39, said that personalities, not issues,
would assure the Democrats a November sweep. He also con
fessed the GOP was still badly divided.
Chairman Henry
Fletcher wrote H.H., August 31, 1934, K-38, that Republicans
would gain few if any seats in the Senate. Also see A.
Brown to Hoover, October 11, 1934, K-15.
^^Spangler to Hoover, September 5, 1934, K-127; Hyde
to Hoover, September 13, 1934, K-61; Allen to Hoover, October
13, 1934, K-2; Strawn to Hoover, October 10, 1934, K-132,
bemoaned the dole and the votes it assured for the Democrats;
Senator Dickinson charged the Democrats with "buying
favoritism" and implementing Tammany methods on a national
scale.
Dickinson to Hoover, November 1, 1934, K-29. Ogden
Mills wrote H.H. that Democrats were setting records through
out the nation in their "colossal outpouring of funds."
Mills to Hoover, September 7, and October 1, 1934, K-92.
®®Hoover to Spangler, September 10, 1934, K-127;
Hoover to Lewis Strauss, September 10, 1934, K-130, admitted
that the G O P 's hopes looked lean for November.
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election.As

Tammany methods swept across the nation,

Hoover feared that the people had "abandoned all their
creative thought.
Aside from the lean Republican prospects, Hoover
lamented the failure of so many party candidates to defend
principles or attach the major issues.

To him,

"jelly-fish"

politicians were accepting fifty per cent of FDR's platform,
and Vandenberg was "a profound example."^®

Frank Knox tried

to bolster his Chief's morale by showing that some Republi
cans were dispensing "the good, old-fashioned gospel.
Unreconciled, H o o v e r ’s faith in the party's future declined.
Following the disastrous November election, Hoover and
Chairman Fletcher grasped at every straw.

^ K e n t to Hoover, October

8

, 1934,

®®Dickinson to Hoover, November 1,

Admitting the

K-61.
1934, K-29.

^ H o o v e r to Will Irwin, August 27, 1934, K-61; Hoover
to Knox, October 2, 1934, K-72, began to doubt the party's
future.
^ H o o v e r to Hyde, October 1, 1934, K-61; Hoover to
Hurley, September 11, 1934, K-60; Hoover to Allen, October
17,
1934, K-2; Hoover to Knox, October 2, 1934, K-72; Hoover
to Reed, October 17, 1934, K-107, praised the Pennsylvanian
for "fighting the campaign on its main issue and the real
question of principle."
Hoover to Tox, October 8 , 1934, K39, praised Reed and Fess as the only ones not "trying to
pussyfoot into office." H.H. was probably upset with the
assaults on his administration and the weak defense of it by
congressional Republicans.
For example, see Cong. R e c ., 73
Cong. 2 Sess. (February 1, February 5, 1934), 1784-1785,
1795, 1934.
^ K n o x to Hoover, October 23, 1934, K-72.
72Hoover to Knox, October 2, 1934, K-72.
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party's loss within Congress,
strength outside.

they hoped it was gaining new

Although GOP totals had fallen since

1932, they noted that the Democrats had lost seven million
votes.

Consequently,

alive, even strong,

they concluded that the party was still

and had been beaten b y money.

Hoover tried to boost party morale and rally an oppo
sition.^

Republicans everywhere recognized the difficult

task they faced in the new C o n g r e s s . ^
the California election, where "sane"

Hoover thought that
(conservative) Demo

crats allied with the GOP to defeat the radical candidates,
portended an important lesson for the future.

73port to Hoover, November 7, 1934, K-38, noted that
Jersey Republicans ran less attractive candidates and suf
fered from a shortage of funds.
Hoover to Fletcher, November
8 , 1934, and Fletcher to Hoover, November 12, 1934, K-38.
Hoover to Fess, November 9, 1934, K-36, and Hoover to Dickin
son, November 9, 1934, K-29, discussed the heavy spending by
the Democrats.
Hoover to Reed, November 9, 1934, K-107.
0 'Laughlin to Hoover, November 12, 1934, K-101, pointed to
the relief rolls, the many concessions to Labor, the GOP
division, FDR's personality, and higher farm prices, as
explanations of the expansion of Democratic totals.
O 'Laugh
lin noted the GOP, with forty-six per cent, was strong enough
to challenge the N e w Deal in the future.
Despite the November
setback, the Literary Pi crest polls were most encouraging.
^ H o o v e r to Snell, November 9, 1934, K-126; Hoover to
Vandenberg, November 13, 1934, K-141.
"Defeatism stalked through the Republican camp." E.
Francis Brown, "The Moral of the Elections," Current H istory,
XLI (December, 1934), 279-283.
Vandenberg to Hoover, Novem
ber 8, 1934, K-141.
76Hoover to Snell, November 9, 1934, K-126; Hoover to
Vandenberg, November 13, 1934, K-141. Hoover hoped GOP
leaders in Congress might gain the cooperation of "sane"
Democrats to thwart the New Deal.
Later, Vandenberg would
become the famous advocate of bipartisanship in Congress.

1X0
Hooverite Arch Shaw of Chicago,

in a sourgrapes mood,

concluded that the elimination of Republican candidates who
refused to defend the Hoover Administration and attack Ne w
Deal transgressions was p r o p e r . 77

However,

Reed, Pennsylvania's powerful GOP leader,

Senator Dave

a firm advocate of

the Hoover line, had suffered an ignominious defeat.
and other stalwarts had been unseated.

78

Pess

Nothing could

cover the fact that the GOP h a d lost ten more Senate seats
and nineteen additional House seats.7 9

Regardless of what

they said to one another, Hooverites could find little
consolation.

In bitterness,

Reed said that the election was

"an a u c tion” and "an endorsement of [nothing] but ready
80
cash.”

Hoover assured the Pennsylvanian he would "be more

effective in awakening the public mind outside of the halls
81
of the Senate than even in them."ox

Pennsylvania voters agreed.

77ghaw to Hoover, November 9, 1934, K-119.
O 'Laugh
lin to Hoover, November 12, 1934, Box 44, O 'Laughlin Papers,
agreed with the opinion that some Republicans were deserving
of defeat.
Ashmun Brown to Hoover, November 15, 1934, K-15,
believed that the GOP invariable nominated weak candidates
for the 1934 races.
^ H o o v e r to Reed, November 9, 1934, and Reed to
Hoover, November 20, 1934, K-107.
Mayer, The Re p u b l i c a n s ,
432-435; E. Francis Brown, "The Moral of the E l e ctions,”
Current H i s t o r y , XLI (December, 1934), 278-283, said that
the defeats of Reed and Fess were particularly stinging.
^Mayer,

The R e p u b licans, 432-435.

®^Reed to Hoover, November 20, 1934, K-107, although
recognizing that money had beaten him, could not understand
h o w the American "people were fooled so easily."

8^Hoover to Reed, November 9, 1934, K-107.
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As Republicans reflected on the November debacle and
their own internal divisions, they recognized that the time
for national reorganization had arrived.

Once again, h ow

ever, they differed on the proper method for revival.

Cal

0 'Laughlin expressed a widely held contention that there
were too many prima donnas at the national level.

In the

Senate alone, Republican individualists like McNary, Hiram
Johnson, Norris, Borah, Nye, and even Vandenberg refused to
follow sound leadership.

Old Guard leaders in the East

refused to make concessions within the party organization
and hence progressive-Old Guard quarrels were frequent.
Someone from the center
and to

would have to revitalize the party,

Hooverites there was only one man for the job . ® 3
As Jerseyite Franklin Fort informed the Chief,

following a conference with Borah and publisher Frank
Gannett, all wings of the party wanted an alteration in the
Republican image.

Too long, Democrats had pinned the GOP

with placing "property rights before human rights." Although
Fort knew the two were inseparable, he recognized the problem.

Like his Chief, the Jersey adviser hoped to improve

the party's image and remain "left to Hilles, Pomeroy, and
Roraback" without moving in the direction of the

Q9
0

'Laughlin to

8 8 Ibid.;

Hyde to

Hoover, November 12, 1934, K-101.
Hoover, November 19, 1934, K-61.

8<% o r t to Hoover, November 14, 1934, K-38.

New Deal.®^
Progressives William Allen White and Roy Roberts of
Kansas also spoke for a revitalization of the party.

How

ever, they thought a Midwesterner, not closely identified
with the past administration, would serve as the best consolidator.

Both noted the availability of Frank Knox.
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As efforts to remold the national party gained momen
tum, the various state parties attempted to reorganize.
Earl Warren, the chairman of the Republican State Central
Committee in California, wrote his Chief asking for a
conference.

The purpose was to discuss the future of the

state party.
By late November, Hoover, pondering if his mail or
his recent public receptions signified anything, became
increasingly anxious to commence a public debate on issues.
He even encouraged a public request for his return to the
pO
stump.
Since the printed word had failed to awaken the

8®Hoover to Fort, November 17, 1934, and Fort to
Hoover, December 12, 1934, K-38.
As to Borah, the ex-President said, "he constitutionally just must be against every
thing.
If ever there was a program . . . in line with
Borah's sentiments” it was the New Deal.
®®Hyde to Hoover, November 19, 1934, K-61.
The
Missourian, following a talk with White and Roberts, reit
erated his belief that H.H. alone had "the name, the vision
or the popular support to undertake the task."
8 ?Warren to Hoover, November 23, 1934, K - 1 4 5 .
88Hoover to Hyde, November 23, 1934, K-61.
"I am
wondering if a group of 1 0 0 representative men over the
country could be organized to make a request that I undertake
a constructive debate of the measures before Congress . . .
as a needed public service."
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populace to its danger, perhaps public addresses would
revitalize America's conscience and bring her back to the
idea of liberty.

CHAPTER V
ON THE ROAD
As the new year began,

the ex-President prepa r e d to

take to the road w i t h a series o f public addresses w h i c h he
h o p e d w o u l d reawaken America's conscience.
once said:

As Raymond M o l e y

"No pol i t i cian w o u l d w i s h his words and actions

to be k n o w n as political;

to deny political m otives is a

first principle in the political a r t . H o o v e r ,
m i t t i n g h i m s e l f to rust in in a c t i v i t y , ”
prolific correspondence,

never

carried on his

issued numerous statements,

memos to his aides, p en n e d articles,

"per-

sent

and framed speeches

throughout the early months of 1935.^
Hooverites,
his sanctuary,

aware of their Chief's decision to abandon

vied for the opportunity to publicize his

public pronouncements.

Harrison Spangler,

the Iowa national

^Moley, F irst N e w D e a l , 7.
^Moos, The R e p u b l i c a n s , 395.
3Hinshaw, H o o v e r , 304, says that H.H. spent 1933-1934
reflecting on events.
Then, in the spring of 1935, "he went
forth to preach, according to his light, the gospel of the
p l ace of government in the life of an individual, the place
of the individual in his relations with other individuals
and government, and the place of the individual in God's
un f o l d i n g purpose for the u n i v e r s e . " See Hofstadter, Politi
cal T r a d i t i o n , 308, concerning H.H.'s assumption of "the
role of a hopeful J e r e m i a h . "

114

115
committeeman, pushed for a Midwestern Republican conference
in Chicago to demonstrate GOP vitality and to reassure the
public.

He indicated the willingness of non-Hooverites such

as John D. M. Hamilton of Kansas to cooperate in the rally.
Too,

Spangler thought that it was an opportune time to push

for a reorganization of the party.^

In January, Hoover,

ostensibly on a business trip, conferred with Chicago
C
Republicans.
Walter Newton, having learned of a Young
Republican meeting planned for Lincoln's birthday at Spring
field, urged his Chief to speak, on this auspicious occasion
and expressed the hope that such an address would be aimed
at young Republicans of the Midwest.®
Meanwhile, Hoover and Ashmun Brown continued to
analyze Roosevelt's budget and express disgust with the
administration's attempts to disguise its actual spending.
They found that FDR was transferring all public construction
and reclamation costs from their normal categories to the
"Recovery and Relief" section,

and then dispensing false

reports of a government surplus .7
Will Irwin, the C h i e f ’s closest friend, disclosed the

^Spangler to Hoover, January 4, 1935, K-127.
®Hoover Collection,

LXIV

(January

6

, 1935), Item

2176A.
®Walter Newton to Hoover, January 22, 1935, K-97.
7 A.

Brown to Hoover, January 14, 1935, and Hoover to
A. Brown, January 18, 1935, K-15.
Both men blasted FDR's
dual budget system.
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most startling political discovery.

Irwin, on a trip to New

Orleans, learned that the "Louisiana dictator, " Senator Huey
P. Long, was planning to run on a third-party ticket in the
presidential election of 1936.

The "ingenuous Long" expected

to split the Democratic vote, thus assuring the Republicans
of victory.

In return. Long expected the GOP to reward him

with "all the patronage south of the Mason and Dixon Line."
With this financial power base, the "Kingfish" could
O
seriously bid for the White House in 1940.
On February 12, Lincoln's Birthday, the former Presi
dent attended the National Republican Club Dinner in New
York City.

in a few brief remarks, Hoover praised Lincoln's

most admirable qualities of individuality, self-reliance,
courage, patience, tolerance, and intellectual honesty.
Hoover also made a p l e a for personal liberty and warned that
the public must always be master and "not the pawns of the
state . 1,9
Having broken his two year's silence, Hoover soon

®Irwin to Hoover, January 24, 1935, K-62. To Irwin,
Long was, "in his crooked, unscrupulous way, a genius." Con
cerning the Long strategy, see T. Harry Williams, Huey L o n g ,
794-801.
®New York T imes, February 13, 1935, 1. Hoover Collec
tion, LXIV (February 12, 1935), Item 2180.
Clinton Rossiter,
Conservatism In America (New York, 1955), 187-191, notes
that H.H. like all classical liberals, was devoted to Jeffer
sonian phrases and ideas.
Liberty was a favorite word with
which to defend laissez-faire.
Inasmuch as a man's eulogy
often describes characteristics the speaker himself admires,
Hoover's speech revealed his own desires.
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issued a public statement praising the Supreme court's
decision negating America's repudiation of the gold clause.
Hoover, a traditional defender of the gold standard and an
arch-opponent of any repudiation of the Covenant,

foresaw a

restoration of confidence in the dollar and hoped for a re
establishment of the gold standard.

He contended that such

action would restore jobs, create new ones, lower the
living costs, reassure creditors,

and check inflation.^®

Following Hoover's February barrages, Kansas Governor
Alf Landon, possibly courting the ex-President's favor,
struck up a correspondence with Hoover.
Hoover's "penetrating" economic analyses,
the country,

Landon, praising
stated:

"X hope

as well as the party, may have the benefit of a

more active interest m

politics on your p a r t . 1

Such words

must have been sweet music to H o o v e r ’s ears.
Cal 0

'Laughlin, ever laudatory, expressed his and

justice James Clark M cRe y n o l d s ' agreement with H o o v e r 's gold
statement.

19

Hoover,

aware of the political repercussions

his public views had caused, regretted that no other
Republican had been willing to protest the moral issues.

To

•^New York T i m e s , February 21, 1935, 1. Hoover Collec
tion, LXIV (February 20, 1935), Item 2185.
See Cong. R e c .,
74 Cong. 1 Sess. (February 21, 1935), 2379.
According to
Nelsen, "Hoover Press Image," 167-158, H.H. reclaimed his
role as spokesman for the "opposition" in his gold statement.
■^Landon to Hoover, February 22, 1935, K-74.
0

'Laughlin to Hoover, February 23, 1935, Box 44,
'Laughlin Papers.
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Hyde, he disclosed,

"X will not keep still any longer, and X
1 *3

an going to periodically shoot at the situation.N-1-J
Despite Hoover's efforts to breathe life into the GOP
corpse, other party leaders failed to exemplify his aggres
sive lead.

0 'Laughlin continued to inundate his Chief's

desk with pessimistic letters concerning the abuses of the
NRA, AAA., and other alphabetical organizations.

0 'Laughlin

forecast even greater chasms and disasters in the f u t u r e . ^
Hoover, in turn, wrote his lieutenants of "a real degenera
tion of the economic situation."
in drafting a forthcoming

He wished for Hyde's aid

a d d r e s s . - ^

Despite unusually strong opposition on the part of
his advisers, Hoover prepared a stinging message for the
Young Republican Convention assembling at Sacramento. °
Perturbed at the National Committee and Republican Congres
sional leaders, Hoover, although aware of the political
folly, decided to unburden his conscience.

He reasoned that

his unselfishness, and the hari-kari tone of his act, would
prove his disinterest in further political office.

Too, he

hoped that his GOP critics would realize, despite their

13noover to Hyde, February 25, 1935, K-61.
-*-^0 'Laughlin to Hoover, March 2, March 9, March 16,
March 23, and March 30, 1935, Box 44, 0 'Laughlin Papers.
H.H.'s pessimistic Washington adviser moved steadily to the
"right" throughout the 1930's.
l ^ H o o v e r

to Hyde, March 15, 1935,

K-61.

^ Ho o v e r to Hyde, March 17, 1935, K-61.
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selfish motives,

that there was "such a thing as patriotism

in the world.
In his address to the Sacramento convention,

the

former President urged young Republicans to accept "The
Responsibility of the Republican Party to the Na t i o n . "

He

insisted on a "defense of fundamental American principles"
and a restoration of the Constitution.

"The newly created

system of regimentation and bureaucratic domination," he
said,

"must be scrapped."

To Hoover,

the future of the

country depended on a rejuvenation of a vigorous GOP organi
zation.

He thought that the incumbent administration had

repudiated its obligations, debased the currency, multiplied
the national debt, bureaucratized every facet of the economy,
crushed competition,

restricted production,

violated the Constitution,

abetted monopoly,

and abridged individual liberty.

Hoover demanded a change in methods.

To him, real recovery

was possible only through individual initiative and a new
1 Q

opportunity free of regimentation and bureaucratic tyranny. °

l^Hoover to Hyde, March 19, 1935, K-61.
" T h e Responsibility of the Republican Party to the
Nation,” Herbert Hoover, Addresses Upon The American Road,
1933-1938 (New York, 1938), 40-44.
Hereinafter cited as
Hoover, Addresses on the R o a d . New York T i m e s . March 24,
1935, 1. Hoover Collection, LXIV (March 23, 1935), Item
2187. H.H. bemoaned the acceleration of class conflict.
He
hoped for a restoration of the traditional place of the
family, and of the home, in men's lives.
Democratic Congress
man Fred H. Hilderbrandt, a constant critic, lambasted H.H.'s
return to political activity.
The South Dakotan said that
it was tragic that Hoover wanted to revive a reactionary ele
ment which had continually impeded progress.
Concr. R e c . . 74
Cong. 1 Sess. (March 25, 1935), 4403.
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Correspondent Lawrence Sullivan wrote the ex-President:

"The Sacramento declaration is a smash!"

a rallying point for all New Deal opponents.
time in two years,

"the banner is u p . I n

It provided

For the first
championing an

aggressive attack on the New Deal, Arthur Hyde blasted the
"opportunism and cowardice of others" and urged Hoover to
give no quarter to the enemy.

He reminded his Chief that

"he who would be greatest among you shall be minister of
a l l . "2^

Rank and file Republicans were pleased with the

former President's return to the arena and applauded his
vigorous defense of "justice" and "right . " 2 1
Although Hoover,

searching for a method to gain

greater endorsement of his ideas, had hoped for a vigorous
"grass roots expression of Republicanism" from the Resolu
tions Committee of Midwest Republicans assembling in Kansas
City,

a distressed Hyde reported the failure of the committee

to enunciate principles or indict the New

D e a l .

22

Mis

sourian also noted a deterioration in party harmony as the
Kansas

clique pushed a Knox-Landon ticket for 1936.

if Republicans would only defend a

principle,

To Hyde,

"they can then

-^Sullivan, Memo #28, March

24, 1935, K-132.

2®Hyde to Hoover, March 23,

1935, K-61.

21por example, see John Broom to Hoover, March 25,
1935, K-15, and Oliver Street to Hoover, April 1, 1935,
K-132.
22Hoover to Knox, March 1, 1935, K-72, urged the
Chicago leader to move his group toward a positive defense
of their principles.
Hyde to Hoover, March 20, 1935, K-61.
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do their worst on candidates.

Charles H. Hilles,

the

national committeeman and New York "boss," concerned about
the continued splintering of the party, urged a private
Hoover-Hilles-Fletcher conference to discuss the party's
future.
Despite the setback at the Kansas city conclave,
Spangler promoted another Midwestern conference for early
June.

He believed that such a move would provide an

excellent chance to rally the prairie belt to Hooverian
ideas.

Recognizing the need to avoid further squabbles over

presidential candidacies, he pressed the leaders for the
selection of a neutral speaker.

Hyde wanted to invite

Colonel Charles A. Lindbergh to address the meeting.
Their Chief,

thinking in political terms, had a better idea.

Having reopened contact with Governor Lowden during the 1934
chairmanship fight and having cultivated the friendship of
this old Progressive, Hoover, recognizing the Illinoian's
influence with other segments of the party and anxious to
promote harmony,
for speaker.

suggested that Lowden was the ideal choice

Although the former politico had enjoyed seven

years of retirement, Hoover personally visited h i m in

^ H y d e to Hoover, March 20, 1935, K-61.
2^Hilles to Hoover, March 21, 1935, K-54.

2^Spangler to Hoover, March 26, 1935, K-127.
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a

/;

Illinois and coaxed him into making the Springfield address.
With the growing belief, obtained through his steadycorrespondence,

that his efforts were creating "a change in

public p s y c h o l o g y , ” Hoover began to take heart at America's
future.

He was convinced that the time was ripe for a

declaration of principles and a staunch defense of his past
record with its "positive” solutions for the depression.
him, only the N e w Deal ha d prevented r e c o v e r y . ^
Allen White h a d stated,

To

As William

inflationists and jealous Republicans

continued "to hurl garbage" at the ex-President because they
p

failed to recognize the depth of his economic analyses.
Yet,

to Hoover,

p

°

even the disbelievers were potential converts.

Hoover's return to political activity received ap
plause from a variety of Republicans.

An Alabama lawyer

expressed the hope that the former President would run the
N e w Dealers out of Washington.

pq

Relief associate Vernon

Kellogg praised his Chief as the natural

"leader of the

^^William T. Hutchinson, Lowden of Illinois (Chicago,
1957), II, 678-680.
Following H o o v e r ’s lead, Knox and Hyde
readily conferred with Lowden concerning the Springfield
Conference.
^ S t o n e to Hoover, March 23, 1935, and Hoover to
Stone, March 29, 1935, K-130.
Both me n perceived a change
in the public mood.
Also see Hoover to Spangler, M arch 29,
1935, K-127.
28white to Hoover,

February 26, and March 4, 1935,

K- 1 4 7 .
^ O l i v e Street to Hoover, April 1, 1935, K-132.
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Republican p a r t y =

Governor Landon, excited at Hoover's

reassertion of leadership, said:

"I, for one, am happy to

follow your leadership and will be glad to receive sugges
tions from you at any time . 11^fl
ouring April, talk of presidential candidates surfaced
at every Republican conclave.

Hanford MacNider, who had

been promoting a Knox boomlet for over a month, began to see
oO
d i v i d e n d s . I n fact, Knox, a former Bull Mooser, seeing
the

rapid momentum his candidacy was gaining, began tofear

a ’'premature” enthusiasm.^3

Nonetheless,

following a

Chicago conference with Hoover, Knox, in a private letter to
MacNider, disclosed the confidential admission that their
Chief,

"in the most specific terms,

never be a candidate again."

[stated] that he would

The Chicagoan, sympathizing

with Hoover, recognized the necessity for keeping his
silence in order to maintain a degree of influence within
the p a r t y . ^
In spite of, or because of, H o o v e r ’s renewed activity,
Republican divisions became more evident.

Hoover,

lamenting

-^Kellogg to Hoover, April 1, 1935, K-67.
^^Landon to Hoover, April

4, 1935, K-74.

■^Knox to MacNider, March 1, 1935, Series 5, Box 73,
Hanford MacNider Papers, Herbert Hoover Presidential
Library.
■^^Knox to MacNider, April 5, 1935, Series 5, Box 73,
Hanford MacNider Papers.
3^Knox to MacNider, April 5, 1935, Series 5, Box 73,
Hanford MacNider Papers.
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the lack of cohesion in the party, told Knox that GOP leaders
panicked every time he left Palo

A l t o .

35

Hilles,

in a letter

to Spangler, expressed the belief that the Midwestern co n 
clave must promote party harmony and concentrate on Ne w Deal
failures rather than Republican personalities.^^ 0

'Laughlin

reported a Fletcher-Hamilton split within the national h e a d 
quarters .^ 7
Magazines began speaking of the former President's
busy activities, especially his conferences with Eastern GOP
leaders.As

rumors flew concerning Hoover's candidacy as

well as his decision not to run again, his lieutenants urged
him to make no statements which would weaken his influence
oq

or imply endorsement of any other candidate.J=
disavowal would minimize his influence.

To them,

a

Too, Congressional

leaders, long envious of his popularity with rank and file
Republicans, would say that he was simply recognizing the
fact that he had no chance at the nomination . ^ 0

■^Hoover to Knox, April 29, 1935, K-72.
Also see the
N ew York T i m e s . May 8 , 1935, 1, concerning House leaders'
fear of another Hoover candidacy.
36nilles to Spangler, April 22, 1935, K-54.
370 'Laughlin to Hoover, April 27, 1935, Box 44,
0 'Laughlin Papers.
3%yews-Week, V

(April 27, 1935),

17.

39a . Brown to Hoover, April 29, 1935, K-15; 0 'Laugh
lin to Hoover, April 21, 1935, Box 44, 0 'Laughlin Papers.

4°Ibid.; A. Brown to Hoover, April 29, 1935, K-15.
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^ H o o v e r t o A. B r o w n , A p r i l 27, 1935, a n d A . B r o w n t o
H o o v e r , A p r i l 29, 1935, K-15.
Both me n were convinced that
a m a n f r o m t h e W e s t w o u l d b e t h e 1936 n o m i n e e .
H o o v e r to
0 ' L a u g h l i n , A p r i l 27, 1935, K-101, w o n d e r e d i f t h e E a s t e r n
press would ever realize that Mills was disinterested.
H.H.
h o p e d that some of the p r e s i d e n t i a l aspirants woul d awa ken
to the value of his p e r s o n a l endorsement of their candidacy.

A.

^Kellogg
B r o w n , M a y 3,

1935, K-25.

A p r i l 27, 1935, K-67? H o o v e r
K-15; H o o v e r t o C r e a g e r , M a y 16,

to Hoover,

1935,

to
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Midwestern Conference
Prior to the conclave, Hyde worhed on a draft of--his
own principles while Spangler pressed William Allen White to
accept the lead role in advocating a platform with Hooverian
ideas.

Although the Kansan expressed general agreement on

issues,

for personal reasons, he hesitated to participate

officially.^

Hoover, anxious for White's participation,

wrote the Kansan that the time had come to defend their
principles.

He urged White to move party leaders toward a

statement which defended the GOP record and pointed up the
international origins of the depression, the recovery under
way in 1932

(prior to the election and panic), the constitu

tional violations by the New Deal, and the direction to true
recovery.45

White, disturbed at the Republican failure to

formulate a constructive program and anxious to avoid embroil
ment in the factional disputes of his party, declined the
leadership role of the approaching c o n ference.^
Colonel Creager theorized that factionalism was

^ M i l l s to Hoover, May 13, 1935, K-92.
Donald R.
McCoy, "Alfred M. Landon and the Presidential Campaign of
1936," Mid-America, XLII (October, 1960), 204, says that
Mills was an official Landon adviser during the campaign.
^ H y d e to Hoover, May 10, 1935, K-61.
Spangler to
Hoover, May 13, 1935, K-127. Hyde to Hoover, April 29,
1935, K-61, expressed doubt concerning the Kansan's ability
to formulate "a decently conservative platform."
^^Hoover to Spangler, May 10, 1935, K-127.
46Hoover to Spangler, May 10, 1935, and Spangler to
Hoover, May 13, 1935, K-127.
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4?Creager bo Hoover, May 10, 1935, K-25.
40Hoover to Creager, May 16, 1935, K-25.
49Ibid.
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t o H o o v e r , M a y 29,
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5^Creager to Hoover, May 10, 1935, K-25.
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Knox.5^

Senator Borah and various Progressives

were accusing the N R A of discrimination and of abetting
monopoly.

In March,

1935, Roosevelt appointed a commission,

headed b y Clarence Darrow,
coercion,

to investigate the codes,

and their negative results.

their

When no reports were

printed and no Republican leader questioned the failure to
publicize the commission's findings, Hoover decided to

52

Knox to Hoover, May 1, and May

6

, 1935, K-72.

^ M i l l s to Knox, M ay 9, 1935, Box 11, Ogden Mills
Papers, Library of Congress.
Knox to Gordon 0 'Neill, May
15, 1935, Box 11, Ogden Mills Papers.
Creager to Hoover,
May 10, 1935, K-25.
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provide “some intellectual leadership for the p a r t y . O n
May 15, he issued a press statement on the NRA, indicting it
as "un-American in principle and a proved failure in prac
tice."

To him, the codes had retarded recovery by increasing

the "costs of production and distribution, and therefore
prices."

He said that non-consumption and unemployment were

the end results.

He charged the NRA with encouraging

monopoly by allowing certain violaters to bypass the anti
trust laws.

He noted a new degree of coercion and intimida

tion by federal bureaucrats.

He concluded that "we do not

construct new buildings on false foundations,

and we cannot

build a nation's economy on a fundamental error."

He called

for specific statutory laws abolishing the abuses which the
NRA had, in spite of its shortcomings,

sought to o v e rcome.^

As Hoover accelerated his activities, he noted and

55noover to Creager, May 16, 1935, K-25.
H.H.'s
charges were endorsed in the U. S. Senate Committee on
Finance, 74 Cong., 1 Sess. Hearings:
Investigation of the
National Recovery Administration (Washington, 1935), 1101,
1271, 1304-1307, 2010, 2215, 2396, 2399, 2602, 2604, 2669,
2633, 2891, 2847.
The testimony underlined the lack of
uniformity in administering the codes, the defective weak
nesses in the codes, the coercion, the circumvention of the
anti-trust laws, the destruction of competition, especially
the detriment to small business, and the impediments to
national recovery.
^ H o o v e r collection, LXIV (May 15, 1935), Item 2195;
New York Times, May 16, 1935, 1; Hoover, Addresses on the
Ro a d , 45-48.
On May 24, H.H. issued an additional statement
on the NRA, concentrating on its methods. Hoover Collection,
LXIV (May 24, 1935), Item 2197.
See Ogden L. Mills, What of
Tomorrow? (New York, 1935), 10-14, 65, 121-217. Mills used
Hooverian language in criticizing the N R A and economic
planning as violations of individual liberty.
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drew satisfaction from the "squirming" of his opponents.

57

The ex-President continued to w o r k for regional conferences
which w ould endorse his ideas.

Willis C. Hawley of Oregon,

an author of the controversial 1930 tariff,

sent Hoover a

list of Beaver State Republicans of "political experience
and influence" who shared their belief in "the great pri n c i 
ples of the Republican Party."58
On May 27, the Supreme Court invalidated the N R A as
unconstitutional.

Hooverites saw the decision as a personal

victory for their C h i e f as it was

"in accord with the views

you have been p u blicly expressing.
Although Ho o v e r was pleased with the Supreme Court's
decision, he was u n e a s y about the new proposals of the
Administration.
0

Throughout June, he received letters from

‘Laughlin describing an acceleration of demagoguery,

political opportunism, power grabs,
vidual

r

i

g

h

t

s

.

and violations of indi

Hoover became so obsessed with O

'Laughlin's

pessimism that he turned his Chicago parley with Governor

^ H o o v e r to O
O 'Laughlin Papers.

‘Laughlin, M a y 20, 1935,

Box 44,

SSwillis c. Hawley to Hoover, May 31, 1935, K-50.
Hawley informed H.H. that the Oregon party was as badly
divided as the national organization.
5 9creager to Hoover, M a y 29, 1935, K-25.
Doctor Joel
T. Boone to Hoover, June 6 , 1935, K-14, noted, "your sound
decisions upheld."
O 'Laughlin to Hoover, M a y 28, 1935, Box
44, 0 'Laughlin Papers, praised H.H.'s sagacity.
See Mason,
Supreme C o u r t , 84.
600 'Laughlin to Hoover, June 1, June 7, June 15,
June 22, and June 29, 1935, Box 44, O 'Laughlin Papers.
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Lowden into a discussion "of the administration's proposals
to change to a European form of government."®-**
The Springfield Conference loomed as a crucial event.
Hoover wired the delegates to fight for American principles.
They could "give heart to the country."®^

Despite the

initial success of the Hooverites in drawing up resolutions
which dissented from various Ne w Deal methods,
tion soon strayed from the Hoover path.®3

the conven

Governor Lowden1s

Springfield speech was all the Hooverites could have hoped
for as it indicted the New D e a l 1s NR A and AAA.

The latter

attack surprised some delegates to the extent that Hoover
was charged with writing the speech and then persuading
Lowden "to deliver it because of his greater influence with
rural Republicans."

Actually, L o w d e n 1s speech was aimed

primarily at the N R A but due to a few critical remarks on
the AAA, the speech was misinterpreted.

Notwithstanding,

it

had the Hoover tone.®^
Despite mixed reports thereafter,
acted independently of the Hooverites'

SlHoover Collection, LXIV
New York T i m e s . June 4, 1935, 1.

the Convention

advice.

(June 4, 1935),

The

Item 2200?

®^Hoover Collection, LXIV (June 6, 1935), Item 2201.
A message to Springfield Republican Grassroots Convention.
® 3Hyde to Hoover, June 13, 1935, K-61.
®^Hutchinson, Lowden of Illinois, II, 681.
The
Lowden biographer positively denies any Hoover authorship
and credits Lowden with penning the entire speech, even the
remarks on the AAA.
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Resolutions Committee endorsed a farm plank which included
an "equalization fee," anathema to Hyde.

Too,

the Mi s 

sourian was beside himself at its failure to include "a
statement on the cause of the depression" and to point out
Roosevelt's role in

abetting it.®'’

Arch Shaw of Chicago

denounced the Springfield conclave for rejecting Hoover's
depression theory and urged the ex-President to explain the
"facts" to the nation.®®

In a less objective report,

Creager informed Hoover that the conference was a great
success.

He noted a new harmony and enthusiasm.

He said

that divisive issues like agriculture had been avoided and
that "there was absolutely no evidence of the beginnings of
organized candidacies."

But then, Creager had conferred

mainly with Hurley, Hyde, Lowden,

and Fletcher.®^

Following the Springfield Convention, Ashmun Brown
noted the increasing number of anti-New Deal editorials,

and

wrote Hoover that his Challenge to Liberty and his recent
public statements were responsible for the growing signs of
courage.

To Brown, Hoover's inspiration was reflected in

Judicial decisions and New Deal criticism b y men in the
street.®®

®®Hyde to Hoover, June 13, 1935, K-61.
Newton to
Hoover, June 15, 1935, K-97, shared Hyde's disappointment.
Newton thought that the depression issue could not be
avoided and that the GOP erred in not "facing it squarely."
SSghaw to Hoover, June 21, 1935, K-119.
®^Creager to Hoover, June 22, 1935, K-25.
®®A. Brown to Hoover, June 14, 1935, K-15.
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On June 16, Hoover delivered the commencement address
at his alma mater, Stanford University.

He spoke on the

’’Essentials of Social Growth in America. "

Aware of public

interest in “so-called social security,” he enumerated the
principles of true security as the freedom "to develop their
own talents and to be rewarded for their effort" and "the
capacity to produce a plenty of goods and services with which
to give economic security to the whole of u s , " as well as a
set of constitutional "checks and balances" and independence
from the "concentration of economic or political power."
The ex-President reaffirmed his belief that "there are no
short cuts.

. . . Social security must be built upon a cult

of work, not a cult of leisure."

&9

Again, the former

President had enunciated an unmistakable stand against a New
Deal proposal.

Again, he had reaffirmed his belief in

American Individualism.
Hoover's was not the first voice raised in opposition
to social security proposals.

Weeks earlier two Negro

writers denounced the idea as a political trick.

They noted

that in the "black belt," states would control the Negro's
social security check and would continue the discrimination

^ % o o v e r , Addresses on the R o a d , 51-57.
Guerrant,
Comparisons and Contrasts, 80-86, notes H.H.'s classical
liberal approach to security. Wilbur and Hyde, Hoover
Policies, 48-52, 91, note H . H . ’s idea that "personal thrift"
was the key.
Too, H.H. favored an old-age plan through
private mutual life insurance companies with low premium
payments.
Also see "Hoover: Ex-President Gives His Idea of
'Social Security,'" News-Week, V (February 23, 1935), 9.
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that existed in other areas.

According to them, only a

"pollyanna optimist" could fail to see through the AAA,
NRA, and now the Social Security Bill.
Negroes,

the

They contended that

as marginal workers, had been the first to lose

their jobs under the NRA, and that they had also been under
differential wage scales as a result of the codes.

Too, as

tenants, Negroes had lost their livelihood as a result of
government restrictions under AAA and had rarely received
allotment checks from that a g e n c y . ^
As New Deal injustices mounted, Hoover became more
sensitive to the need of positive leadership.
President returned to the political stump.

The former

Speaking at

Grass Valley, California, on July 4, he warned that a
"crisis of liberty" was at hand and that "America had today
a transcendent mission to civilization,
safety.

far beyond our own

It is our high duty to hold bright the light of

individual l i b e r t y . " ^
Hoover's pique at his p a r t y ’s failure to defend

^Edito r i a l , "Social Security— for White F o l k , "
C risis, XLII (March, 1935), 80; George E. Haynes, "Lily-White
Social Security," C r i s i s , XLII (March, 1935), 85-86.
For an
early denunciation of NRA, see John P. Davis, "What Price
National Recovery?" Crisis, XL (December, 1933), 271-272.
Also see John P. Davi's, ^ Black Inventory of the N ew D e a l , ”
Crisis, XLII (May, 1935), 141-142, for charges of racial
discrimination in NRA, AAA, and PWA.
See Roos, NRA, for a
fuller treatment of this problem.
^ H o o v e r Collection, LXIV (July 4, 1935), Item 2209.
Congressman Hilderbrandt blasted Hoover's statements on
Liberty as "ludicrous" and as an apology for exploiters of
the working class.
Cong. R e c ., 74 Cong. 1 Sess (May 10,
1935), 7318.
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principle accelerated at much the same rate as speculation
on the 1936 presidential race.
remained the front runner.

For several months, Knox

Despite Hurley's assurance that

the former President had "absolutely no wish to return to
public office," Old Guard leaders as well as their progres
sive counterparts remained uneasy at Hoover's refusal to
disavow his own possible candidacy.^
Concerning the various rumors of Hoover's unavaila
bility, his disinterest, his endorsement of Knox, and his
alleged intention of publicly announcing his decision to
seek no more public offices,

a disturbed Hyde wrote;

"Please

do not let them drive you far enough to say you would not
accept if drafted."

And "don't slam the door against the

7o
rise,of a sentiment which may yet come."/J

New Hampshire's

George M o s e s , ^ colonel C r e a g e r , ^ and Henry R. Adams, a
California Republican, equally upset with recent rumors,

^ H u r l e y to Hoover, July 1, 1935, K-60.
^ H y d e to Hoover, July 1, 1935, K-61. The Missourian
reported that many of his friends and acquaintances thought
that H.H. was the most experienced and able leader in the GOP
but that they doubted his availability or his election
chances.
However, such reasoning, to Hyde, did not "prevent
the growth of a positive pro-Hoover sentiment" in the near
future. Fearing a disavowal statement from his Chief, Hyde
urged caution, moderation, and the maintenance of an open
door.
7A
^ M o s e s to Hoover, July 2, 1935, K-95, also encouraged
further Hoover-Knox negotiations.
^ C r e a g e r to Hoover, July 8, 1935, K-25.
Creager
pointed to the political advantages of remaining silent and
urged H.H. to consolidate his "influence in the party and
in the next national convention."
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wrote Hoover to

abstain

from any public disavowal.78

Chicago lawyer Nathan W. MacChesney,

a Hooverite but

one outside the inner circle, hoped that the ex-President
would maintain his noncommittal attitude on a possible
candidacy.

Having heard businessmen discuss Hoover's

ability and the fact that he was the "logical candidate, 11
MacChesney thought that he saw a drift in Hoover's direc
tion.7^

After a trip to the west

c o a s t , 7^

the Chicagoan

announced that critical times might force a draft-Hoover
move since the ex-President remained "the strongest single
candidate" for office.

7Q

A rank and file Republican, John

Broom, endorsed the MacChesney statement and called on
Hoover to expose the "Raw Deal."®®
In the month of July there were a myriad of m i s takes.
The Kansas City Star reported,

in an authoritative tone,

that Hoover privately had given Knox his blessing.

Arthur

Hyde attempted to force a retraction by editor Roy Roberts

78Adams to Hoover, July 20, 1935, K-l.
Adams pre
dicted that the nation would again call on Hoover for
leadership.
77MacChesney to Richey, July 5, 1935, K - 8 6 .
78Ibid.
"I am leaving for California tomorrow night
where I plan to see M r ..Hoover and talk things over with
him. "
78Los Angeles T imes, July 13, 1935, 1.

80Broom to Hoover, July 8, and November 19, 1935,
K-15.
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but left the waters even more muddied.

Henry Fletcher

allowed or encouraged the National Committee to circulate
copies of Post articles which placed the ex-President in a
bad light.83

Hoover was so incensed that he considered

publicly demanding a change in the chairmanship.®3

Spangler

equally irritated with Fletcher's conduct, admitted that the
Chairman should spend even more time "at the golf course in
Greencastle" but thought a public breach was unwise since
many of their opponents would accuse Spangler of desiring
the party post.®^

The Spangler note tempered Hoover's anger

In fact, when Ogden Mills wrote the Chief demanding a shakeup in national headquarters, Hoover calmly replied that the
time was wrong.

He did promise, however,

reorganization in the future.

to work for

Hoover also concluded that

Fletcher was

"now only a dummy for Hamilton" who was under
oc
the wing of the Chicago group.
The former President remained uneasy at the efforts

®-*-Hyde to Hoover, July 4, 1935, K-61.
The Star p r o 
moted the Landon candidacy.
Roy Roberts became the Governor
publicity agent.
See James W. Davis, Presidential Primaries
Road to the White House (New York, 1967), 180; Herbert Eaton
Presidential Timber (London, 1964), 363; and McCoy, "Landon
and the Campaign of 1936," 197, 198, 202. McCoy says that
H.H. "could not be considered out of contention." Hence,
the article was probably a deliberate effort to discern
H.H.'s actual intentions.
82nc>over to Spangler, July 15, 1935, K-127.
8 3 Ibid.
®^Spangler to Hoover, July 18, 1935, K-127.
8 ^Mills to Hoover, July 22, 1935, and Hoover to Mills
July 30, 1935, K-92.
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to deprive his friends of influence within the party hierarchy.

Hoover and some of his advisers continued to press

the Party for a defense of his administration and for a
popularization of his depression-recovery theory.

They

reasoned that the depression could not be avoided as a c a m 
paign issue and that an aggressive attack was the best means
to minimize its effect.8^
In spite of Roosevelt's novel experiments,
remained on a low key.

the economy

The processing tax stifled the tex

tile industry in Rhode Island and undoubtedly affected
election results in the small New England state.

The August

returns were so surprising that several Eastern newspapers
predicted that FDR would be a one-term President.
Throughout the nation,

88

consumers' prices soared.

Inflation was reflected in the astronomical rise in food
stuffs,

and especially in meat prices.

taxes spiraled upward,

As living costs and

there was increasing talk of C o n 

sumers' Leagues as a means to protest government policy.88

88Hoover to Spangler, July 24, 1935, K-127.
8 ^Hoover to Ashmun Brown, July 25, 1935, K-15.
88 a . Brown to Hoover, August 12, 1935, K-15.
New
York T i m e s , August 7, 1935, Ne w York Herald Tribune, August
7, 1935, Worcester Telegram, August 7, 1935, and Providence
Journal, August 9, 1935, with their editorials on the elec
tion, are included in the Brown to Hoover letter of August
12, 1935.

88Ibid.; Henry J. Allen to Hoover, September 6, 1935,
K- 2 .
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On August 11, Hoover released a public statement
indicting the Administration's efforts to alter the Consti
tution.

He warned of the destruction of the "balance of

powers."

He argued that Congress had surrendered its checks

on executive authority, that the federal government had vio
lated states rights, that bureaucracy had become a leviathan,
and that constitutional revision was being promoted in an
effort to alter the Supreme Court's challenge to the concen
tration of power in the hands of the e x e c u t i v e , A l a b a m a ' s
national committeeman,

Oliver Street, wrote the former

President that he alone among national leaders had pointed
to "the supreme issue"— concentrated power.

The lawyer urged

Hoover to wage "an aggressive war on Roosevelt."9-1*
As Hoover-oriented Republicans continued to push for
a platform of

p r i n c i p l e s ,9^

Spangler convinced Fletcher to

call a September meeting of the Executive Committee.

The

GOP Chairman also agreed to cooperate with the Grass Roots
movement in the Midwest and designated Spangler, Hamilton,
and I n d i a n a 1s George Ball to head the Chicago organization.93

^^Hoover Collection, LXIV (August 11, 1935), Item
2211. N e w York T i m e s . August 12, 1935, 1. Also see Mills,
What of Tomorrow? 7-10, for a denunciation of the suspension
of the constitution and unlimited executive power.
91Street to Hoover, August 12, 1935, K-132.
9^Henry Adams to Hoover, August 7, 1935, K-lr
Spangler to Hoover, August 20, 1935, K-127.

93Ibid.

140
Throughout the summer of 1935, the Knox presidential
bandwagon gained steam.

The Bull Mooser made inroads in New

Jersey,94 Iowa,95 North Dakota,96 and Georgia.97
friendly to the former President,
Hoover's blessing.^8

assumed that Knox had

When Knox came within one vote of

Senator Lester Dickinson in Iowa,
burst.89

Delegates,

the GOP Senator's balloon

Senator Borah's drive also stalled.-1-99

Senator

Arthur Vandenberg, waiting in the wings, needed the endorse
ment of the Western Progressives if he was to become a serious
c a n d i d a t e .-1-9-1Republican National Committeeman Mark Requa of Cali
fornia conferred with Earl Warren,

the state Attorney General,

and informed his Chief that California laws negated any p o s 
sibility of running uninstructed delegates for the national
convention as a group.

Each delegate, by state law, must be

94port to Hoover, July 27, 1935, K-39.
95icnox to MacNider, August 23, 1935, Series 5, Box
73, Hanford MacNider Papers.
96i b i d . . August 30, 1935.
97h . H. Turner to Hoover,

September 9, 1935, K-15.

98lbid.
99Knox to MacNider, August 23, 1935, Series 5, Box
73, Hanford MacNider Papers.
-'-"waiter Myers to Hoover, August 20, 1935, K-97.
lOlport to Hoover, July 27, 1935, K-39.
Fort dis
closed the attractiveness of Vandenberg to Washington leaders
and the "old Regular crowd," many of w hom thought that H.H.
was unavailable.
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elected individually.l0^

Ne w Yorker Alan Fox, persistently

pressing his chief towards an active candidacy, conferred
with Oklahoma Republicans and learned of a surprising rankand-file receptivity for the former President.

Although the

majority of pro-Hoover men believed that he was unavailable,
and although Fox admitted that his Chief could not openly
seek the nomination,

the New Yorker thought that Hooverites

could encourage a public demand for the ex-President.-L®3
Larry Richey, H o o v e r ’s alter-ego,

encouraged Fox and other

friends of the Chief "to do whatever you can."1®^
When rumors spread concerning a break in the Hoover
inner circle, Lewis Strauss,
ferred with Mills.

a confidant of the Chief,

con

Strauss soon denied "the defeatest

attitude attributed to" the disciple and said that Mills
continued to see Hoover as the antithesis to the New
Deal.105
As the September meeting of the executive Committee
approached,

Spangler reminded his Chief of its importance

102j^eq Ua to Hoover, August 12, 1935, K-108.
The
motive for this inquiry remains uncertain.
Knox, the closest
candidate to H . H . 1s ideas, was the frontrunner.
Only later
did Landon emerge as the man to beat.
Perhaps H.H. was
reconsidering his own position as a non-candidate.
103pox to Richey, August 27, 1935, K-39.
104Richey to Fox, September 11, 1935, K-39.
l®^strauss to Hoover, September 17, 1935, K-130.
Strauss conceded that Mills' conversation might have been
"tempered by knowledge" of Strauss' own sympathies.
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and the need to mobilize all Hooverites.

lOfi

The former

President urged Franklin Fort to push for a publicity drive
by the organization and a delegation of more power to
Spangler and the Midwestern group.

Hoover also wanted a

direct appeal to the youth of the nation and an acceleration
of efforts at the local level.
Hooverites such as Earl Warren remained agitated at
the expanding federal bureaucracy, the regimentation of
Americans "into a socialistic state, and the [centralization
*| rjp

of] all power in Washington.

consequently the need for

positive alternatives accelerated.

Fort decided to send up

"a trial balloon" in an effort to prove the need for a
stronger platform on principles.I-®9
For his part, Hoover made a Constitution Day Address
at San Diego, California, on September 17.
Bill of Rights."

He spoke on "The

Hoover accused alien philosophies popular

in Europe with creating "a new slavery" in their violations
of individual rights and their distortions of the role of
government.

To him, the Bill of Rights were as clear as the

Ten Commandments.

Moreover,

"behind them is the conception

-*-®^Spangler to Hoover, September 10, 1935, K-127.
^®^Hoover to Fort, September 14, 1935, K-39.
-L®8Warren to Hoover, September 18, 1935, K-145.
Warren damned federal regulation of business and agriculture.
He thought that it was incredible that farmers could be
imprisoned for raising more than five bushels of potatoes
without a federal permit.

109port to Hoover, September 18, 1935, K-39.
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which is the highest development of the Christian faith:
the conception of individual freedom with brotherhood."
Hoover,

the new panaceas lacked virtue,

He said,

To

reason, or legality.

"Liberty is safe only by a division of powers and

[through] local self-government. " H O
Following the National Executive Committee meeting,
Walter Brown sent a full report to his Chief.
pated,

As antici

Spangler had been named to chair Western activities.

The Iowan promised to promote Young Republican Clubs and
Leagues across the country.

GOP finances were improving.

There was an increasing optimism regarding a platform of
111

principles.

Throughout 1935, Hoover made "what h e regarded as
authoritative definitions of party d o c t r i n e .
he worked through the National Committee.
stumped the country.

At times

More often he

As an orator, he was ineffective,

he read his uninspired speeches monotonously,
his eyes from the m a n u s c r i p t .

"for

rarely lifting

Yet, hi s oratorical

11 n
J"LUHoover, Addresses on the R o a d , 58-62.
Ne w York
T i m e s , September 18, 1935.
See Cong. R e c .. 74 Cong. 1 Sess.
(August 12, 1935), 12872.

H l w . Brown to Hoover, September 26, 1935, K-16;
Spangler to Hoover, September 30, 1935, K-127.
Brown's reso
lution on behalf of Spangler was unanimously endorsed.
Hooverites were in the saddle as far as the Executive
Committee was concerned.
H2jyiayer, The R e p u b licans, 436.
ll^Qeorge Creel, Rebel At Large (New York, 1947), 266.
Creel also noted H.H.'s improvement as an orator after his
presidency.
By the mid-1930's, H.H. looked at his audience.
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efforts were improving.
variation.

Even his phraseology reflected a

There was increasing talk, even some articles,

concerning the "new" Hoover— mellow, pungent, and h u m a n . ^ ^
Correspondents were amazed at the buoyancy, optimism,
camaraderie of the oppositionist leader.

and

His biting sarcasm

and analytical "brilliance” sparkled in his Oakland
lie

address.

Speaking to the California Republican Assembly on
October 5, 1935,

the ex-President focused on "Spending,

Deficits, Debts and Their Consequences."
return of common sense, Hoover said,

In his plea for a

"The issue of America

is not a battle of phrases, but a battle between straight
and crooked thinking."

He denounced a "policy of deliberate

spending," an unbalanced budget, and increasing debts.

He

lamented the fiscal maneuvers of the Administration and
warned that generations upon generations would have to pay

chose his w o r d s , and elucidated many p r o blems. Also see
Guerrant, Comparisons and Contrasts, for a critical evalua
tion of H.H.'s speaking liabilities.
114schlesinger, Politics of U p h eaval, 526-527.
"Hew
Hoover Challenges New Deal," Literary Digest, CXX (October
12, 1935), 8.

115xbid. Also see"GOPossibilities," Time, XXVI
(October 14, 1935), 15-16.
Time noted a "new," vigorous
H.H. and spoke of him as the "only national figure" in the
GOP.
"Hoover: Ex-President’s Attack Shows New Vim, Vigor,
Humor, " News-Week, VI (October 12, 1935), 12, credited Ben
S. Alien, an Associated Press correspondent, with influ
encing H.H.'s n e w style.
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for present mistakes.-**-**^

He noted that the national debt

was rising some three and a h a l f billion dollars a year and
that the only w a y to recovery was through a sound fiscal
program such as that which his own administration had p ur
sued.

He called on the public to end "the most gigantic

spoils raid in our h i s t o r y .
Despite its unprecedented power,

the N e w Deal,

Hoover's mind, h a d failed in area upon area.

in

He pointed to

the unemployment figures which h a d remained w i t h i n half a
million of the 193 2 totals,

to budget deficits,

to inflation,

to the repudiation of debts, to the rise in consumers'
prices,

and to the declining living standards as evidence

a "mistaken" policy.

To him,

retrenchment,

fiscal p o l i c y , " was the answer.

in a

of

"sound

Hoover called for a restora

tion of liberty and admitted that the road ahead was rough
but that it was the only way.

He concluded:

spend ourselves into a real prosperity.
to bankruptcy.'1

"We cannot

That is joyriding

He predicted that the election of 1936 would

be the most important of the century.-*-’*-®
Hoover was repeating the indictments that h e had made

116i b i d .; N e w York T i m e s , October 6, 1935, 1; Hoover,
Addresses on the R o a d , 63-65.
Also see Mills, W h a t of
T omorrow? 47-64, 76, for a similar concern over spending,
deficits, and debts.
James P. Warburg, Hell B e n t For Elec
tion : (Garden City, 1935), 9, 14, 17, 25-27, is extremely
critical of F D R ’s economic policy.

l^Hoover, Addresses on the Road, 65-67.
H 8 lbid., 68-73.
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in Challenge to L i b erty.

Although his content remained

soaked with words such as regimentation,
balanced budgets,

individualism,

centralization,

and liberty, he showed

"surprising flashes, even grim humor."

Above all, a

crusading fervor radiated his fierce determination to awaken
the country to its spiritual decline.

At times he achieved

eloquence in invoking an older America of individual enter
prise and individual responsibility.11!^

Hoover's spiritual

motif was constantly reflected in his correspondence.
rank-and-file admirer, he said:

Of a

"Here is another

disciple.1,120
As October drew to a close, various Republicans sought
Hoover's advice on the forthcoming campaign.121

Sol Levinson,

the financeer, a Borah booster, worked for a reconciliation
between the "Lion of Idaho" and the former President.

At

the least, he hoped to elicit Hoover's promise to support
Borah should the Senator gain the Republican nomination in
1936.122

H ^ S c h l e s i n g e r , Politics of Upheaval. 526-527.
120Hoover to Shaw, October 19, 1935, K-119.
H.H.
commented on the laudatory letter from Colonel Charles R.
Gow which endorsed H.H.'s ideas.
121styles Bridges to Hoover, October 30, 1935, K - 1 5 .
The rising young H e w Hampshire Republican, a Hoover admirer,
said that his state would send an uninstructed delegation to
the 1936 convention but assured H.H. that Knox, as a "native
s o n , " would enjoy solid support.
122Richey to Hoover, November 21, 1935, K-14, belat
edly reported Levinson advances,
Borah was emphasizing the
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Although Hoover ignored the Borah overtures, he sent
Richey a memo of contentions that he wished Borah had the
sense to recognize.

The list cited the need for the GOP to

unite against the New Deal rather than commit self-destruc
tion; to realize that Hoover had "no organization seeking
delegates" and had "refused to allow anything of the kind";
that the Old Guard and Hoover were antagonists; that Borah
and Hoover had many similar views; that both "should keep an
open mind that [would] enable them to use their influence to
secure some proper man and a proper set-up of Republican
principles";

that Hoover was not opposed to a Borah candi

dacy; and that Borah should give the country assurance that
he would not bolt the GOP in 1936, regardless of the candi
date. 123

it

on to Levinson.

xikely that Richey passed this information
It is equally doubtful that Borah accepted

the validity of the Hoover pronouncements.
Hoover's burst of activity and his numerous trips
across the country fanned speculation that he was indeed a
candidate for the 1936 presidential nomination.

Consequently,

Arthur Sears Henning of the Los Angeles Times obtained an
interview with the former President.

According to Henning,

ideas he shared with H.H. concerning distaste for the Old
Guard and the N e w Deal.
Borah led the October public opinion
polls with forty-two per cent, more than Landon and H.H. com
bined.
These three men remained at the top of the polls from
October, 1935 to May 1, 1936. Hadley Cantril (ed.), Public
Opinion, 1935-1946 (Princeton, 1951), 590-597.
Also see
McKenna, Borah, 315, 322-326.

l^^Hoover memo, 1935, Borah folder, K-14.
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Hoover was not actively seeking the nomination and was very
conscious of his depression image and the "disastrous defeat"
of 1932.

The ex-President was dedicated to exposing the

defects of the New Deal and, according to Henning, was
simply sounding the trumpet for the loyal opposition.

Hoover,

he said, wanted a change, regardless of who led it.-*-24
In a press statement of November 11, 1935, Hoover
reasserted that his only objective was the defeat of FDR and
the restoration of principles.

He thought that "the first

duty of the Republican Party is a just and frank debate of
the N e w Deal."

Speaking of the various failures of N e w Deal

policies, he predicted the desertion of millions of D e m o 
crats to the Republican ticket in 1936.
On November 16, Hoover,
"The Consequences of
For I t . "

in New York City,

'Economic Planning'

Although he realized that if he

spoke on

and Some Remedies
"were simply to

read the Ten Commandments it would be interpreted as critical
by the Administration, " he wanted to point up the "planned
extravagance" which was prevalent.

"The starry-eyed young

124^1-thur Sears Henning, "Menaces of N ew Deal Hoover's
Chief Concern," Los Angeles T i m e s , November 9, 1935.
Henning
did admit that H.H. would accept another nomination in the
event the convention turned to him.
l-2%[oover collection, LXIV (November 11, 1935), Item
2230, includes articles speculating on Hoover's possible
candidacy.
The newspapers included were the Chicago Daily
N e w s , November 11, 1935, Washington P o s t , October 7, 1935,
New York Times. November 8, 1935, Palo Alto T i m e s . August
24, and October 10, 1935, and a clipping from N ews-Week,
November 23, 1935.
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men in Washington, " he charged, were impoverishing the nation.
He doubted that any amount of rhetoric could conceal their
passion for

p o w e r .

-*-26

Hoover used the departure and disillusionment of
numerous "brain-trusters," government officials,

and even

cabinet members as ''proof" of the inadequacy of New Deal
planning.

He concluded that the nation was rapidly progres

sing toward the end with its alphabetical agencies.
castically, he said,

Sar

"but of course the New Russian alphabet

has thirty-four letters."127
In a biting manner, Hoover blasted the "carefree
scattering of public money" as exhibited in the budget, the
increasing debt, and the relief roles.

To him, economic

planning was limiting competition, restricting production,
concentrating power in Washington, abetting monopoly, and
creating a "planned scarcity."
was repeating past mistakes.

He said that the New Deal
To him, history had long

proven the lack of wisdom in fiscal irresponsibility and the
hampering of individual freedom.

1

90

Perhaps the worst aspect

126fjOOVer, Addresses on the Road, 75-76. Hoover Co l 
lection, LXIV (November 16, 1935), Item 2231. New York
Times, November 17, 1935, 1. Also see "Politics:
Hoover
Rounds Up His Forces and Looks To His Fences," Newsweek. VI
(November,23, 1935), 12.
■^^Hoover, Addresses on the Road, 77-79.
In his
sarcasm, H.H. suggested that New Dealers, in order to exhaust
the American alphabet, might establish a Quick Loans Cor
poration for Xylophones, Yachts, and Zithers.
128jj00verf Addresses on the Road. 81-85.
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of the "planned economy," he said, was its cost to farmers,
workers, and businessmen who would pay the price far into
the future.

He called for an end to "planned extravagance."

He concluded that the time had arrived for "plain speaking."
America must face the facts. ^
Following Hoover's New York address, Justice Stone
praised his Chief's sound, courageous, constructive effort
to point up the fallacies in the economic policies of the
New Deal.

Stone lamented America's loss of markets as a

result of artificial restrictions on production.

He rea

soned that the public would be shocked when it learned the
complete truth about the spreading bureaucracy.-*-^^ Encouraged
by Stone's candor. Hoover promised to continue hammering at
principles.

He said,

"I have no other interest than to see

that the issues are put before the country.

...

As you

seemed to like the last book in this so far compiled Bible,
X send you a copy of it."^-^-*The "hermit of Palo Alto" crossed the Rockies fourteen
times between 1933 and 1935.-*-22

His efforts, coupled with

the Republican's November showing throughout the East, buoyed

129Ibid.
-*-29Stone to Hoover, private, November 19, 1935, K-130.
-^-^H.H.'s belief in the sacredness of his message is
unmistakable in this letter. Hoover to Stone, November 27,
1935, K-130.
GXX

132)iH0o v e r 1s New Deal
(November 23, 1935), 5.

'Remedies,'" Literary D i g e s t .
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party hopes.

] o*i

Even Ogden Mills regained a certain opti

mism concerning the 1936 election.

The New Yorker, however,

became increasingly uncomfortable in Hooverian circles where
he felt "self-accusations of disloyalty" from his statement
that Governor Landon was "an outstanding contender."134
Walter Brown, recovering from a protracted illness,
resumed working with the chief in late November.

Brown

urged Hoover to time his next speech so as to anticipate the
National Committee meeting.

This, he reasoned, would boost

party morale.-*-35
As the date for the conclave approached, Creager and
Hoover discussed the possible sites for the 1936 Convention,
its timing,

and other matters.

The Texan was most concerned

with capitalizing on Democratic discord.
late time,

Thus, he favored a

in order to benefit from any divisions which

developed at the Democratic Convention, and an alliance with
Constitutional Democrats, to be gained by nominating someone

133 q 'Laughlin to Hoover, November 9, 1935, Box 44,
0 'Laughlin Papers. N e w York T imes, November 8-9, 1935, 1.
■^-^^Strauss to Hoover, November 27, 1935, K-130.
Whatever H.H.'s intentions were, "a coterie of personal sup
porters preferred another catastrophe at the polls to the
abandonment of the ex-President." Mayer, The Republicans,
436. Strauss, ever loyal to H.H., probably encouraged Mills'
feeling of disloyalty.
Strauss to Hoover, November 27,
1935, K-130.
135Brown t-0 Hoover, November 20, 1935, K-16. Brown
to Richey, telephone conversation, November 29, 1935, K-16,
urged a speech on agriculture.
He also disclosed Ted
Joslin's endorsement of Landon.
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like Senator Harry Byrd of Virginia for the second spot on
the ticket.

The ex-President emphasized the desirability of

choosing St. Louis or Cleveland as the site because of the
Midwestern flavor.

He admitted that St. Louis might attract

more dissident D e m o c r a t s .135
Speaking at the John Marshall Republican Club in St.
Louis, December 16, 1935, Hoover concentrated on "the Bank
Panic and Relief Administration Reform."

Concerning FDR's

recent defense of his economic policy, Hoover said:
will not be astonished if we do not agree.

...

"You

In its

larger dimensions this irrepressible conflict is between the
American system of liberty and N ew Deal collectivism."
Hoover denied that "the mechanics of civilization," as
Roosevelt h a d put it,
To Hoover,

"came to a dead stop on March 3, 1933."

such a partisan statement was without founda

tion .3-37
At St. Louis, Hoover presented his pe t thesis that
his administration h a d checked the depression in the summer
of 1932,

that recovery had

with its uncertainties ha d

begun, and that only
halted

the

the election

upswing. Concerning

the "so-called collapse of the banking s y s t e m , " ninety-two
per cent of the banks were

proven

own admission.

it was the N e w Deal which ha d led

To Hoover,

sound even by Roosevelt's

1 3 6 c r e a g e r to Hoover, December 2,
Creager, December 10, 1 9 3 5 , K - 2 5 .

1935,

^•^Hoover, Addresses on the Road, 87-88.

and Hoover to
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to a "breakdown in confidence.

3®

The former President was incensed at efforts to smear
him as inhumane.

Had the public forgotten his experience as

a relief worker and Food Administrator?

He recalled that he

had seen far too much human suffering, hunger, and despair.
He had witnessed more than his share of wars,
famines.
tion,

floods, and

To Hoover, however, relief was an emergency opera

"not a social experiment."

"more red tape than relief."

He saw the Hew Deal as

He castigated visionaries and

politicians for claiming that the people had suffered in
silence until the New Deal came along and solved all their
problems.

In reality, he said, the panacea had broken

people's spirits.
Hoover, warning to the attack, quoted the Democratic
mayor of Pittsburgh as charging the New Deal with creating
"a blood clot in the arteries of industry."

For his part,

Hoover urged a re-establishment of checks and balances,
of the division of power.

and

He noted that the public must

"learn that there are other things moving around in the dark
besides Santa Claus."140
Following Hoover's St. Louis speech, Creager, who had

138ib i d ., 89-92.
Also see "Who But Hoover?" New
Republic, LXXXV (December 4, 1935), 92-95, for a discussion
of the Hoover depression theory.
The article concluded that
it was human to excuse his failure but wrong to deny it.
l3®Hoover, Addresses on the Road. 92-95.

140Ibid.. 96-99.
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listened to it with Spangler,

Brown, Requa, and other members

of the inner circle, wired the former President:
effective speech we have ever heard.
to the p a r t y . "^41

...

"most

A great service

jyiore and more Republicans were seeing

Hoover as the logical candidate.

To them, he was the intel

ligent, courageous, uncompromising leader who could offer
alternatives to the Ne w Deal.
campaign for principle.

Fort urged an aggressive

He said that Hoover,

as the "ablest

Republican," was leading an upswing in party morale.-^2
Yet, there were other candidacies.

Mills, perturbed

at his Chief's refusal to publicly disavow any candidacy,
was moving toward the Landon camp.143

The Borah menace was

aiding the "favorite-son" candidacy of the Kansas
Governor.-*-^

David Hinshaw,

a Hoover biographer,

endorsed

Landon because of his political resemblance to Grover

l^lcreager to Hoover,

telegram, December 16, 1935,

K-25.
l-^john spargo, "Republicans must choose, " Review of
R e v iews, XCII (December, 1935), 22-26.
0 'Laughlin to
Hoover, November 30, 1935, K-101, thought H.H. was "the one
Republican voice to which attention will be paid."
Fort to
Hoover, December 28, 1935, K-39, reported the favorable
comment on the Chief's St. Louis speech.
The San-MateoBurlincrame Advance Star, December 30, 1935, noted H.H.'s
popularity with rank and file Republicans but concluded that
he was "too intellectual to suit a nation accustomed to
ballyhoo,"
D-245.
Wolfe, Hoover, 366, noted that if the
GOP chose the Hoover strategy, he would become the obvious
candidate for 1936.
143noover to W. Brown, December 10, 1935, K-16,
regretted M i l l s 1 pique but felt that a public disavowal
would look foolish.

144port to Hoover, December 18, 1935, K-39.
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Cleveland.

Other conservatives were promoting a Dickin

son boomlet in

O

h

i

o

.

1^6

As political speculation mounted, the Hoover lieu
tenants began shifting and reporting attitudes toward another
Hoover nomination.

Although the Ohio Central Committee

voiced no enthusiasm for another Hoover try, Brown hoped to
gain a favorite son delegation "to keep the lid on."

Brown

had gained the cooperation of Hilles in designating Cleve
land as the next convention site.

Relations with Eastern

leaders had rarely been so c o r d i a l . A l a n pox reported
"some headway" as delegates showed an increasing warmth to
the idea of a Hoover

c

a

n

d

i

d

a

c

y

.

^48

cleared as a convention delegate,

Frank Fort was all but
and his loyalty was well

known.^ 9
At the time of his St. Louis speech, Hoover had refused
to commit himself pn the question of a possible candidacy.
He had reaffirmed his interest in issues.

He even stated,

l ^ H i n s h a w to Harold Johnson, December 19, 1935,
K-74.
146Brown to Hoover, December 6, 1935, K-16.
to Hoover, December 6, and December 18, 1935,
K-16.
In the last letter, Brown, having recently attended
the National Committee meeting, reported the friendly
attitude of Hilles and Pomeroy.
148pox to Richey, December 19, 1935, K-39.

^-^8Fort to Hoover, December 28, 1935, K-39.
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"I have no Interest m

150

picking a candidate.”

Actually,

he was very interested in the speculation about possible
candidates.

At the least, he wanted a nominee who would

defend Hoover policies and ideas.

At his request, Hyde pe r 

formed a reconnaisance on Governor Landon and his political
v i e w s .151
As the year closed, the 1936 election became the
leading topic of conversation in every gathering of Republi
cans.

Regardless of his attitude toward the former Presi

dent, no aspirant or delegate could ignore the shadow of the
former leader.

If Hoover was politically dead,

and many

Republicans expressed such a belief, why did his staunchest
antagonists devote so much attention to his alleged unavaila
bility?

The time for decision, both for the ex-President

and his Party, was fast approaching.

2240.

iSOjjoover Collection, LXIV (December 16, 1935), Item
New York Times, December 17, 1935, 1.

l^lHyde to Hoover, December 19, 1935, K-61.

CHAPTER VI
YEAR OF DECISION
Rexford Tugwell,

a "brains-truster," once theorized

that "the politician of any age is an individual motivated
to influence others, particularly in the direction of support
for himself,

and secondarily in support of the causes with

which he chooses to identify himself."-*-

Although Hoover

placed his ideas ahead of his ambitions,

it was obvious that

an endorsement of Hooverian principles would mate him the
logical candidate for 1936.

At all costs, he was determined

to witness the repudiation of the New Deal.
Throughout 1936, the ex-President released an
increasing number of press statements.

In a devastating

rebuke of the President's message to Congress, Hoover charged
Roosevelt with moving "the date of creation . . .
4, 1933."

to March

To New Dealers, until the inauguration "the world

was without form and void."

Hoover charged that no mortal

man h ad ever exercised such extraordinary powers as FDR.

The

former President called for retrenchment from such authority.2

■^-Rexford G. Tugwell, The Art of Politics
City, 1958), 214.
2251.

(Garden

2Hoover Collection, LXIVA (January 5, 1936), Item
N e w York T i m e s , January 6, 1936, 1.
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On January 7, Hoover lauded the Supreme C o u r t 's
invalidation of the A A A as a great judicial decision.
Hooverites,

equally elated at the Court's verdict,

thought

that the ex-President's sagacity again had been proven.3
On January 16, Hoover spoke at Lincoln, Nebraska,

on

"Further Explorations of the New D e a l — Including Agricultural
Policies."

Hoover accused the Administration o f driving

farmers into the ditch.

He thought that Ne w Dealers had

failed on their promised utopia and then had denounced any
one who criticized them.
problem,

To him,

Agriculture,

affected labor and capital.

pa y i n g direct and hidden taxes?

as a national

Wasn't the farmer

W e r e n ’t the wasteful spend

ing and unbalanced budgets of the federal government bleeding
all agrarians?

To Hoover,

an "economy of scarcity" based on

controlled production was boosting prices, but inflation,
drought,

and world recovery would have achieved as much.^

Hoover thought that the best profits came from u n con
trolled commodities.

Of course, he said, there was no

surplus of such produce.

To him,

this was the point.

He

proposed a "conservation-based policy for agriculture" which
w o uld provide subsidies for new crops as an incentive and

2252.

^Hoover Collection, LXIVA (January 7, 1936),
Ted Joslin to Hoover, January 6, 1936, K-66.

Item

% o o v e r Collection, LXIVA (January 16, 1936), Item
2254.
Hoover, Addresses On The R o a d , 101-106.
"Freedom For
the Farm, 11 Vital Spe e ches. II, January 27, 1936, 271-275.
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positive answer to farm problems.

5

The former President blasted the "processing tax"
which hurt the working classes; bemoaned the Administra
tion's manufacturing sales tax with its twenty-five per cent
allotment on pork, and its thirty per cent tab on flour,
both of which robbed the poor; and reaffirmed his loyalty to
his own 1933 two-and-a-half per cent sales tax proposal
which would have exempted food and cheaper clothing.®
He lamented America's loss of markets due to a forced
scarcity.
exports.

He cited numerous examples of America's declining
To him, New Deal coercion, ineffectiveness, contra

diction, and waste had lowered the purchasing power of the
farmer's dollar to a new nadir.

The time, he said, had

arrived for a reversal in the collectivization drive.

The

farmer's freedom must be restored.7
Hoover was pleased at the reception of his Nebraska
speech.

It "was deliberately critical of the AAA program.'

D

^Hoover, Addresses on the R o a d , 106-108, 111. Hutch
inson, Lowden of Illinois, II, 683. H.H.'s new agricultural
position, embodying so much of Lowd e n 's 1929 proposal, led
to speculation that the Illinois Governor had converted H.H.
to his views.
®Hoover, Addresses on the R o a d . 103, 107.
7I b i d .. 104, 107-113.
^Hoover to Creager, January 19, 1936, K-25.
A. Brown
to Hoover, January 17, 1936, K-15, said that members of the
press were praising the elevated plane of the Nebraska
speech.
Brown enclosed the laudatory editorials of several
newspapers.
L. W. Ainsworth to Hoover, K-l, January 27,
1936, reported an enthusiastic approval in Iowa.
Farmers, he
said, resented restriction which made food imports necessary.

160
The danger was that farmers ha d gained "a taste for direct
subsidy. 1,9

He feared that the "whole situation was changing

rapidly" and that its complexity was becoming unmanageable.-1'®
Samuel Crowther, preparing a book on the AAA, hoped that the
attacks on F D R ’s "ludicrous" farm policy would "blow the
Administration out of the water."1-1'

Other Hooverites were

equally pleased at the ex-President's agricultural analysis.
Hoover's desire for GOP leadership dramatically sur
faced in his Nebraska effort.

He used sarcasm and ridicule
*|O
to a n e w degree in an effort to evoke debate. J He spoke of
the 1930's as "the most critical period in United States
history,

since the Civil W a r . " 1^

In subsequent speeches, he

®Fess to Hoover, January 16, and February 1, 1936,
K-36.
Fess lauded the speech and H . H . ’s proposal of a
subsidy for n e w crops.
He warned that the Democrats would
deliberately pretend to misunderstand H.H.'s positive
solution.
1®Hoover to Fess, January 19, 1936, K-36.
11Crowther to Hoover, January 18, 1936, K-25.
Crowther was working with George Peek on a book extremely
critical of FDR's agricultural policy.
^ J u s t i c e Harlan Stone to Hoover, January 22, 1936,
K-130, lauded the A A A speech and urged publication of "the
unfortunate effect of the curtailment of production on the
home market."
Joslin to Hoover, January 18, K-66.
Hyde to
Hoover, January 25, 1936, K-61, although concerned with
agriculture, was obsessed by the alarming permeation of the
church b y Communist leaders.
He feared that many preachers
were accepting Communist doctrine.
1-^Wolfe, H o o v e r . 367.
2256,

•^Hoover Collection,
2258, and 2262.

LXIVA

(January 17, 1936), Item

12
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frequently used such phrases as "creeping collectivism,"
"dictated economy," "fascist tyranny," "nullification of
liberty," and the need for "equal justice."

Such phrases,

however exaggerated, were clever political weapons.
"weighted words" evoked strong emotions.

These

Any political

speaker worth his salt employs the common currency of debate
m

order to persuade.

15

By 1936, Hoover, however belatedly,

recognized the irrationality in modern psychology.

In this

sense he was a "new" Hoover.
Alan Pox,

impressed by H o o v e r ’s speeches, and con

vinced that the politicians feared his chief's candidacy
because they knew that he was the "best vote-getter," began
promoting talk of the former President in New Y o r k . ^
Hoover remained non-committal but told Pox that the speeches
were directed at forcing "the candidates into the open"
where Hooverites could "form a better judgment as to their
17

qualification. nJ-

The Ne w Yorker, remembering that "we" had

considered Dickinson potential presidential material, con
cluded that the senator had stressed some "good old points"
but lacked "originality of thought or expression."

^ H e r r i n g ,

Fox

politics of Democracy. 251-252.

l^Fox to Hoover, January 18, 1936, K-39.
•^Hoover to Fox, January 24, 1936, K-39.
Since Fox
was an intimate and trusted lieutenant, H.H.'s letter implied
that he was still looking for a Hooverian candidate.
Admittedly, he did not reprimand Fox's aggressive activity,
but H . H . , at the least, wanted friendly delegates who might
defer to his advice.
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believed that the time had come to test public sentiment for
1 ff

Hoover through the use of opinion polls. °

When, in January, the Landon organization kicked out
William Allen White, the colorful editor had second thoughts
about Landon's capability for the presidency.

Hoover, pu r 

suing a dual policy, urged White to promote the election of
uninstructed delegations from the Midwestern states at the
same time that he wrote Landon advising him to disavow all
Hearst connections if he was a serious candidate.^-®
Despite his own setbacks, the irrepressible Alan Fox
continued to promote a Hoover candidacy.

He urged some

concessions to lukewarm factions, demanded an exposure of
Landon's obvious mediocrity,

and pushed for a public poll

which would prove Hoover's popularity with rank and file
on
Republicans.
His Chief, remaining calm, analyzed the
situation thusly,

"The main trouble with our army is that we

have a great number of privates and officers but as yet no
O1
general has emerged."

18pox to Hoover, January 30, 1936, K-39.
Fox, recently
defeated in his efforts to be named a delegate to the 1936
convention, contended that his defeat had nothing to do with
his devotion to the Chief.
The argument is extremely
dubious. Harold Ickes, The Secret Diary of Harold L. Ickes
(New York, 1953), 548, reported rumors that H.H. had stopped
the Landon express and was leaning toward Dickinson.
-*-9Hoover to Hyde, January 27, 1936, K-61.
K-39.

20f o x to Hoover, February 4, and February 6, 1936,
Fox was disturbed at the artificial Landon boom.

21noover to Fox, February, 1936, K*-39. Again H.H.
seems to be looking for an Hooverian candidate.
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Nathan MacChesney,

an old Hooverite,

intermediary between the Knox-Hoover camps.

served as an
He had joined

the Bull Mooser's forces with the pledge that, in the event
of failure, Knox would not deliver his strength elsewhere.
MacChesney,

at Knox's request, solicited the aid of Walter

Brown in heading off Borah in Ohio. ^

Hoover and Brown

agreed that the best path was the "alignment of uninstructed
delegations."

To them, such a course would be "better for

our friend than an actual fight, as that always leads to
difficulties.
Knox, in an optimistic mood, decided to take the more
hazardous course.

He said,

"I am putting my political

future to the test by taking on Borah in Ohio."

Knox

acknowledged Brown's support and concluded that Illinois and
Ohio would make or break his candidacy.

He was amused at

L andon's predicament concerning the Hearst maneuver which
had placed the Kansan in the California p r i m a r y . ^
Hoover,

stumping the country in defense of his ideas,

arrived in Portland, Oregon, for a Lincoln Day Address to

^ M a c C h e s n e y to Hoover, February 6, 1936, K-86.
Ickes
Diary, I, 463, discusses the MacChesney-Knox relationship.
^ H o o v e r to MacChesney, February 11, 1936, K-86, dealt
with Knox and the Ohio situation and concluded that a fight
could be the best move in spite of the obvious dangers.
^^Knox to Hoover, February 15, and February 27, 1936,
K-72, admitted that Illinois was posing a tight race.
Brown
to Hoover, February 24, 1936, K-16, indicated the proba
bility that Knox and all aspirants but Borah would bypass
the Ohio primary.
Taft would head a "favorite son" delega
tion.
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a state GOP conference.
buoyancy,

cheerfulness,

The press noted Hoover's new
and geniality.

After conferring

with Oregon political leaders, the ex-President promised to
"continue fighting the Ne w Deal as long as it existed.
On February 12, he spoke of "The Confused State of
the Union, 11 an obvious rebuttal to FDR's recent State of the
Union message.

After noting the grave times in which they

lived, Hoover launched into an attack on N ew Deal methods.
His intended purpose was to expose the unprecedented debt,
inflation, centralization, regimentation,

and abridgement of

liberty.26
To him, the N e w Deal meant "planned deficits and
planned politics."

He listed the abuses of N R A and A A A and

the subsequent confusion.

He lamented the restricted produc

tion, the elimination of competition, the price fixing,
increased costs, higher prices,
of crops,

the

strikes, the plowing under

the slaughtering of animals, the decline in food

consumption, and the "economy of scarcity."

He said that

the waste and inefficiency of the New Deal were unsurpassed.
He charged that relief was administered by political b a t 
talions under the mo st costly spoils system in history.
him, the facts and figures told the story.

To

During his own

2^Hoover Collections, LSIVA (February 12-13, 1936),
Item 2267, 2269.
26x b i d ., Item 2270. Ne w York T i m e s , February 13,
1936.
"Towers of Babel," Vital Speeches. II, February 24,
1936, 332-335; Hoover, Addresses on the R o a d . 114-116.
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Administration, eighty-one per cent of the government
employees had been under civil service, whereas under the
New Deal only fifty-seven per cent

w

e

r

e

.

^

7

Despite the New

Deal assaults on the Constitution, the Supreme Court had
recently checked the excessive violations.

Nonetheless,

the

fallacious policies enacted had led the nation to a new
OQ
state of confusion. °
Again, Hooverites applauded what to them was their
Chief's penetrating analysis and his logical presentation
of the f a c t s . C r o w t h e r ,

convinced that Hoover's efforts

were forcing New Dealers into a defensive position, hoped
on

that other GOP speakers would "get down to brass tacks.,IJ

Ted Joslin reported a growing esteem among the press corps
O1
for the former President. A
The Boston Globe described Hoover as the Administra
tion 's "most versatile opponent."

Too, he was displaying a

"new resourcefulness" and strength.32

There was increasing

^ H oover, Addresses on the Road, 116-119.
28Ibid.. 121-125.
29crowther to Hoover, February 12, 1936, K-25; Joslin
to Hoover, February 18, 1936, K-66.
Strauss to Hoover,
February 19, 1936, K-130, said that "everyone" was impressed
by his biting speech.
30Crother to Hoover, February 12, 1936, K-25.
3^joslin to Hoover, February 18, 1936, K-66.
San Francisco Chronicle. January 29, 1936, 1.

32BoSton Globe, March 9, 1936, D-245.

See the
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talk of a "new" Hoover.

Even the New Republic, eternally

critical of the "great engineer," was compelled to discuss
the "new” Hoover.

In a devastating attack,

"Who's Hoover?"

the magazine answered its own question by calling him "an
attractive package with a misleading label."

All the

Hollywood arts, it said, were utilized in dressing up the
"old" Hoover.

It pointed out that in 1931, a "new" Hoover,

the happy engineer, had been promoted.

However, the 1935

edition, it said, was a "new" effort aimed at inflating the
"old" balloon before the 1936 convention.
Speculation on presidential candidacies remained the
most popular topic of conversation.

Following the Lincoln

Day Dinners across the country, Vandenberg informed Fox that
Borah delegates were planning to endorse the Michigan
Senator "at the proper time."
Borah effort had s t a l l e d . ^

Everyone was certain that the
Senate leaders were amiable to

33Fort to Hoover, February 28, 1936, K-39.
Fort and
other Hooverites, encouraged by the increasing impression of
the "new" Hoover, wondered "whether the movement could be
sufficiently accelerated between now and June." Fort believed
that Edge was after the vice-presidential spot on the Landon
ticket.
■^"Who's Hoover," New Republic, XLLLVI (March 11,
1936), 137-138.
Despite H . H . 's depression handicap, he
remained politically significant. No one could ignore him
or the fact that he commanded a large coterie of supporters
who wanted another nomination for him, with or without his
consent.
■^Fox to Hoover, February 13, 1936, K-39.
Fox thought
that Vandenberg's disclosure sounded "screwy but . . . accord
ing to Vanderberg, Landon was only after the Vice-Presidencyl"
Hoover to Fox, February 25, 1936, K-39, admitted that Borah
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a Vandenberg candidacy,

and as the "leading conservative

Republican in Congress," as an isolationist on foreign
policy,

and as a compromise possibility, Vandenberg received

increasing attention.

Interestingly, both Hooverites and

Senate progressives liked the Michigan leader.^6

Rumors

even flew that Hoover was "more intent upon the nomination
of Vandenberg on a strong anti-New Deal platform" than an
effort for his own renomination.^

If the ex-President was

determined to seek the nomination, he showed an atypical
canniness in playing off one aspirant against the other, and
in convincing each candidate that he would receive the
ultimate blessing.

Whatever Hoover's actual intentions, by

the time that the convention assembled, Mills, Knox, Dickin
son,

and Vandenberg were purported to have received the

Hoover endorsement.
The former President, anxious for Landon's reprimand
of Hearst,

and an avoidance of a primary fight which would

splinter the California Party, decided to visit the

was finished, but he thought that Landon was in ascendancy.
When the Literary Digest poll of January, 1936, showed 62%
opposed to the New Deal, the GOP nomination's attractiveness
increased.
San Francisco Chronicle, January 17, 1936.
36James T. Patterson, Congressional Conservatism And
The New Deal (Lexington, 1967), 102-103.
George Wolfskill,
The Revolt of the Conservatives (Boston, 1962), 203-204.
Patterson states that despite Vandenberg's overall popularity,
he had liabilities.
As Oregon's Senator McNary noted, he
symbolized "vacuity, vaccilation, and Vandenberg."
•a 7

Wolfskill,

Revolt of the Conservatives. 201.
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K a n s a n . O g d e n Mills, having defected to the Landon camp
in spite of his Chief's comeback, assured Hoover that the
Governor, regardless of the Hearst maneuvers, would not
permit his name to be filed in the California primary.^9
Ed Schorr, Chairman of the Ohio Republican Party,
wrote Hoover that "under election laws of Ohio" a prospective
candidate’s consent was necessary in order for delegates to
file his name for the Republican National Convention.^7®
Hoover was adamant in his refusal to permit his name to be
entered in the primaries.

Walter Brown informed the Chief

that Knox, Vandenberg, Dickinson, and even Landon had agreed
to bypass the Ohio primary.

Thus, the state committee had

readily endorsed Robert A. Taft as a "favorite son."

How

ever, Borah, uncooperative as usual, planned an Ohio
battle.^

But then the "Idaho lion" had always been a "porcu

pine .
Hoover,

strongly believing that a party "not in power

has an obligation to scrutinize every act that will oppose

^ H o o v e r to W. Brown, February 28, 1936, K-16.
^^Hoover to Henry Allen, February 20, 1936, K-2.
Drew Pearson, "Merry-Go-Round," Washington Star, February
22, 1936. Pearson, after the sensational, spoke of a
split in the Hoover ranks.
^®Schorr to Hoover, February 19, 1936, K-16.
41-w. Brown to Hoover, February 24, and February 28,
1936, K-16.
42jRobert Bendiner, Just Around the Corner (New York,
1967), 149.
Borah, "in practice was not so much a lone wolf
as a lone porcupine."
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the welfare of the p e o p l e , u r g e d

Spangler to investigate

the character of loans made by the government.

The ex-Presi-

dent was convinced there were several "unusual loans.
Spangler, encouraged by the progress of his Midwestern
organization, decided to open a West Coast branch.
that the chief would designate a l e a d e r . ^

He hoped

Hoover recom

mended Chester Rowell, the editor of the San Francisco
Chronicle
On March 7, Hoover addressed the Colorado Young
Republican League on "True Liberalism.11

The ex-President,

agitated at the efforts of some politicians to label the New
Deal as liberal, defined the American System, individualism,
"equality of opportunity," and liberty, as the only true
liberalism.

Regarding economics, the supreme test of

liberalism, he defined three avenues which governments could
take:

an unregulated economy, a government-regulated economy,

and a government-dictated economy.

To Hoover, the American

System had traditionally embraced the middle c o u r s e . ^
Hoover accused the New Deal of taking the third
avenue.

The New Deal, he said, had disrupted competition,

^

C h r i s t i a n

science

Monitor, February

15, 1936.

^ H o o v e r to Spangler, January 30, 1936, K-127.
^^Spangler
^Hoover

to

to Hoover,
Spangler,

February
telegram,

12, 1936, K-127.
February

20, 1936,

K-127.
^ H o o v e r , Addresses on the R o a d , 126-134.
Times, March 8, 1936, 1.

New York
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48I b i d .; Hoover, Addresses on t h e Road, 134-138.
49H o o v e r

Collections,

IXIVA

(March

29, 1936), I t e m

2281.

^ S t r a u s s to Hoover, February 19, 1936, K-130.
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send unpledged delegations to the c o n v e n t i o n . ^

Walter

Newton made a cross-sectional survey of public attitude
toward the GOP candidates,

and disclosed a Landon, Knox,

Borah order prevailing everywhere.

Hoover sentiment, he

noted, was strongest in the South.

Georgia could deliver

eighty per cent of its delegation to a Hoover standard.

and

He

found that Kentucky showed some Hoover and Dickinson flavor.
Two West Virginia delegates were openly supporting the exPresident.

The Alabama delegation,

doubted Hoover's a v a i l a b i l i t y . ^

although friendly,

Obviously,

the Alabama

reasoning was widespread.
Walter Edge's endorsement of Landon reflected the
growing strength of the Kansan in the East.53

California

primary loomed larger as it was the one obstacle in the
Landon path.

In New Jersey, Frank Fort, in an effort to

reach the Republican Convention, ran as a delegate-at-large
and as a Landon delegate.

He hoped to encourage "some of the

weak-kneed brethren to think in terms of winning on principle
rather than expediency.

Fox, still hoping for a draft-

^ H o o v e r to Knox, February 24, 1936, K-72.
52jgewton to Richey, March 18, 1936, and Newton to
Hoover, March 21, 1936, K-97.
530 'Laughlin to Hoover, March 21, 1936, Box 44,
0 'Laughlin Papers.
Edge, Jers e y m a n 1s Journal. 243, reasoned
that the East had dominated presidential conventions long
enough.
He was "an enthusiastic Landon supporter."
34port to Hoover, April 4, 1936, K-38.
Hoover to Fort,
April 9, 1936, K-38, replied that "whatever you do is
alright with m e . "
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Hoover Committee, thought that the California primary could
enable loyalists to boost Hoover stock through public polls
following a California victory.

The New Yorker was con

vinced that the Chief, Dickinson, or Vandenberg could be
nominated.

Hilles, obviously hoping to line up with the

eventual winner, remained uncommitted.55
Samuel Crowther, a loyal Hooverite, expressed dis
satisfaction with the front runners:

“Knox has the informa

tion and the backbone of a jolly fish and . . . is a mental
mess."

To him, Landon was no better.55

On the tariff, he

said, Landon did "not know what it is about, while Knox,
his New York speech,

in

showed that he did not even know enough

to keep qu i e t . ,l5^
On April 4, speaking at Fort Wayne, Indiana, Hoover
asked,

"Has the New Deal Solved Our National Problems?'1

Answering his own question in the negative, the ex-President
stated that the "phantasmagoria of propaganda" by the New
Dealers was

"leading to a corruption of clear thinking"

which was "far more insidious and destructive" than all the
dangerous violations of freedom.58
In an effort to construct the "true picture," Hoover

55Fox to Hoover, March 31, and April 1, 1936, K-39.
55Crowther to Hoover, April 1, 1936, K-25.
5^Crowther to Hoover, April 17, 1936, K-25.
58Hoover Collection, LXIVA (April 4, 1936), Item 2283.
Vital Speeches, II, April 20, 1936, 444-449. Hoover,
Addresses on the Road, 142-146.
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reiterated his depression efforts, their success, the brutal
interruption of recovery due to the 1932 election, the
induced bank panic, the disastrous New Deal methods and
their consequent setbacks,

and the need for retrenchment.
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^ H o o v e r Collection, LtXIVA (April 16, 1936), Item
New York T i m e s , April 19, 1936, 1.
^Bendiner,
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59Ibid., 148-157.
2287.
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April,

the Knox candidacy collapsed.

The Kentucky delega

tion switched from the Bull Mooser to the "Kansas C o o l i d g e ."^2
The Illinois primary dealt the Knox forces the fatal blow.
Although the Chicagoan outpolled Borah, 490,000 to 420,000
votes,

the minuscule nature of the victory underlined Knox's

weakness.^

California remained the only obstacle to a

Landon sweep.

The Kansas City Star charged the ex-President

with blocking the Landon drive.^4
William Allen White,

appraising the situation, wrote

Landon that the Hearst endorsement was a "kiss of death" and
that the Governor should disassociate himself from the p o w e r 
ful and controversial publisher.65

Hearst and the Landon

managers were affronting the ex-President, which could weaken
L a n d o n 's presidential bid.^®

620

Ogden Mills tried to prevent

'Laughlin to Hoover, April 4, 1936.

O 'Laughlin Papers.
The Hoover
Jers e y was solidly for Landon.

aide

k^Mayer, The R e publicans, 437,
Hoover, April 18, 1936, K-16.

also

440.

noted

Box 44,
that

New

W. Brown to

®^Hyde to Hoover, April 8, 1936, and Hoover to Hyde,
April 15, 1936, K-61, denied the charge.
Hoover to White,
April 14, and April 17, 1936, K-147, expressed disgust at
the insinuations of the Landon managers.
^White

to

Landon,

April

21, 1936, S e l e c t e d L e t t e r s ,

362-364.
66I b i d .; Hoover to A. Brown, April 22, 1936, K-15.
Hoover to H e nry Allen, April 21, 1936, K-2.
Hoover to White,
April 14, and April 17, 1936, K-147, warned that the Hearst
endorsement and the splintering of the Bear State Party
would assure a November defeat for Landon, if he gained the
nomination.
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/■*7
the filing of the Hearst slate in California.
California Republicans “liked and respected Hoover."
Their hopes for a deadlocked convention were matched by
their hatred for Hearst, the Landon promoter.

Consequently,

Earl Warren, a Hoover disciple, who had worked his way up
from a Hoover delegate of 1928 to the state chairmanship by
1934, drew up a list of the top names in the state party and
announced that he would head an uninstructed delegation to
the 1936 convention.

Warren so deftly outmaneuvered Hearst

that Landon even disclaimed his own slate in California's
May primary.

Despite the difficulties in voting for an

uninstructed delegation, Warren and his independent colleagues
scored a major upset in their victory.®®
Although Hoover claimed that he had tried to prevent
any criticism of the Kansan by the California press, and had
only wanted "an uninstructed delegation" for the purpose of
influencing the platform and maintaining the unity of the

®7W . B r o w n t o H o o v e r , A p r i l 18, 1936, K-16.
Wh i t e to
L a n d o n , A p r i l 21, 1936, S e l e c t e d L e t t e r s , 362-364, a s s u r e d
the G o v e r n o r o f Mills' l o y a l t y and of t h e N e w Y o r k e r ' s d i s 
i n t e r e s t in the v i c e - p r e s i d e n c y .
White said that the Hearst
backing had even scared off Hilles.
Too, Congr essio nal
Re p u b l i c a n s w e r e l i n i n g u p for V andenberg.
®®Leo Katcher, Earl Warren:
A Political Biography
( N e w Y o r k , 1967), 83-85.
K a t c h e r says H o o v e r d e s p e r a t e l y
w a n t e d to " c h a l l e n g e R o o s e v e l t a g a i n . "
The W a r r e n slate was
i n d e p e n d e n t a s m u c h as p r o - H o o v e r .
However, it d i d prove
t h a t L a n d o n w a s n o t "in" as t h e n o m i n e e .
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GOP,®^ Hooverites
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a f f a i r s . ' ”^

Creager, although personally favoring the ex-President,
and inclined to accept the possibility of another Hoover
campaign, doubted GOP chances in November.

Too, he thought

that Hoover's depression image would be an additional problem.
The Texan did agree with Brown that the best poll would ask,
"Whom did you vote for in 1932 and for whom would you vote

^ H o o v e r to H. Allen, April 21, 1936, K-2, Hoover to
Allen, April 24, 1936, K-2; and Hoover to A. Brown, April 22,
1936, K-15.
Hoover to White, April 17, 1936, K-147.
^®W. Brown to Hoover, April 18, 1936, K-15.
Strauss
to Hoover, April 23, 1936, K-130.
Joslin to Hoover, April
11, 1936, K-66, said that a California victory would stall
the Landon express.
He assumed that the Chief was more
receptive to a nomination now.
If not, then Knox or Vanden
berg were probably Hoover's favorites as rumors reflected.
Newton to Hoover, May 7, 1936, K-97, spoke of H.H.'s great
personal victory in California.
Ben Allen, H.H.'s phrasemaker, wired Strauss, " W e have won by a handsome majority."
Ben Allen to Strauss, telegram, May 5, 1936, K-130.
In a
letter to A. Brown, H.H., still angered at the personal
insult of Hearst and Landon, was pleased with their "over
whelming" defeat. Hoover to A. Brown, May 7, 1936, K-16.
Frank Fort thought that the door was wide open and hoped to
have "influence with the Maryland and Pennsylvania delega
tions." Fort to Hoover, May 9, 1936, K-38.
^ S t r a u s s to Hoover, April 23, 1936, K-130, admitted
that Larry Richey's presence may have encouraged White to
temper his remarks.
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now if the same candidates were running?"^2

Ogden Mills,

again pessimistic about Republican chances, was amazed at
FDR's "ignorance or dishonesty" and feared the incumbent
would be returned to o f f i c e . ^3
Mills 1 doubts were hardly altered with the California
primary, or the W h o 's Who Poll which showed Hoover outgaining
Landon by a 2381 to 2294 vote t o t a l . ^
to his scheduled Philadelphia speech,

The Chief,

referring

said it would be his

"last speech" and would deal "mostly with moral i s s u e s . " ^
Enroute to Philadelphia,

the ex-President told the Chicago

press that the GOP would win in November regardless of their
c a n d i d a t e .

On May 14, Hoover spoke in the Quaker city on "An
American Platform."

His speech was the most direct personal

7^F o x to Hoover, April 23, 1936, K-39.
Fox reported
that the Chief had drawn even with Landon in the incompleted
W h o ’s Who Presidential Poll.
W. Brown to Hoover, April 18,
1936, K-16.
^ M i l l s to Hoover, April, 1936, K-92.
^ F o x to Hoover, May 1, 1936, K-39, disclosed the
final poll results.
^ H o o v e r to Mills, May 2, 1936, K-92.
76Hoover Collection, LXIVA (May 10, 1936), Item 2290.
Although H.H.'s constant predictions of victory were used to
prove his lack of realism, he was playing a political role
and like the far more able politicians he sometimes imitated,
he was reassuring his party workers of the possibility of
victory.
In private, however, he showed realism which
greatly contradicted his public predictions of 1932, 1934,
and 1936. At times he failed to anticipate the depth of
defeat, but throughout the lean years he informed his closest
lieutenants that the GOP would lose, and by a decisive
margin.
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attack that he had ever made on Roosevelt.

He noted the

President's advice to young people "to dream dreams and see
visions."

Hoover advised them "to wake up."

He warned that

America was further down the road to collectivism than she
realized.

The time had come, he said,

for "a restoration of

morals in government" and for "courage in the destiny of
America.
To Hoover,

the Administration had pursued false

economic and social policies.
donable sins.

As usual, he cited its unpar

The Republican Party, he said, must restore

the American System with its "regulated business and compul
sory competition" minus the government dictation and
regimentation.
pendent powers.

To him, the states must regain their inde
He said that only the Supreme Court had

checked efforts to create a fascist state.
trouble today is moral as well as economic."

To him,

"our

He pleaded for

a revitalization of traditional "virtues of thrift and honor
and hard work" which could lead the nation forward once
70

again.‘°
Hoover, in his Philadelphia speech, stigmatized the
New Deal as being as progressive as a slow-motion film run
backward."

He referred to it as the "Five Horsemen of the

Apocalypse:

Pork Barrel, Poppycock, Privilege, Panaceas,

^ H o o v e r collection, LXIVA (May 14, 1936), Item 2293.
Vital Speeches, II, June 1, 1936, 555-559.

^Hoover, Addresses on the Road, 162-171.
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and poverty. N

This speech and the California primary gave

h i m a "freshened political p r e s t i g e . T o o ,

letters to

the editor in the Christian Science Monitor, the New York
Herald Tribune, and the Chicago Daily N e w s , as well as other
metropolitan newspapers,

indicated the overwhelming rank and

file support for him.®®

Nonetheless, party leaders con

tinued to doubt his availability or his November chances.
Everyone remained friendly toward the ex-President
but few expressed enthusiasm for his nomination.

81

Hoover-

ites continued to hope that "the Convention will muddle
around awhile and then wind up tied to the only pier strong
Q O

enough to hold the ship of state."0 '11
On May 18, the ex-President met with the press.

He

issued the following statement:
It should be evident by this time that I am not a
candidate.
I have stated many times that I have
no interest but to get these critical issues before
the country.
I have rigidly prevented my friends
from setting up any organization and from presenting

^®"Brisk Hoover," Literary Digest. CXXI
1936), 6.

(May 23,

®®D-245, Hoover Presidential Library, contains politi
cal newspaper clippings and some 400 letters to the editor
of major newspapers urging H.H.'s nomination in 1936 as the
logical and necessary step.
8-*-Fo x to Hoover, May 25, 1936, K-39.
Fox still hoped
for a Hoover-Landon ticket.
He admitted that Knox and
Vandenberg had no chance for a nomination.
®^Fort to Hoover, May 23, 1936, K-38.
Fort admitted
that "everyone" was shocked at his defeat, by some 40,000
votes, for convention delegate.
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my name in any primary or to any convention.
. . . M y concern is with p r i n c i p l e s .83
Hoover denied that any delegates were committed to him.
0 'Laughlin and other Hooverites continued to hope for
a draft.

The Washington adviser wanted the Chief to speak

to the convention.

To him,

a personal appearance and a
O/
dynamic speech by the Chief might set off "a spark.'
Borah's attempt to smear Landon with oil, as well as the
Kansan's obvious mediocrity, provided,
pC
mind, a glimmer of h ope.03
As Hooverites desired,

in 0 'Laughlin's

the ex-President was invited

to address the Cleveland Convention.88

He reiterated his

belief that the GOP could win in November with "a candidate
who can arouse the moral and spiritual instincts of the
country."®^

Privately,

Hoover told Hyde,

anticipating his Cleveland appearance,

"I wish X had a divine inspiration to

present this issue to them in such a way as to carry

88Hoover Collection, LXIVA (May 18, 1936), Item 2294.
Even conscious of the past and the Coolidge experience, H.H.
knew well that only a determined fight could stop the Landon
bandwagon.
Like his presidential predecessor, he did not
want the nomination badly enough to dispute it.
®^Port to Hoover, May 23, 1936, K-38, hoped for a
dramatic change.
0 'Laughlin to Hoover, May 11, and May 23,
1936, Box 44, 0 'Laughlin Papers.
0 'Laughlin informed
General Douglas MacArthur that the Chief would accept a draft.
85I b i d .
SSjjoover Collection, LXIVA (May 29, 1936),

^ H o o v e r to Kellogg, May 23, 1936, K-67.

Item 2295.
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88Hoover to Hyde, May 30, 1936, K-61.
In almost iden
tical letters, Hoover wrote Fort and Bascom Slemp that he
had no desire to be a "hanger-on at the convention" and that
he had completed the job which he "set out to do." Hoover
to Fort, May 26, 1936, K-38.
Hoover to Slemp, May 23, 1936,
K-124.
8®Crowther to Richey, June 3, and Crowther to Hoover,
June 3, 1936, K-25.
The writer agreed with Henry Ford that
the GOP could not deny their sole leader.
Landon’s campaign,
he said, was pusillanimous.
®°Moley, 27 Masters of Politics, 26-27. According to
Moley, the President, contrary to popular myth, feared H.H.
of all the possible GOP candidates.
FDR thought H.H. capable
of offering an alternative program. He also bet his former
adviser that H.H. would be the nominee.
91f d R;

586.

His Personal Letters

(New York, 1945), 585-
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"the wily politician who for years had dealt out the
Southern delegations like so many black-and-tan packages of
coffee across the counter" gave the Kansas Governor the nod.
"One of the most masterly jobs of creative journalism"
resulted in a presidential

n o m i n a t i o n .

While the Ohio group shoved Walter Brown from power
in his own baliwick, ex-Senator Dave Reed, of the Mellon
barony of Pennsylvania, watched in awe and helplessness as
the Landon bandwagon rolled toward victory despite the
uncommitted status of the large Pennsylvania and New York
delegations.93
On June 6, Hoover blasted the "minimum wage laws" as
a violation of state authority.

He pointed to the success

and exemplary nature of California's minimum wage laws and
questioned the constitutionality of a federal m e a s u r e . ^
Hoover remained the obvious GOP candidate if his ideas were
accepted.

Hence, the struggle over the platform became

crucial in the minds of Hooverites.
Despite the usual ambiguity, the GOP platform was
mild in its tone.

Significantly, there were no demands for

®2Stokes, Chip Off My Shoulder. 422-426,* Raymond
Clapper, Watching the World {New York, 1944), 136, says that
the Eastern clique traditionally nominated Presidents while
the Western wing dominated Congress.
Schlesinger, Politics
of Upheaval, 539-541, credited the Eastern bosses and
business politicians such as Mills with the Landon selection.
®^Stokes, Chip Off My Shoulder. 423.
94noover Collection, LXIVA (June 6, 1936), Item 2296.
New York T imes, June 7, 1936.
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repeal of any major New Deal laws,

and it even encouraged

the expansion of unemployment relief and farm benefits.
Hoover was pleased with the gold plank of the platform and
probably encouraged by Landon's disavowal of several minor
planks.^

The Governor was grandstanding in an effort to

appear more independent of the bosses.97
normal jocosity,

Roosevelt,

in his

said that the Republicans ha d declared "in

favor of the Ten Commandents, proclaiming from housetops
that the Democratic Party wished a) to amend the Ten Commandments, b) to add to the Ten Commandments,
scrap the Ten Commandments.

and c) to

On this issue they are confident

they can sweep the country."98
On June 10, Herbert Hoover appeared before the GOP
Convention and spoke of "The Road to Freedom."

As expected,

it was one of Hoover's most moving and moralistic speeches.
He spoke of the "greatest responsibility . . .
generations."

in three

To him, this convention would "determine the

95pendleton Herring, The Politics of Democracy (New
York, 1940), 235-236, says that platforms inevitably force
compromise on sectional, ethnic, and economic views.
The
platform fell short of Chet Rowell's proposed "positive
program" in its agricultural plank and its failure to defend
H.H.'s achievements.
Chester H. Rowell, "A Positive Pro
gram for the Republican Party," Yale Review, XXXV (Spring,
1936), 443-457.
96noover Collection, LXIVA
Ne w York T i m e s , June 12, 1936, 1.

(June 11, 1936), Item 2299.

9^Herring, Politics of Democracy, 236.
98j^3Xer, Presidential W i t , 136.
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^ Twenty-First

Republican National Convention
(New
H o o v e r , A d d r e s s e s o n t h e R o a d , 173174. H y d e t o H o o v e r , M a y 23, 1936, K-6, m a d e s e v e r a l s u g 
g estions for t he Cleveland address.
For Hyde, there was
"one i ssue a n d o n l y one:
liberty."
He doubted GOP courage
a n d feared t h e i r failure to d e f e n d l i b e r t y w o u l d r e s u l t in
another W h i g fiasco.
It w o u l d b e b e t t e r , h e said, " to r i s k
t h e h u s k s o f v i c t o r y for a c r u s a d e w h i c h s h a l l d e t e r m i n e t he
future of the nation."
P r i n c i p l e , to h i m , w a s m o r e e n d u r i n g
He said th at t h e r e "must be n o c o m p r o m i s e o n the i s s u e of
human liberty."
H e c o n t i n u e d t o h o p e f o r H . H . 's d r a f t a s
the nominee.
York,

1936), 115-125.

lOOyital Speeches, II, 570-573.
the Road, 173-174.

Hoover, Addresses on
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found that the New Deal had bred class hatred,

fear, and

destruction.-*-0^"We have arrived at the hour

[when] the New Deal may

be a revolutionary design," he charged.
that it was

"poisoning Americanism. "

had delayed recovery long enough,

Too, he thought

To him,

the New Deal

and the GOP had a duty,

a

moral obligation, to restore "freedom in the economic
field."

There were eternal inviolable principles. u

2

He continued:
Here in America, where the tablets of human freedom
were first handed down, their sacred w o r d has been
flouted.
Today the stern task is before the Repub
lican Party to restore the Ark of the Covenant to
the temple in Washington. . . . Shall we keep the
faith? There are some principles which cannot be
compromi s e d .10 3
In his attempt to give his party the issue, liberty,
Hoover urged the convention to courageously face the p r o b 
lem.

"Ideals and character," he said, were the essence of

man.

To him, man must be free to plan, to think, to act,

and to succeed.

Questioning the convention, he asked:

Is the Republican Party ready for the issue? . . .
Will you for expediency's sake, also offer will-othe-wisps which beguile the people? Or have you

^•°^Hoover, Addresses on the Road, 175-178.
102I b i d .. 178-181.
-^^I b i d ., 181.
The religious imagery and H . H . ’s
moralism were seldom more evident than in hi s Cleveland
speech.
Rarely and never more sincerely di d he speak from
his heart.
Modern demonstrators have frequently used his
language and expressed his emotion.
To his followers he
undoubtedly had "soul."
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determined to enter in a holy crusade for liberty
which shall determine the future and the perpetuity
of a nation of free men? . . . Republicans and
fellow Americans, this is your C a l l . 1-04
Pandemonium broke loose as the crowd wept, stood on
its seats, shouted, cheered, and sang "Onward Christian
Soldiers."

The big prune-faced man at the podium was

receiving the greatest political ovation of his career. 1-^5
He had released their "pent-up evangelism" and called them
to "a holy crusade."

Their hearts belonged to him.^-0^

In a

crescendo of personal tribute they recognized his fidelity,
his patience, his sportsmanship.
also due to a "guilty conscience."
labored for the party.

The Hoover ovation was
The ex-President had

"With a far more adept hand than he

lQ4Ibid.. 182-183.
lO^Edwin P. Hoyt, Jumbos and Jackasses (Garden City,
1960), 350. Bendiner, Just Around the Corner, 154.
Schlesinger, Politics of Upheaval, 545-546.
Clapper, M y
W o r l d , 143-145.
San Francisco Chronicle, June 11, 1936, 1;
Philadelphia Public Ledger, June 11, 1936, 1, said that
"Hoover came and saw and conquered for a night." Minneapo1is Tribune. June 11, 1936, 1, said that "the night gave
him the last full measure of vindication."
Los Angeles
Times, June 11, 1936; Requa to Hoover, June 21, 1936, K-108;
and Oliver Street to Mrs. C. C. Morgan, June 29, 1936, K132, are of value.
Street said, "I never saw anything like
it at a National Convention.
An almost religious, spirit
pervaded it. . . . Tears and love shown in every eye."
106gencli.n e r , Just Around the Corner, 3, 154. Bendiner,
who once saw Hoover as having "no more flair than an assis
tant funeral director, "thought he now owned the hearts and
souls of Republicans." For expedience, they passed over
their true favorites in every convention from 1936 to 1964.

l°^Clapper, Mv World, June 11, 1936, 143-145.
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showed in his greater political days,” he had provided the
issue. 1-08
Despite their disavowals, the Landon managers must
have felt uneasy at the ex-President's ovation and the
hearty chants of J,we want Hoover."-'-®9

Landonites were con

vinced of an eleventh-hour attempt by Hoover to gain the
nomination.

They reasoned that the emotional ovation led

him to believe a stampede was in the making.

Snell, the

temporary chairman, they alleged, announced Hoover's departure
for New York while the ex-President actually returned to his
hotel and pressed Vandenberg and Knox for an endorsement.
The two leaders apparently informed him that it was too

-*-®®Ibid. Clapper thought that H.H. skillfully used
history, imagery, and nuance in his discussion of GOP
tradition as espousing liberty from the slavery days of the
nineteenth century to the new tyranny of the 1930's.
It was
the ex-President's swan song, a dramatic finish.
Street to
Mrs. C. C. Morgan, June 29, 1936, K-13 2, expressed disgust
with GOP cowardice, and admitted that the GOP convention had
been "like a good old fashion Methodist camp-meeting."
-'-"stokes, Chip Off My Shoulder, 428.
Schlesinger,
Politics of Upheaval, 541-546, 616, credits Republicans with
buying off Borah with a few platform planks, and H.H. with
an ovation.
Schlesinger thinks that Hoover captured "the
mood of the Republican Party" and its "hysterical certitude
that the Republic was on the verge of collapse."
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late.Whatever

the case, Landon was nominated the next

morning.-*- -*-■*Hoover was “highly gratified" at his reception at the
convention.

Following the nomination of a Landon-Knox ticket,

the former President said:

“Every ounce of energy I have is

at the call and command of my p a r t y . " H 2

jn ^

display unity, Vandenberg, Knox, Dickinson,
Taft made seconding speeches for Landon.•*■■*-■^

effort to

and Robert A.
Many Hooverites

burned at the thoughtless rejection of their hero.-*-**-4

110jv[ayer, The Republicans, 440-442, says Chester
Rowell, the chairman of the California delegation, served as
an intermediary.
The only scrap of corraborating evidence
in the Hoover Papers is a Fox to Richey letter of June 3,
1936, K-39.
Fox was informed by Edgar Rickard of the pro
gram "to use Lowden to head off Landon." This could easily
mean the platform instead of the nomination.
H.H. made no
serious effort to collect delegates in 1936, aside from the
California primary.
On the other hand, his correspondence
shows a marked receptivity in 1940.
Although he could have
destroyed letters proving a 1936 attempt, why did he not
tamper with the 1940 letters? At no time did he express any
belief that he could be nominated in 1936.
See his Memoirs,
II, 194-195, for a realistic approach on the belief that
anyone who wants a nomination must fight for it. To him, a
movement only went as far as its leader would take it. The
riddle of his 1936 efforts will never be cleared despite his
obvious wish for vindication.
Hlwolfe,
2301.
1.

Hoover, 370.

-*--*-^Hoover Collection, LXIVA (June 11, 1936) , Item
New York T imes. June 11, June 13, and June 21, 1936,
-*-•*•-^Wolfskill, Revolt of the conservatives, 201-205.

114port to Hoover, June 28, 1936, K-28.
0 'Laughlin
to Hoover, June 13, 1936, Box 44, 0 'Laughlin Papers, was
dismayed at the convention’s failure to recognize brains and
character.
Dawes to Hoover, June 25, 1936, K-28, regretted

189
Privately, Hoover expressed disgust at "the funeral
eulogies . . . by all the press.
grave,

As a last flower on the

they have elected me Elder Statesman."

He hoped to

organize the job and "chagrin the funeral directors."

lie

The press probably sensed a Hoover finale because of Walter
Brown's failure to be returned to the National Committee.
The Ohio lieutenant's defeat undercut Hoover's chance of
holding "a high card or two in 1940.
Hoover's
call

to

the

convention

disenchanted.

address h ad
To

many

served

as

Republicans,

a clarion
he

had

given

the s p i n e l e s s R e p u b l i c a n s w h o i g n o r e d "the l o g i c a l c a n d i 
date . . . the l e a d e r o f the p a r t y in its d a r k e s t a n d m o s t
discouraging days."
R i c k a r d t o M i l l s , J u n e 13, 1936, B o x
53, M i l l s P a p e r s , s a i d t h a t H o o v e r i t e s , i n g e n e r a l , u n d e r 
s t o o d t h a t " b u t f o r [ M i l l s ’] i n t e r v e n t i o n , t h e N e w Y o r k
d e l e g a t e s w o u l d h a v e p o s t p o n e d t h e i r c a u c u s u n t i l a f t e r Mr.
Hoover made his speech."
Rickard w a nted Mills' version.
M i l l s s e r v e d as a L a n d o n a d v i s e r a n d w a s l o o k e d o n as a
"traitor" by Hooverites.
The Chief was h u r t and the close
H o o v e r - M i l l s r e l a t i o n s h i p w a s n e v e r r e s t o r e d a l t h o u g h the
two m e n corresponded infrequently during the remaining years
o f Mills' life.
F o x t o H o o v e r , J u n e 23, 1936, K-39, s a i d
that "everyone" really w a n t e d a Hoover-Landon ticket.
Theron Bronson, a C o n n e c t i c u t Republican, and faithful H.H.
admirer, l i k e n e d h i m to L i n c o l n , "one o f t h e g r e a t sa v i o r s
of the real liberties of men."
B r o n s o n t o H o o v e r , J u n e 13,

1936, K-15.
H 5H o o v e r t o B r o w n , J u n e 23, 1936, K-16.
H o o v e r to
H y d e , J u n e 22, 1936, K-61, e x p r e s s e d t h e d e s i r e t o o r g a n i z e
"a m i l i t a n t b a n d " t o d i s p r o v e t h e o b i t u a r i e s .
H o o v e r to
D a w e s , J u n e 29, 1936, K-28.

H 6 B r o w n to Hoover, June 29, 1936, K-16, admitted
that his main purpose in trying to maintain his seat on the
committee was to aid Hoover.
Too, he foresaw that the
C h i e f ’s "restless spirit will find no satisfaction in the
role of Elder Statesman."
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the campaign "a tone of high purpose and resolve.

117

'In

the months ahead John Hamilton, the National Chairman, and
Frank Knox, the vice-presidential nominee, would echo the
Hoover line.-*--*-®
According to one historian, Landonrs "colorless p e r 
sonality and inadequacy as a speaker" hamstrung his efforts
against the dynamic Roosevelt.-*--*-®

The "dull" Governor was

the very antithesis of the suave, sophisticated, colorful
incumbent.

L a n d o n 1s "halting, labored midwestern twang" and

"homespun simplicity" were underlined by FDR's contrast.-*-2®
The President was reassured by the Kansan's nomination,

117

H a m i l t o n t o H o o v e r , J u n e 16,
C h e s n e y t o H o o v e r , J u n e 16, 1936, K-86.
J u n e 11, 1936, K-78.

1936, K-46.
Lowden

for

Mac-

to H o o v e r ,

-*--*-®Hoover to Hamilton, July 14, 1936, K-46, was
pleased that the chairman was following the anti-New Deal
lines suggested.
Eaton, Presidential Timber, 362, notes
Knox's denunciatory approach to the New Deal.
Hyde to
Hoover, July 13, 1936, K-61, noted Hamilton's approach.
In
the New York T i m e s , September 24, 1936, columnist Arthur
Krock thought that the Republicans had given FDR his best
issue: Hoover and the depression.
-*--*-®Rauch, N e w D e a l , 260.
D o n a l d Bruce Johnson, T h e
R e p u b l i c a n P a r t y a n d W e n d e l l W i l k i e ( U rbana, 1960), 9, s p o k e
of a "rather colorless st andard bea rer."

l^Eaton,

Presidential Timber, 362.
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Landon lacked experience, had a vulnerable record, and "was
unknown to most people."

171

The Republican nominee isolated Old Guard Republicans
and Hooverites during the early weeks of the campaign.
the "specter of Hoover" remained obvious.

Yet,

Landon head

quarters feared the ex-President's public appearances as
much as a plague.

1 77

William Allen White, recognizing the bleakness of GOP
chances, thought that the Governor might "crumble or crystal
lize" under the pressure.

As the nominee was "a decent,

square, kindly, courageous" individual, White urged Hoover
"to help him all you can."-1*23

The former President con

tinued to hope for "considerable fireworks" in the
campaign.12d

■*-2^James A. Farley, Behind the Ballots (New York,
1938), 305-308.
Farley and FDR thought that Landon1s w e a k 
nesses were so obvious that he would never be nominated.
"His flat and uninspired acceptance speech" hastened his
downward spiral.
Farley notes that Landon1s great achieve
ment of balancing the budget was possible because of New
Deal loans and works projects. Moreover, many of the
Governor1s acts were declared unconstitutional by the Kansas
courts, thus depriving the GOP of some of the best issues.
Too, he was "unacquainted with federal affairs."
22Schlesinger, Politics of Upheaval, 605. Tugwell,
The Democratic Roosevelt.; 428. D. R. McCoy, "Alfred M.
Landon and the Presidential Campaign of 1936," Mid-America,
XLII (October, 1960), 213-214.
123White to Hoover, July 1, 1936, Selected Letters,
365-366.
2306.

-*-2%[oover Collection, LXIVA (July 5, 1936), Item
Hoover, in Oregon, spoke with the press.
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Although Landon and Ogden Mills were convinced "the
tide" was running with the Republicans,

Hyde and his

Chief were despondent over the political outlook.

Confi

dential Congressional Digest polls showed thirty-one per
cent of the Republicans defecting to Roosevelt, while only
eight per cent of the Democrats favored Landon.^ 6
ex~President decided that it was time to act.

He asked

Lewis Strauss to go to Topeka and press Landon for a change
in strategy.127
Numerous Republicans were agitated at the "tepid
campaigner. 11 Even Hamilton was disturbed at the Topeka
strategy and thought that the ex-President should take part
in the campaign.

Hoover,

sensitive to the Landonites1

embarrassment at his efforts, reiterated that his

"purpose

in life was to see that the N ew Deal was put out of Washing
ton, " but he refused to campaign without Landon1s request.1^8

^ - ^ M i l l s t o L a n d o n , J u l y 2, 1936, a n d L a n d o n t o M i l l s ,
J u l y 6, 1936, B o x 52, M i l l s P a p e r s .
Landon anticipated
v i c t o r i e s in the M i d w e s t and farm belt.

126noover to Hyde, July 9, 1936, K-61. Hoover to Fort,
July 9, 1936, K-38.
Throughout the campaign 0 'Laughlin
blasted Landon's timidity and ineptness.
O 'Laughlin to
Hoover, July 4, July 11, July 18, July 25, and August 29,
1936, Box 44, 0 'Laughlin Papers.
H.H. predicted that the
Democrats would carry California by over a million votes.
Hooverites were not as realistic as their Chief.
Fort saw
the East as Landon country and predicted Lemke would poll
enough votes on the third-party ticket to give Landon several
Midwestern states.
Fort to Hoover, July 17, 1936, K-38.
i27jjoover to S t r a u s s ,

July 17, 1936, K-130.

128Hoover to Shaw, August 18, 1936, and Shaw to Hoover,
August 27, 1936, K-119.
The Chicagoan assured his Chief of

193
The nominee's role was superseded in the last months
of the campaign by Knox, Hamilton, Hoover,
Smith.Several

and even Al

Republicans felt that L a n d o n 1s "double-

dealing" and the Hearst endorsement explained his poor
showing in the polls.

l -30

Arthur Hyde was so infuriated at

Landon's posture that he considered a public condemnation of
the "platform and the candidate.
Hoover tried to bolster GOP morale.

He wrote John

Hamilton that in spite of the chaotic feeling, progress was
notable and that "the organization will begin to jell in
September."132

a Republican rally in San Francisco,

ex-President introduced Hamilton.

the

In his introductory

remarks, Hoover blasted "New Deal Collectivism" and warned
that "the leopard cannot change his spots even when he runs
for

o f f i c e .

shortly, Hamilton and Knox became more

Hamilton's sincerity in wanting him to campaign.
Politics of Upheaval, 605, 612-618.

Schlesinger,

129lbid. McCoy, "Landon and the Campaign of 1936,"
213-214, noted the deep fragmentation in the campaign and
"the personalized speaking campaigns" of those Landon could
not control.
See Schlesinger, Politics of Upheaval, 616,
618-619, 623-624, and Rauch, New D e a l . 238, 260.
130fjy3e to Hoover, July 13, 1936, K-61.
0 'Laughlin
to Hoover, July 4, July 11, July 18, and July 25, 1936, Box
44, 0 'Laughlin Papers.
In Lan d o n 's defense, Mayer, The
Republicans, 436-439, 442-443, says that the Governor was a
good strategist, a "superior m a n , " who "concealed his shrewd
ness . "
^■^Hyde to Hoover, September 3, 1936, K-61.
^■^Hoover to Hamilton, August 14, 1936, K - 4 6 .

133Hoover Collection, LXIV (August 13, 1936, Item 2308.
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aggressive in their campaign.
Knox said,

In a most belligerent tone,

“Today no life insurance policy is secure; no

savings account is safe.'1^ 3^
Republicans in New England took heart.

George Moses,

anxious to return to the Senate, wrote the ex-President
asking for a public endorsement and letters to influential
state leaders.^33

Ted Joslin reported that Ne w England's

November vote would be Republican.
the former press secretary said:
Deal,

In a revealing statement,
“Opposition to the New

although strong at the top, has not sifted down to the

everyday people who work with their h a n d s ."136
Until September,

Landon maintained his containment

policy concerning Hoover's participation in the campaign.
Landon headquarters in Chicago even snubbed the ex-President
in a "chilled reception."

Nor did the nominee's failure to

mention Hoover in his addresses go unnoticed.

^-34schlesinger, Politics of Upheaval. 616, 618-619,
623-624.
Wolfskill, Revolt of the Conservatives, 205-215,
saw Hamilton as more conservative than Landon despite the
fact that he was L a n d o n 's manager.
As Schlesinger notes,
even Landon adopted the hard line by October and riddled
Roosevelt as directing "the nation down the road to
dictatorship."
135jv[OSes to Hoover, August 31, 1936, K-95.
H.H.,
pleased that his endorsement was still coveted, readily
replied in the affirmative. Hoover to Moses, September,
1936, K-95.
Akerson to Hoover, August 31, 1936, K-l, anti
cipated a Republican sweep in the East.
136josiin to Hoover,

September 1, 1936, K-66.

^ ^ S c h l e s i n g e r , Politics of Upheaval, 605.
The Republicans, 442.

Mayer,
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After considerable backstage maneuvering and with
definite awkwardness, Landon, with obvious reluctance,
for Hoover's aid in the campaign.

asked

The ex-President was eager

to help but insisted that Landon inform other Republicans of
TOO
the request.
On September 4, following the official
request, Hoover announced that he would campaign.2-39

He

released a barrage of press statements exuding confidence in
the Republican nominee and his election c h a n c e s . ^
H o o v e r 's silence during the following weeks created a
certain anxiety in the Landon camp.

Actually, the former

President was in seclusion, working on his speeches.2-42-

On

September 23, he addressed a Ne w York Herald Tribune Forum
concerning "The Administration of Relief. "2-42
The ex-President stated that the two objectives of
relief were to prevent hunger and suffering and to minimize
waste and needless sacrifice on the part of those providing
relief.

He viewed all bureaucratic relief as inefficient,

i38Landon to Hoover, telephone conversation, September
2, 1936, 12:40 PST time, K-74, and Hoover to Landon,
September 2, 1936, K-74.
2-3®Hoover Collection, LXIVA

(September 4, 1936) , Item

2311.
^ ^ I b i d . (September 5, September 6, and September 10,
1936), Items 2312, 2313, 2314.
'^■''Newton to Hoover,

September 26, 1936, K - 9 7 .

2-42noover Collection, LXIVA (September 23, 1936),
Item 2317. N e w York T i m e s , September 24, 1936, 1; Hoover,
Addresses on the Road, 186-190.
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costly,

and political? he also held that relief should be

only on an emergency basis.14^
Hoover stated that local relief agencies were more
effective,

efficient, inexpensive,

relief, he thought,

and apolitical.

ruined man's "self-respect."

encouragement of unemployment,
growing relief rolls.

Federal
Its

to him, was obvious from the

Aside from the spiritual loss, he

noted that infant mortality statistics were the highest in
the nation's recent history.

He demanded reform and a

return to local relief.144
The ex-President accelerated his tempo towards the
close of the campaign.

He addressed the Metal Mining Con

gress at Denver, Colorado,

on September 30.

his talk was "Reform in Some Federal Taxes."

The subject of
Although his

speech was intended as non-political, he inevitably broached
economic issues in his defense of balanced budgets,
and state powers,

and related topics.

federal

He upheld "the

principle of making people pay according to their means" as
right but denounced the use of taxation to "effect social or
economic ends."14^
At a convention of GOP women in Pennsylvania, Hoover

143Ibid., 186-188.
144 i b i d ., 188-190.
Despite the truth of H.H.'s facts,
he ignored the possibility that under the acute circum
stances of the depression, infant mortalities would have
been even higher but for federal intervention.

14^New York Times. October 1, 1936, 1.
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spoke of "New Deal Morals in Arithmetic."

His October 16

speech was one of the most vituperative of his career.

It

evolved around the "intellectual dishonesty" of the Adminis
tration.

He pointed to FDR's 1932 campaign promises con

cerning spending, the budget,

and recovery.

According to

Hoover, the Supreme Court had removed the most obvious
impediments to recovery:

the Roosevelt measures.

The Presi

dent, Hoover said, reminded one of the story about "the old
gentleman that was surreptitiously pushed off the dock in
order that the hero could gain the plaudits of the crowd as
a life s a v e r . " ^
The ex-President was amazed at the dishonesty in the
New Dealer's bookkeeping.

Despite the attempts to cover

the truth, he found that expenses in many areas had increased
as much as 500 per cent.

"If an income taxpayer or any

corporation kept books like this administration," he said,
"that is if they showed similar morals in juggling their
accounts,

they would be put in jail."

Hoover urged a reduc

tion in expenses and the return of the purse to Congressional
control.
At Denver, Colorado, on October 30, Hoover, preparing

146Hoover Collection, LXIVA (October 16, 1936), Item
2322. V i t a l Speeches, November 2, 1936.
Hoover, Addresses
on the R o a d , 201-204.
^-^I b i d . t 204-215. H.H. noted the juggling of figures,
the mislabeling of expenditures and credits, the transfer of
extraordinary regular expenses to the "emergency" column,
and other budgetary deceptions.
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to deliver his closing campaign address, told the press
that Landon was gaining ground every day and would carry New
York, Pennsylvania,

and O h i o . ^ ®

Addressing the Young Repub

lican League on "The Challenge to Liberty," Hoover returned
to his favorite t o p i c . T o

a degree, he recaptured "the

ideological tone . . . characteristic of his long trek across
the stage of American politics."150
Repeating the importance of the election, Hoover
bemoaned the "shadow boxing of political campaigns."
him,

the real issue of 1936 was liberty.

liberalism," he said,

"The spirit of

"is to create free men;

regimentation of m e n . ”

To

it is not the

He thought that coercion, central

ization,

and government dictation were at odds with American

liberty.

He demanded an end to "economic planning," ineffi

ciency, human suffering, government competition with business,
and encroachment on individual rights.
He called for the restoration of the American System,
with its spiritual tone, its freedom from coercion.
doubted that material welfare was enough.

He

"What," he said,

"is the nation profited if it shall gain the whole world and
lost its own soul?"

To him,

1^ 8Hoover Collection,
Items 2323 and 2324.

the time had come to reestablish

LXIVA (October 30-31, 1936),

149jjew York T imes, October 31, 1936, 1.
Addresses on the R o a d , 216-227.

Hoover,

ISO m q o s , The Republicans, 375.
151

Hoover, Addresses on the Road, 216-222.
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truth and morals in public life.
issue was freedom.

To him, the transcendent

He closed by saying:

these spiritual heritages of America.

"We must recover

. . . We shall battle

it out until the soul of America is saved.
On November 2, Hoover, made some final remarks about
the campaign.

He reiterated his belief that the New Deal

threatened liberty,

that this was the most important politi

cal campaign of the century,

and that a restoration of the

American System was an economic and moral necessity.
revealing,
said:

although unintended,

In a

election prognosis. Hoover

"No matter what comes from this election,

. . . we

will and must continue to f i g h t ."153
On November 3, as the ex-President and many of his
followers anticipated, Roosevelt swept Landon into oblivion,
but "the size of the majority" was incredible.

The fact

that Republicans h a d lost almost four million votes since
1932 raised doubts as to the value of a coalition with
Jeffersonian Democrats,

Liberty

There

"worth

Leaguers,

and Townsendites.
*1

was

much

that was

c o n t e m p l a t i o n . 11X3 ^

Many

152Ibid., 222-227.
Spangler, elated' with H.H. 1s
speeches, said "when the underbrush is cleared away, your
message will always live."
Spangler to Hoover, November 2,
1936, K - 1 2 7 .
■^■^Hoover Collection, LXIVA (November 2, 1936,) , Item 2325.
^ ^ H o o v e r to Reed, November 11, 1936, K-107.
Fort to
Hoover, November 7, 1936, K-38, blamed Landon's campaign and
pointed to H.H.'s greater appeal as a candidate. Moses to
Hoover, November 24, 1936, K-95, and Hyde to Hoover, November
21, 1936, K-61, concluded that "the pusil animous Landon"
was responsible for the disaster.
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Republicans felt that "money was spent as if the crew of
drunken sailors from a battleship had it in their pockets."
Hooverites thought that the administration had aroused class
feeling and used demagogic tactics.^55
the L a n d o n

outfit had

Too, they felt that

ignored principles

and

the pos sibility

of witnessing "a resurrection; they [sought] only to cast
lots

for

a garment

of

R e p u b l i c a n i s m . " - 1-®®

However,

the

GOP

could take comfort in "the unanimous support of the educated,
157

thoughtful element of our population." J

Theron K. Bronson, a Connecticut Republican, revealed
a great deal of the Republican problem in his post-election
analysis.

Obsessed with the idea that New England was the

"Cradle of Liberty,” the intellectual community of the
nation, and the most responsible electoral area, Bronson
"knew" that Hoover's ideas were popular.

All the businessmen

and farmers whom he talked to were Hoover Republicans.
men of sobriety, they "always" voted Republican.
he said, of the "best New England stock.11
elections, he noted,

As

They were,

But in recent

the Irish and especially the Italians

ISSMoses to Hoover, November 24, 1936, K-95.
Hoover, November 5, 1936, K-107.

Reed to

■'■^Hyde to Hoover, November 21, 1936, K-61.
0 'Laugh
lin to Hoover, November 7, 1936, Box 44, 0 'Laughlin Papers,
bemoaned the failure to defend principle.
Hyde to Hamilton,
November 4, 1936, K-46, lamented the GOP failure to defend
the Hoover Administration. He speculated that such a display
of cowardliness led to the 1936 fiasco.

■*"^Reed to Hoover, November 5, 1936, K-107.
to Hoover, November 5, 1936, K-15.

Bronson
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had swelled the totals of radical candidates in every N ew
England city.
To him,

"Old time America, 11 he said, was besieged.

Roosevelt's

political

revolution.

was

endangered.

ing

the

him,

"leveling

Bronson

"gap b e t w e e n

the

younger

discipline.
reaching

an

He

Like

the

Hoover,

also

he

blamed

that

did
the

"knew"

and

not k n o w
crime

alarming proportion.

of

Bronson

Roosevelt's

for
less

a new

analysis

overwhelming

ideology

as

concerned with

Individualism

and
the

that

He

for

their

in

hoped

that

sweep.

Young people

of

the

the

impressed

with

N ew Deal's

security,

guaranteed payments,

To

of

cities
Hoover

were

Depression.
of

of opportunity."

realism

accelerat

was
could

significant

abstract principle

"equality

liberty

1 CQ

to

a result

a

elders.

the

pointed

Hoover's

its

creating

the m e a n i n g

rate

save the country before it was too late.
The

was

Roosevelt

young people"

generation
noted

out process"

in p r oviding

causes
looking

They were
American
They were
job

1 cq
and government a s s i s t a n c e . J3

Businessmen and farmers were no longer a majority even
when they combined.

Metropolitan pluralities were decisive

in every election of the 1 9 3 0 ‘s and 1940's.
noted,

As Bronson

Italians and other ethnic groups were voting Demo

cratic and throwing the urban majorities to FDR and his

158t .
Bronson to Hoover, November 5, and November
8, 1936, K-15.
Bronson was concerned about good government,
political influence, responsible citizens, and morality.
He often quoted Hoover's speeches.

159

Adrian and Press, American Political Process. 188.
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coalition.
The most decisive change in Roosevelt's 1932 and 1936
totals, however, was due to the Negro vote.
time in history,

For the first

a Democratic Presidential nominee garnered

a majority of the black vote.

Whereas Hoover had polled

seventy-one per cent of the Negro vote in 1932, Landon
received only thirty-five per cent.

A political revolution

had occurred in the Negro wards.
Finally,

as one Republican precinct captain observed,

by 1936 Roosevelt had "become one of the family."
personal victory as far as Negroes,

His was a

labor, and the so-called

middle class were concerned.-*-®^

^6C>Samuel
Eldersveld, "The Influence of Metropoli
tan Party Pluralities in Presidential Elections Since 1920,"
American Political Science Review, XLIII (December, 1949),
1195-1199.
Viorst, Puritan E t h i c . 166-169, notes FDR's
sweep of Negro, Italian, Jewish, and labor votes.
161grnest M. Collins, "Cincinnati Negroes and Presi
dential Politics," Journal of Negro History, XLI (April, 1956),
132-133.
Elmer W. Henderson, "Political Changes Among
Negroes in Chicago D u r i n g ,the Depression," Social Forces, XIX
(May, 1941), 538-546. Richard S. Kirkendall, "The Great
Depression:
Another Watershed in American History?" re
printed in Braeman, Change and Continuity, 170-172.
See
Degler, Out of Our P a s t . 396.
Despite Negro disappointment
with FDR, and their realization that he often played politics
at their expense, they saw some improvement, even 200,000 jobs
in the CCC.
They hoped for even more and therefore supported
hi m in 1936.
See John A. Salmond, "The Civilian Conservation
Corps and the N e g r o , " Journal of American H istory, LII (June,
1965), 75-88.
Also see Leslie H. Fishel, "The Negro in the
New Deal E r a , " Wisconsin Magazine of History, XLVIII (Winger,
1964), 111-126.
162GOsnell, Grass Roots Politics. 132.
With the
changes in the middle class, the ethnic, racial and urban
vote insured FDR's heavy margin of 1936.
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With the final tabulations recorded, Republicans were
a decimated species.

The Hartford Daily Courant described

the party as too weak to prevent further centralization and
bureaucratization.
had saved.

Its principles were all that the Party

Pointing to the future, however, the newspaper

expressed a belief that Republicans could demand "efficiency
and a minimum of expense" regarding impending New Deal
policies.

The reorganization of the government and the

extension of civil service were positive goals that the
Party might promote.-^3
Lewis Strauss cautioned his Chief's silence as his
supporters were the obvious "nucleus around which any recon
struction will have to be made."

Hooverites even anticipated

Governor Landon asking the ex-President "to assume leader
ship. "

Mills was relieved that the Chief had not been the

nominee, since the certain defeat, although unavoidable,
would have blamed on Hoover personally.
Several Republicans feared that Hamilton lacked the
broad understanding and political skill necessary for recon
structing the party along acceptable lines.

The chairman

had an "intense energy, a somewhat brilliant personality,
but a rather superficial grasp of matters."

A

■^^Hartford Daily Courant, November 6, 1936.
164Strauss to Hoover, November 6, 1936, K-130. The
New York loyalist thought that "Ogden is truly repentant and
very much bewildered.11 Mills wanted "bygones to be by 
gones." Mills to Hoover, November 16, 1936, K-92.
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reorganization of the Party was the most important issue in
the months ahead.-*-65

Before Hoover would undertake the

enormous task of reorganizing the party, he wanted a recon
naissance of the election,
their loyalties,

the issues, potential leaders,

and a mass reaffirmation of principle.

•^^Spangler to Hoover, November 21, 1936, K-127.
Moses to Hoover, November 24, 1936, K-95, thought "Hamilton
should be' u n horsed11 and could assure E d g e ^ cooperation in
that specific endeavor.
Hyde to Hoover, November 21, 1936,
K-61, urged the Chief to draw up a list of key men in several
states who shared their opinions.
Through such a skeletal
organization, Hyde hoped to rebuild a party of principle.

CHAPTER VII
RECONNAISSANCE

The 1936 election shattered the GOP.

As National

Chairman John D. M. Hamilton admitted, Republicans had "lost
the pulse of the people."

The Party must be reorganized and

the job would be anything but easy.'**
was

"who" should lead the revival?

The greatest question

Despite his disastrous

defeat, the 1936 nominee Alf Landon had a legitimate claim.
Hamilton, as National Chairman and a communicant with all the
factions, had a theoretical claim.

Senator Arthur Vandenberg,

the Congressional leader of an anti-New Deal coalition of
Republicans and Democrats, received much publicity.
ex-President,

The

as the last official spokesman for his party,

and the leader of a loyal band of lieutenants, was eager for
a return to center stage.

Mutual distrust complicated the

problems of the leaders and the reorganization of the party.
Franklin Fort
less,

and drifting.

spoke
To

the

of

a

"floundering"

Jerseyite,

his

party,

Chief was

leaderthe

only

•^-Donald B r u c e J o h n s o n , T h e R e p u b l i c a n P a r t y a n d W e n d e l l
W i l l k i e ( U r b a n a , 1960), 13.
H e r e i n a f t e r c i t e d as J o h n s o n ,
Willkie.
2C o n r a d J o y n e r ,

The

Republican

4.
205

Dilemma

( Tuscon,

1963) ,
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possible

leader.

appropriate

action.

alternatives
appeal.
does

not wish

1936 b l u n d e r ,

He

for him.

However,

demand his

Hoover,

to

of

listen"

Hoover

return

soon
The

that

to

in

an

meditation,

decided

role

of

a

that

"evangelist

that

national

pondered

there

Cincinnatus

beckoned him.

thought
the

deep

in
In

were
had

a world
view

Republicans

of

the

two
little
that

their

should publicly

podium.^

As the ex-President reflected on Republican strategy
o f 1936, he became convinced that Landon tactics were respon
sible for the loss of every state except Maine and Vermont.
A n y idiot, he concluded,

could see that an aggressive anti-

N e w Deal approach was the only p a t h to a Republican future.
Hoover, on the verge o f challenging Landon for party control,
was convinced that the Kansan was,
C
prairie p o l i t i c i a n , ,IJ

at best,

"a mediocre,

^Fort to Hoover, January 7, 1937, K-38.
Hyde to
Hoover, January 8, 1937, K-61.
The Missourian thought that
someone m u s t call back the nation "to her original faith."
^Hoover to N o r m a n Beasley, December 29, 1936, K-9.
Hoover to Hyde, January 1, 1937, K-61.
The two letters were
identical in tone and thought.
Beasley to Hoover, January 5,
1937, wrote H.H. that "no cause is lost so long as there are
those who believe in it enough to fight for it.
But to
fight they m u s t have a leader . . . a leader from whom they
can draw strength and to whom they can give strength."
The
historian agreed with Hyde that the GOP had only one such
man.
^Mayer, The R e p u b licans, 448.
San Francisco Chron
icle , August 24, 1937, expressed anger over the fiasco
brought about by the "me-tooers." Robinson, Roosevelt
L e a d e rs h i p , 191, notes that many N e w Deal opponents thought
that Landon's nomination had muddled the issues.
Too, the
conservative South h a d voted for FDR.
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For his part, Landon thought of Hoover as "a stuffy
egotist and a perpetual Presidential candidate."

Undoubtedly,

the ex-President and his record were an albatross for Repub
licans.®

The 1936 nominee, however, wanted a closer

alliance with anti-New Deal Democrats, and even proved
receptive to the idea of a new party.

7

Aside from the maneuvering of aspirants for the GOP
leadership position, the party itself had to choose a direc
tion from four options.

Basically, these were again the

four possible roads of 1935.

Hoover, becoming more and more

the voice of conservatives, pointed to an anti-New Deal
route which would defend individualism, states rights, con
servative fiscal policies such as the gold standard and a
balanced budget, and less federal regulation.
Q
responsible opposition.

He wanted a

®Mayer, The Republicans, 448.
7Johnson, Willkie. 14-15.
Patterson, Congressional
Conservatism, 255-259, notes that the proponents of a coali
tion party all but won Landon and Vandenberg.
The 1936
nominee had even approved of a move to nominate Senator Byrd
or another Southern Democrat as his running mate.
8Johnson, Willkie. 14. The American Political Science
Association, Toward A More Responsible Two-Party System (New
York, 1950), made an eloquent plea for ideological parties.
It quoted H.H.'s statement that J,if a man from the moon, who
knew the essentials of representative government came as a
total stranger to the United States, he would say some
obvious things within the first week or two. . . . He would
say that in all this ideological tumult, if there cannot be
a reasonably cohesive body of opinion in each major party,
you are on a blind road where there is no authority in the
ballot or in government."
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Progressives demanded a liberal move which would go
further leftward than the New Deal.

The obvious weakness of

such a course was its alienation of many Republicans with
their moderate to conservative philosophy.

Moreover, Pro

gressives composed a very small faction of the GOP in the
1 9 3 0 's.9
A third group preferred to see the Republican Party
die and thus free its members to form a new party, hopefully
along ideological and economic lines, and with a Southern
flavor.

Men of diverse views favored this approach.

Several

Senate leaders including McNary and Vandenberg leaned in
this direction,

and Landon showed a surprising receptivity

to the idea.-*-®
The GOP, suffering an accelerating fragmentation,
chose the fourth option and "muddled along" as a "loyal
opposition."

11

At the darkest moment in the p a r t y ’s recent

history, the President announced his Court Plan.

The

February 5, proposal amounted to an attempt to pack the
court.12

It gave the Republicans an issue on which to unite,

^Johnson, Willkie, 15. New York T i mes. January 6,
January 17, January 31, February 7, March 5, and March 10,
1937, 1, pushed for a liberalization of the party.
1 ® J o h n s o n , W i l l k i e . 15-16, 26-27.
Fortune M a g azine.
( F e b r u a r y , 1937}, 67-71, a r g u e d t h i s l i n e .
A l s o see
P a t t e r s o n , C o n g r e s s i o n a l C o n s e r v a t i s m , 255, 259-260.

XV

11Johnson,

Willkie,

16.

12New York Times, February 6 , 1937, 1.
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albeit m

opposition.

13

On the very day that Roosevelt announced his judi
ciary maneuver, the ex-President held a press conference.
In an unmistakable tone, Hoover attributed the Judiciary
Reorganization Bill to the Court's invalidation of "pet" New
Deal programs.

The President's bias, he held, was undeniable,

but the method of bypassing a constitutional amendment and
openly attempting to destroy the independence of the court
was unpardonable.

The proposal, he noted, would subordinate

the court "to the personal power of the Executive."

To

Hoover, this would nullify "the greatest savior of liberty.
Several Republicans applauded Hoover's public state
ment on the Court Plan and thought that he had added strength
to the opposition s i d e . ^

The majority of GOP leaders, how

ever, preferred Senator McNary's strategy of silence.

To

Senate politicos, the defeat of the Roosevelt scheme was
possible only if Democrats led the fight against the Court

1-3Johnson, Willkie, 17-19.
1-^New York Times, February 6, 1937, 1.
Addresses on the Road, 228.

Hoover,

l % o r m a n Beasley to Hoover, February 27, 1937, K-9,
expressed his and Wendell Willkie's admiration for the exPresident 's effort to show Republican character. Theron
Bronson to Hoover, February 10, 1937, K-15, thought that
sane men must defend constitutional government and principle
from FDR's onslaught.
O 'Laughlin to Hoover, February 22,
February 23, February 27, March 6, March 9, March 13, March
20, and March 27, 1937, Box 44, 0 'Laughlin Papers, showed
an obsession with the court plan.
Of GOP officeholders, only
Governor John Bricker of Ohio endorsed a public repudiation
of the President's plan.
Bricker to Hoover, February 24,
1937, K-14.
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Plan.

McNary

tion,
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and Borah

presenting

Congressional
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a
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long
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and especially Hoover.
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ex-President
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divided,

Court
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on
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defensive.^-®

Although Hoover reluctantly acquiesced in the McNary
policy throughout the spring of 1937, he took one last blow
at the packing plan in his Chicago address of February 20.
He

demanded

widespread
from

"Hands
concern

every party,

moderate

Off
over

stand between

He

of

did

"elder

he

"the

Old

court plan

Guard

said,

era

Court."
on

and p rofession.
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recognize

Supreme
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role
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ready
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"radical"

urging him
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16Boskin, "Politics of an Opposition Party," 93-96.
James D. Patterson, Congressional Conservatism, 101-106, 108
110, 331.
"Leadership in congress," Review of Reviews, XCV
(January, 1937), 47-51, described McNary as a "shrewd
politician.11
^Boskin,
" P o l i t i c s o f a n O p p o s i t i o n P a r t y , " 93-96.
P a t t e r s o n , C o n g r e s s i o n a l C o n s e r v a t i s m . 101-106, 108-110,
107, 331. A l s o s e e M a y e r , T h e R e p u b l i c a n s . 447, f o r a n
a d m i s s i o n that r a n k and file Republicans favored an a g g r e s 
sive d e n u n c i a t i o n of t he C o u r t Plan.
■^Patterson,

331.

congressional

Conservatism.

105-106,
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Hoover denied that the Supreme Court was behind in
its work.

He pointed to the historical precedent which

allowed John Marshall and Oliver Wendell Homes to serve the
nation long after their seventieth birthdays.

He denied

partisanship on the part of the Court, and pointed to its
unanimous decisions on the "greater issues" such as the
N R A . 20
Hie ex-President accused Roosevelt of trying to
revolutionize the constitution and abolish an independent
judiciary.
blank check.

No executive, he said, had ever asked for such a
He questioned the need for a court of "Presi

dent's judges."

To him, such a proposal violated logic,

rights, and the Constitution.

He urged the maintenance of

an independent judiciary.2
Despite the ex-President's assured public silence, he
continued to maneuver backstage regarding the Court Plan.
At the least, he encouraged 0 'Laughlin to undercut Roosevelt
by bringing about the resignation of a liberal judge.

In

the past, James Clark McReynolds, one of the most conserva
tive judges on the Supreme Court, had shown an admiration

l^Hoover, Addresses on the R o a d , 229-230.
20Ibid., 230-232.

21Ibid.. 232-236.

212
for Hoover.

0 'Laughlin approached McReynolds and persuaded

him to ask Chief Justice Hughes to encourage the retirement
of Judge Louis Brandeis.

Although McReynolds complied with

the request, Judge Brandeis enjoyed good health and decided
9p
to remain on the banch. ^ Since "everyone" knew that
Senator Joseph T. Robinson of Arkansas, notwithstanding his
conservatism, had been assured the next vacancy, the embarrassment to the President could have been considerable. J
With Hoover's hearty approval, Ben S. Allen helped
organize a League for Supreme Court Independence.

Financial

support was easily found and the organization rapidly
expanded.^4

Another group, the National Committee to Uphold

Constitutional Government, proved to be the most effective
propaganda agency in the Court fight.

Publisher Frank

Gannet, editor Edward Rumley, and the "political pamphleteer"
Amos Pinchot were the buiding lights of this organization.
They distributed a pamphlet entitled The Assault on the
Supreme Court.

They made a positive contribution to the

^ H o o v e r to 0 'Laughlin, February 26, 1937, Box 44,
0 'Laughlin Papers, reiterated that "everyone" wanted a
public denunciation of FDR's court-packing plan.
0 'Laughlin
to Hoover, February 22, February 23, February 27, 1937, Box
44, 0 'Laughlin Papers, dealt with the McReynolds efforts
and the court plan in general.
23ibid.

2^Allen to Hoover, April 5, 1937, K-2.
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President's s e t b a c k . ^

Walter Lippmann, the widely read

columnist, condemned the President’s lack of respect for the
Constitution and questioned the basic integrity of the
Administration as well as its political wisdom in proposing
the Court Plan.2®
As opposition to Court-packing accelerated,

the Senate

Committee on the judiciary held extensive hearings on the
Reorganization Bill.

Although the ex-President did not go

before the Committee, his views were represented in the
testimony of economist John Flynn.

The embittered New Deal

critic lamented the challenges to liberty manifested in the
attempt to destroy judicial independence.

97

In a similar

vein, Odgen Mills published his book. The Seventeen Million,
which noted the "menace of collectivism" and its "everlengthening shadow."

Individual freedom was dying as the

government became master of the people.2®
Although the ex-President was concerned with the Court
Plan and its repudiation, he devoted much energy to pure

^ R i c h a r d Polenberg, "The National Committee to Uphold
Constitutional Government, 1937-1941, " Journal of American
History, LII (December, 1965), 582-598. These men, Polenberg
said, hoped that the GOP was dead since they despised H.H.
as "a fool . . . always misinformed."
2®New York Herald Tribune, March 25, 1937, 1.

27y. s. Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 75 Cong.,
1 Sess., Hearings; Reorganization of the Federal Judiciary
(Washington, 1937), 915-924, 22-23.
2®Ogden Mills, The Seventeen Million
1-16, 142-143.

(New York, 1937),
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29Crowther to Hoover, January 21, 1937, K-25, dis
cussed New Hampshore political trends.
0 'Laughlin to Hoover,
March 27, April 3, April 12, 1936, Box 44, 0 'Laughlin Papers.
Ben S. Allen to Hoover, April 5, 1937, K-2.
30
W h i t e t o W i l b u r , J a n u a r y 29, 1937, K-14S.
This
letter u n d e r l i n e d the true authorship of the p l a n and d i s 
c l o s e d i t s e a r l y c o n c e p t i o n a s w e l l a s i t s p r o m o t e r 1s e a g e r 
ness for the titular leadership of his party.
■ ^ M a y e r , T h e R e p u b l i c a n s . 448, 453, n o t e s L a n d o n ' s
d e t e r m i n a t i o n to t h w a r t a H o o v e r comeback.
Despite the
c h a r g e s o f a p o w e r bid, H . H . ' s p r i m a r y c o n c e r n , a c c o r d i n g to
J o h n s o n , W i l l k i e , 20, w a s f o r a " s t a t e m e n t o f p r i n c i p l e s . "
H.H. h o p e d that a c on f e r e n c e of leaders w o u l d call for a
n a t i o n a l c o n v e n t i o n a n d n o t e d t h e 1919 h i s t o r i c a l p r e c e d e n t
in w h i c h W i l l H a y s a n d O g d e n M i l l s h a d d r a f t e d a s e t o f p r i n 
c i p l e s t o w h i c h R e p u b l i c a n s h a d r a l l i e d , p r i o r t o t h e 1920
election.
H o o v e r t o H a m i l t o n , c o n f i d e n t i a l l e t t e r , A p r i l 15,
a n d A p r i l 23, 1937, K-46, a d m i t t e d t h a t h e h a d w r i t t e n t h i r t y
leaders concerning a declaration of principles.
H.H. intended
to l e t a s e p a r a t e c o u n c i l d i s c u s s s p e c i f i c p o l i c i e s .
He
w a n t e d the p a r t y to e n d o r s e h i s p r i n c i p l e s .
He thought that
t h e G r a s s R o o t s C o n v e n t i o n s o f 1934 h a d d e v e l o p e d t o t h e
point that a party conference was not feasible.
He feared
that the two-party system w o u l d en d if the GOP d id n o t take
a p o s i t i v e a c t i o n at once.
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politico proved amiable, Hoover's correspondence with him
accelerated.^
The ex-President wanted other GOP leaders to openly
push for a party conference.

He was disappointed at Governor
O O

Lan d o n ’s failure to cooperate.

Hyde, on his Chief's behalf,

pressed Senator Dickinson to move for a declaration of party
principles through a conference of GOP leaders.

Although

the Iowan approved the general idea, he feared any person
alized attempt by Hoover, Borah, or Mills to reorganize the
Party.

In vain, Hyde tried to convince Dickinson that Hoover

alone had the leadership qualities, the principles,
press coverage necessary for Republican revival.

and the

Hyde even

thought that the public should demand H o o v e r 's return to
politics.^

Crowther reported that New Hampshire politicos

were anxious for a declaration of principles and were waiting
for leadership.^
The ex-President,

at last, recognized that his per

sonal intervention was necessary.

Consequently, he called

on Governor Lowden at "Sinnissippi."

Both men expressed

32noover to Governor John Bricker, March to November,
1937, K-14. Hoover to Governor Wilbur Brucker, June to
November, 1937, K-14.
-^Hoover to Bricker, March 12, 1937, K-14, urged the
Ohioan to aid in the move.
Hoover to Hamilton, April 23,
1937, L-128, MacChesney Papers.
o a

Dickinson to Hyde, May 7, 1937, and Hyde to Dickin
son, May 10, 1937, K-29, reflected agreement on principles
but a difference on leadership.

^^Crowther to Hoover, May 22, 1937, K-25.
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alarm at the hostility between the Hoover and Landon camps.
The Illinoian also agreed to support the idea of a party
3 ft

conference.

By late spring, Hooverites were confident of a partial
victory in the court Plan fight.

The Hughes letter to

Senator Burton K. Wheeler had pointed up the efficiency of
the tribunal and undermined one of FDR's main arguments for
reorganization.

Yet, 0 'Laughlin and others feared that the
37

President would agree to a compromise proposal of some typer'
Justice Van Devanter's resignation, as well as the decision
upholding the Wagner Act, dispelled the half-hearted support
for the President's plan.

3Q

Hooverites rejoiced at the outcome.00

Before the Court fight faded into the background,
Hoover renewed his efforts to evoke a party conference.

■^Hutchinson, Lowden, II, 724.
370 'Laughlin to Hoover, April 3, and April 12, 1937,
Box 44, 0 'Laughlin Papers.
George H. Haynes, The Senate of
the united States (Boston, 1938), I, 1097-1100.
Robert S.
Allen, "Hughes Checkmates the President," Nation, CXLIV (May
20, 1937), 610-611.
0. R. Altman, "First Session of the
Seventy-fifth Congress," American Political Science Review,
XXXI (December, 1937), 1085-1088.
Hoover Papers, Q-223,
contains hundreds of articles, letters, and notes on the
court plan, its repudiation, and related materials.
3^lbid.
Robert S. Allen, "Hughes Checkmates the
President," Nation, CXLIV (May 20, 1937), 610-611.
Robert
S. Allen, "Roosevelt Fights Back," Nation, CXLV (August 28,
1937), 187-188, sees FDR as the victor in the Court fight
because of the court's subsequent decisions on the New Deal.
FDR, he says, suffered defeat only through the palace revolu
tion which split his party.
Hoover to MacChesney, June 1,
1937, C-15, MacChesney Papers, shows relief that the plan
was defeated.
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Aware of Governor Bricker1s enthusiasm for the idea, the
ex-President expressed desire for a Bricker-Lowden-LandonVandenberg conference to discuss reorganization.
•aq

Ohio Governor agreed to cooperate. J

Again the

Hoover, already

agitated at the constant "chatter11 about a GOP corpse,
became incensed at the press charge that he was promoting
the conference.

It was, he said, a grass roots idea which

many leaders favored.^
Arthur Hyde, perturbed at "the masterminds of Kansas"
and their rejection of a Hoover comback, took to the road
and urged Republicans to draft the ex-President as their
leader and reorganizer.

Hyde reiterated his belief that

Hoover alone has the "intellectual and spiritual leadership"
necessary for a revival of the p a r t y . D e s p i t e Hyde's
efforts, the old "inner circle" was dissolving.
Jerseyite Franklin Fort died of c a n c e r . ^

On June 20,

Four months later,

Ogden Mills also d i e d . ^

•^Bricker to Hoover, June 1, 1937, K-14.
Hoover to
Bricker, June 21, and Bricker to Hoover, June 28, 1937, K-14.
^ H o o v e r to Spangler, June 24, 1937, K-127.
^ H y d e to Hoover, June 14, 1937, K-61, blasted the
"liberalizers, compromisers, wobblers and defeatists" of the
Party. New York Times, June 27, 1937, 1. George Akerson to
Hoover, August 18, 1937, K-l, thought that the Chief was "the
only one in the country, on the horizon, who can furnish the
leadership." Ashmun Brown to Hoover, August 23, 1937, K-16,
saw Hoover as "a guide to clear thinking."
42

Hoover to Mrs. Frank Fort, telegram, June 21, 1937,
K-38, lamented the passing of "our greatest friend."

^ % e w York Times, October 12, 1937, 1.
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At Charles Dawes' request, Hoover agreed to meet with
a "number of state political heads" in the Northwest during
August.^

Hyde soon reported that the Young Republican

Clubs were determined to witness a declaration of principles.
They were, he said,

"the only group that can save America.

Hoover continued to make forays into enemy country in
an effort to win converts to his idea of a party conference.
At Buffalo, Wyoming, in early August, the ex-President
admitted that he had "heard of a proposed 1938 rally of
Republican Party leaders" but denied knowledge of its con
firmation.^®

A week later, he denied any attempt to bypass

Governor Landon and Chairman Hamilton.

He noted that the

Chairman had suggested the idea of a party conference to the
Executive Committee and that numerous state leaders were
urging a Party Convention.
Spangler, looking toward the September meeting of the
Executive Committee, agreed to press for the convention and
expected Earl Warren and Ralph Williams to support his

^ H o o v e r to Dawes, July 22, 1937, K-25.
^ 5Hyde to Hoover, July 10, 1937, K-61.
^®Hoover Collection, LXV

(August 10, 1937), Item 2368.

47New York T i mes, August 21, 1937, 1. Hoover to
Spangler, August 21, 1937, K-127, could not understand
Hamilton's disavowal.
Lowden had arranged a Landon-Hoover
parley at Sinnissippi.
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efforts.

AQ

Governor Bricker and Ohio State Chairman Ed

Schorr were drumming up support, too.^9

Western leaders

were anxious for an aggressive organization, and Jacob Allen,
a Grass Roots founder from Chicago, thought that Hoover's
idea of a declaration of principles was a brilliant sug
gestion .
The New York Herald Tribune leaked Hoov e r 's Conference
efforts in August.

It failed to credit other leaders with

authorship or support of the idea.

The ex-President was

greatly embarrassed and feared that personalization of the
idea might jeopardize its c h a n c e s . ^

Hoover, obviously

aware of his precarious position in the party, knew that
opposition to the plan would accelerate if it was credited
as his idea.
Hoover's future hopes now rested on the National

^^Spangler to Hoover, August 25, 1937, K-127, dis
cussed the coming Executive Committee session.
Hoover to
Spangler, August 28, 1937, K-127, reaffirmed the support of
Warren and Williams.
^ B r i c k e r to Hoover, August 30, 1937, K-14.
^ H o o v e r to Bricker, August 24, 1937, K-14.
Jacob
Allen to MacChesney, August 30, 1937, C-13, MacChesney
Papers.
Hoover to Wilbur Brucker, August 24, 1937, K-16,
hoped that the Michigan Governor could sway state party
leaders to the idea. He admitted that he had avoided a
conference with Vandenberg but still hoped all the party
leaders would support the conference. Vandenberg's attempts
to curry favor with anti-New Deal Democrats, according to
Patterson, Congressional Conservatism. 259, 253, 200-210,
had raised doubts in some quarters as to his Republican
steadfastness.

5^-Hoover to Brucker, August 24, 1937, K-16.
to Bricker, August 24, 1937, K-14.

Hoover
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Committee's issuing a call for a general conference.

He

accepted the necessity of a broad base including the Young
Republicans, delegates to the 1936 Convention,
men, and candidates for office.

state chair

Significantly, he was not

concerned about the inclusion of the Congressional
c9
leaders.
He recognized that the "wobblers" would be of
little aid in drafting a declaration of principles.

To him,

the party needed intellectual inspiration, not more oppor
tunism.^
Following a conference with Paul Saxon, a Hoover
secretary, Chairman Hamilton informed the ex-President that
everything was clear.
September 23.

The Executive Committee would meet on

A Hearst minion, he said, had broken the

story about Hoover's authorship of the Conference plan.
Hamilton had refused to comment in order to prevent charges
of disloyalty from the Landon c a m p . ^
Governor Brucker of Michigan reported enthusiasm for
the conference.

He thought that the public was waiting "for

the kind of leadership" Hoover could e x e r t . S p a n g l e r

and

52noover to A. Brown, August 28, 1937, K-16.
53lbid. American Political Science Association,
Toward A More Responsible Two-Party System. 41, 69, quotes
H.H. 's belief that ideological parties were needed, for "if
there cannot be a reasonably cohesive body of opinion in
each major party, you are on a blind road where there is no
authority in the ballot or in government."
^ H a m i l t o n to Hoover, September 2, 1937, K-46.

S^Brucker to Hoover, September 3, 1937, K-16.
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George Ball of Indiana were to meet the ex-President in
Chicago prior to the Executive Committee

c

o

n

c

l

a

v

e

.

Hoover's

hopes improved to the point that he wrote Knox that rank, and
file Republicans were demanding a party conference.

He urged

the Chicagoan to aid in drafting a declaration of princi
ples .^
Throughout 1937, the ex-President continued to dabble
in local politics.

He worked with Earl Warren in promoting

Hooverish Republicans in the California party, and advised
the national committee man concerning the party conference
and related matters.

Hoover and Warren enjoyed the whole

hearted support of Justus Cramer, the chairman of the
California Republican Central

C o m m i t t e e .

Hoover also continued to assert his leadership on the
national level.

In September, he published an article on

"The Crisis and the Political Parties" in the Atlantic
Mo n thly.

Hoover reiterated his belief in the need for ideo

logical parties and a strong two-party system.

A party out

of office, he said, must always provide alternatives and

S^Spangler

to Hoover, September 2, and September 15,

1937, K-127.
^ H o o v e r to Knox, September 13, 1937, K-72.
5 ® W a r r e n to Hoover, September 20, October 6, and
October 13, 1937, K-145.
Cramer to Hoover, June 11,
September 9, and October 28, 1937, K-24.
Cramer generally
discussed the intricate details of California politics.

play the "loyal opposition.
The ex-President lamented the abridgement of liberty,
the increased federal direction and coercion, the patronage,
excessive spending,

and the attempts to undermine the checks

and balances of a three-branch government.
said,

The New Deal, he

"like all drugs, required increasing d o s e s . " ^
To Hoover, the worst aspect of the Ne w Deal was its

economic policy which led to "price fixing, wage fixing,
managed production in farm and shop, managed currency,
managed credit, managed interest" and coercion.
American spirit of enterprise was in eclipse.

The
He cited a

long list of economic ills.®^
Hoover charged 1936 campaigners with blurring issues;
parroting Roosevelt; and using outmoded labels such as
reactionary,
plicable,

conservative,

and liberal which were now inap

intellectually dishonest,

and defaming.

He noted

that both parties had an Old Guard and a lunatic fringe.
was time, he said,
alizations.^

It

to concentrate on issues and ignore person

He charged Ne w Dealers with abetting "vicious

political machines," currying favor with public money,

and

using corporate and union funds for campaigns.
Hoover noted the GOP's opportunity for a revival of

^ H e r b e r t Hoover, "The Crisis and the Political Par
ties," Atlantic Mont hly, CHK (September, 1937), 257-258.
6°ibid.

61ibid.. 59-60.

62Ibid., 260-264.

63Ibid.

223
their organization.
said,

The fidelity of some Party members, he

"is second only to their religion."

He thought that

Republicans should defend their record and reassert their
principles.

Although there was talk of a new third party

through a realignment,
and difficult."

such a move, to him, would be "slow

He used historical examples to prove the

improbability of success.

Time, he said, was too precious

to encourage a continuation of the New Deal by splitting the
opposition.

He doubted that many Republicans would ever

leave their party with its history and its commendable
record.
Hoover wanted the party to enunciate its principles
and let the chips fall where they might.
creed:

He proposed a

"I believe," he said, in liberty, the bill of rights,

economic freedom, a balanced budget, equality of opportunity,
and other traditional principles.

His creed was individual

but he hoped that the party would convene and draw up a plat
form of principles which would rouse the public to a defense
of l i b e r t y . ^
Confident that the party could not resist his pro
posal much longer, the ex-President traveled to Sinnissippi
for a meeting with Lowden and Landon.

The three men reached

accord on a Republican Conference and the need for a broad
base in determining the delegates.

They also consented to

the National Committee's creation of a "committee to draft a

64Ibid., 264-266.

65Ibid., 266-267.
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declaration of fundamental principles."

In turn the draft

would be submitted to a spring conference of party leaders.®®
Following the Sinnissippi conclave, Hoover spoke with
Knox and pushed for a "positive, courageous" declaration
"free from personal politics."

Despite Hoover's request,

Vandenberg declined to serve on the Committee because of
Congressional opposition.®^

The ex-President was chagrined

at Landon's demand for Congressional inclusion.®®

Although

reports circulated of Landon's encouragement of Congressional
rejection, the Kansan wrote Senator John Townsend of Dela
ware and urged Congressional participation on the basis that
they would have to run on the platform adopted.®®
Several newspaper columnists interpreted the Hoover
push for a party conference as the best indicator that he

^Hutchinson, Lowden, II, 724-725. The ex-Governor
saw through the surface amiability of H.H. and Landon, and
recognized that they misunderstood each other on several
points.
The basic difference concerned the composition of
the conference.
H.H. wanted National Committee figures to
dominate, whereas Landon favored the Congressional leaders.
Too, Landon wanted specific policy proposals, whereas H.H.
wanted a declaration of principles.
H.H. conceded the
latter point after much suasion by Vandenberg.
Hoover to
Hamilton, September 14, 1937, K-46, exaggerated Lowden's
enthusiasm for the convention.
Hoover to Hamilton, October
5, 1937, K-46, was a key letter explaining H.H.'s views of
the Sinnissippi conclave.
®*^Hoover Collection, LXV (October 4, 1937), Item 2378;
New York Times. October 5, 1937. Hoover to Spangler,
October 7, 1937, K-127, discussed the Hoover-Vandenberg
exchange.
®®Hoover to Lowden, October 8, 1937, K-78.
®9Landon to Senator Townsend, October 6, 1937, C-15,
MacChesney Papers.
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was “definitely running for nomination in 1940."

The Old

Guard, anxious for control of the party machinery, pretended
enthusiasm for Hoover's ideas.
pulling in every direction.

The various factions were

The fact that many Committee

members would be ousted in 1938 underlined the importance of
Hoover's drive while he still controlled the largest
personal faction.

70

While Republicans discussed the pros and cons of a
party conference, certain labor leaders approached Hoover
regarding a change in tactics concerning Republican labor
views.

Robert Littler,

a San Francisco attorney and fre

quent defender of labor, noted the increasing dissatisfaction
with bureaucrats.

The New Deal, he said, was an artificial

stimulant which created internal dissention and was fomenting
labor's dependency on the federal government.
a GOP reconciliation with l a b o r . ^

Littler urged

Hoover, intrigued with

the possibilities, made several inquiries.
Raymond Bellany,

an A.F. of L. representative, assured

Hoover that a labor-Republican alliance was possible.

Labor

leaders, he said, lamented the paternalism of the government.
For Hoover's use, Bellany enclosed a list of friendly A.F. of

70Hill Blackett to Boake Carter, October 8, 1937, L128, MacChesney Papers.
Blackett estimated that H.H.'s
faction comprised less than twenty per cent of the party.
Although he failed to define them, Blackett spoke of six
major factions.

^Littler to Hoover, October 13, 1937, PPS 141,
Labor.
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L. leaders who were loyal to the GOP.

Bellamy urged their

inclusion in party councils and all well-advertised national
72

functions.

With the labor situation in mind, Hoover proved
increasingly receptive to the idea of specific planks for
the party conference.

Disturbed over the failure of Landon

to communicate with the National Chairman, Hoover accelerated
his public activities.

He informed the press that Republi

cans would present a united front concerning the declaration
of principles and that they would "reorient the Party to the
problems of the times. "73
On October 23, Hoover urged a "national crusade."

He

spoke of an overwhelming public support for a National Con
vention to enunciate definite policy alternatives to the New
Deal.

Polls, he said,

showed that ninety-four per cent of

the Republican rank and file favored a party rally.

He

hoped that the public would soon have all the facts con
cerning the New

Deal.^4

^^Bellamy to Hoover, October 27, 1937, and Hoover to
Bellamy, October 18, 1937, PPS 441, Labor.
The Bellamy list
included Matthew Woll, Vice-President of the A.F. of L.,
William Hutchenson, President of the Carpenters and Joiners,
and John Coefield, President of the Plumbers Association.
Aside from these staunch Republicans, Bellamy included a
list of others.
^ H a m i l t o n to Hoover, October 14, 1937, K-46.
Collection, LXV (October 19, 1937), Item 2381.

Hoover

^4Ibid., 2385. New York T i m e s , September 26, 1937,
showed the Spangler poll of 6000 Republicans reflecting a
ninety-four per cent endorsement of a party conference.
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Three days lacar,

in Boston, the ex-President

addressed the Massachusetts Republican Club.
Program of American Ideals."

He spohe on "A

He discussed the role of an

opposition party, the need for constructive alternatives,
fresh blood, principles and ideas.

He lamented the loss of

morality in the political profession and repeated his own
disinterest in "any public office."

He also reaffirmed his

devotion to principle.7^
In urging change in methods to solve current problems,
he stated that "Collectivism and Planned Economies never
achieve recovery."

He doubted that the New Deal could ever

raise "real living standards."

Revealingly, he noted that

the public would join Republicans only "if they hnow where
we are going."
Ben Allen praised the Chief's speech as the "greatest"
and "most effective in delivery" of his career.

Young Repub

licans, Allen said, were stirred to the point of refusing to
compromise on the idea of a party conference.

Allen thought

that the Young Republicans would hold their own party con
ference if the National Committee failed to issue the call.77
Ashmun Brown described the Chief's speech as "a gust of fresh
air in a night club at 4 a.m."

It was, he said,

"good to

have someone tahe us out of the intellectual slums in which

7^Hoover, Addresses on the R o a d . 264-266.
76I b i d ., 266-274.
77Allen to Hoover, October 28, 1937, K-2.
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we have been dwelling so long."
shown that honor, decency,

He thought that Hoover had

and integrity were not entirely

archaic words.
Hoover wrote Spangler that the National Committee
must call a policy conference.^9

On November 5, the Repub

lican National Committee sanctioned the creation of a policy
committee of one hundred.

Lowden was named chairman.8®

Yet, the victory was tarnished by the rejection of a party
convention.
tion,

The ex-President, making the best of the situa

spoke with the press and lauded the creation of a

Committee of 100 as a sound approach to contemporary p r o b 
lems.

Its membership, he said, would include every profes-

sion and pose unlimited possibilities. 8X

•?8A. Brown to Hoover,

October 27, 1937, K-16.

^ 9Hoover to Spangler, October 29, 1937, K-127.
ex-President insisted that Lowden be named chairman.

The

8®Spangler to Richey, November 8, 1937, K-127. H u tch
inson, Lowden, II, 726.
Lowden's illness negated his active
role.
Landon's reluctance turned into open opposition.
Hamilton to Landon, November 1, 1937, and Hamilton to Hoover,
November 2, 1937, K-127.
As Hamilton mediated between the
two camps, he received two resolutions from H.H. The one
calling for a policy committee was adopted, whereas the one
calling for a party convention was rejected.
8^Hoover was distressed at Hamilton's inability to
sway the National Committee to the idea of a 1938 convention.
All H.H.'s opponents ganged up on h im in Chicago.
Joe
Martin, Knox, and the Washington crowd had struck a death
blow at his plan.
MacChesney noted that H.H. "tapped every
political, financial and industrial mogul who was under
obligation to him in any way" and might have won with a d is
avowal of his 1940 candidacy.
Landon, still a rival for the
titular leadership of the party, joined in the narrow defeat
of the ex-President.
MacChesney memo, PPS, 163, MacChesney
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Although Hoover won a partial victory in the creation
of a Committee of 100, he remained unhappy at Congressional
opposition.

in a series of exchanges with Spanger, he dis

cussed the possible selections for chairman in view of
Lowden's continued illness.

With Lowden out of the picture,

Hoover had no strong preference for the post.

He vetoed any

selection of Knox but thought that ex-Senator Otis Glenn of

Papers.
(The authorship of the memo is speculative, but it
is objective enough that it came from an insider who recog
nized the reality and who sympathized with H.H. but not to
an extreme point.
Johnson, Willkie. 20-22, credited Landon,
Knox, and Borah with the defeat of H.H.'s plan.
They forced
a compromise in the form of the Committee of 100.
It should
be noted, however, that H.H. retained control of the member
ship because of his influence with the Executive Committee
which would appoint all members.
Spangler, a most loyal
lieutenant, ran the Executive Committee.
For his own view,
Hoover to Spangler, December 2, 1937, K-127, lamented the
"general conspiracy" fanned by Landon, Knox and Martin, which
prevented the policy conference.
H.H. was confident that
Creager and Spangler could overcome the obstacles in their
creation of the Committee of 100.
Its membership, he
assumed, would include men of ideas.
Joseph Boskin, "Poli- .
tics of an Opposition Party," 228-230, showed H.H.'s strength
within the party hierarchy.
Knox, on November 5, 1937,
wrote that the "party is in danger of being Hooverized." He
recognized that H.H. controlled sixty of the 100 committee
members.
Boskin's study underlined what contemporary Repub
licans knew so well: Hoover, despite his 1932 defeat and
depression image, remained a formidable force in the party
and a definite political threat,
see Hamilton to Hoover,
November 2, 1937, and Hamilton to Landon, November 1, 1937,
K-127, for the difficulty in working with both camps con
cerning party resolutions.
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Illinois would be a wise choice.

09

On November 8, at Waterville, Maine, Hoover spoke on
"Free Speech and Free Press."

He cited several historical

examples in which dictators had organized propaganda machines
to color the news, discredit the previous regime, promise
new panaceas, foment hate, and violate liberty.

He warned

of a controlled press in America and urged a tenacious
defense of free speech and a free press.
Four days later, at Syracuse University, Hoover spoke
on "Training for Public Service."

He noted that "the major

purposes of our universities outside of football" were "to
train minds and strengthen character."

He applauded the

training for public service but warned that the spoils
system was destroying the chance for public service.

He

cited recent proposals for abolishing the Civil Service
Commission and warned that partisan politics was incom
patible with public service.

He urged the young to accept

joe Martin ignored public opinion and
encouraged Congressional opposition to the party conference
according to Spangler.
Spangler to Hoover, November 3, 1937,
K-127. Hoover to Spangler, November 6, and November 11,
1937, and Spangler to Richey, November 8, 1937, K-127.
The
Hoover-Knox split concerning the party conference and its
implications for H o o v e r 1s future was amplified in the per
sonal exchanges between the two men. Hoover to Knox,
November 6, 1937, expressed disgust with Knox's misrepresen
tations.
Knox to Hoover, November 9, 1937, K-72, stated
that "everyone" believed the ex-President wanted a National
Convention as his lieutenants fought for it to the last
minute.
Knox expressed innocence as far as some of H.H.'s
charges were concerned.
^ C o n g r e s s m a n

®^Hoover, Addresses on the Road, 276-278.
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the duties of citizenship as well as its opportunities.®^1
By the end of the month,

Spangler asked for the

Chief's recommendation of a Negro,

and of labor and agricul

tural leaders for the Committee of 100.®®

Hoover suggested

the appointment of "Dr. Moton or his successor at Tuskegee"
to represent the Negro community.®®

Hoover also asked for

the inclusion of Samuel Crowther of New Hampshire on the
list and noted the availability of Glenn Frank as a possible
07

Cha i r m a n .0

A week later, the ex-President sent Spangler a list
of “the backbone of the committee."
inability to serve as chairman.

Hoover regretted L o w d e n 1s

He reiterated the impor

tance of seeing that the "right men" served on the Committee.®®
On December 16, Hoover addressed the Chicago Economic

2392.

®^Hoover Collection, LXV (November 12, 1937), Item
Hoover, Addresses on the R o a d , 281-286.

®®Spangler to Hoover, November 23, 1937, K-127,
thought a Negro's appointment would "inspire confidence in
the colored race."
Spangler to Hoover, November 29, 1937,
K-127.
®®Hoover to Spangler, November 25, and December 2,
1937, K-127.
According to one observer, ”Dr. Moton was on
more intimate terms with Herbert Hoover than was any other
colored citizen— more intimate, in fact, than many outstand
ing whites."
Claude A. Barnette, "A Southern Statesman," in
William Hardin Hughes and Frederick D. Patterson (eds.),
Robert Russa Moton of Hampton and Tuskecree (Chapel Hill,
1956), 200.
H.H. corresponded with Moton from 1925 onward.
For example, see Hoover to Moton, January 23, 1925, 1-1208,
Hoover Papers.
®^Hoover to Spangler, November 25, and December 2,
1937, K-127.

88Hoover to Spangler, December 9, 1937, K-127.

Club on "Economic Security and the Present Situation."

He

doubted that economic security was possible with future
opportunity.

Fear, anxiety, and insecurity, he said, were

the trademarks of the 1930's.

To Hoover, talk of a reces

sion might soften the pain of reality, but it would not cure
the problem.

Industry had stagnated, home construction had

halted, the planned economy had spread confusion, and the
oq

government was competing with business.017

Hoover lamented

the debasement of currency, the repudiation of debts, the
abandonment of the gold standard, the acceleration of
inflation,

and the "obvious violation of common sense."

He

said that the American System was the only sound economic
approach and that history had proven its contribution,
despite minor abuses and weaknesses.98

He called for a

reform in methods, a new attention to labor problems, and
the cooperation among all interest groups.

He accepted the

idea of collective bargaining and hoped that labor recognized
its responsibilities as well as its rights.
greater protection of small wage earners.

He insisted on
To him, all true

standards of conduct emanated "from the sermon on the Mount."
The time, he said, had come to heal differences and cooperate
for the betterment of all men.9^
Ashmun Brown reported an increasing "Hoover sentiment"

89Hoover, Addresses on the Road, 287-290.
90Ibid., 290-294.

91Ibid., 294-299.
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Q9
as a result of the Chief's recent oratorical e f f o r t s . ^
Hoover,

gravely concerned over Brown's declining health,

urged the editor to take care of himself,
soldiers" as Brown were scarce.

for "such good

J

As 1937 drew to a close, the ex-President was acutely
aware of his deteriorating political position.

His bid for

party leadership had fallen flat although the Committee of
100 might salvage part of his reputation and principles.
Age, death, and political defeat, were taking toll on his
political influence.

Walter Brown and Alan Fox had lost

their positions of power.
dead.
Brown.

Ogden Mills and Franklin Fort were

Age and illness crippled Dawes, Lowden, and Ashmun
Aside from Spangler and Hyde, the Chief's main sup

port v/as in his California fiefdom where Earl Warren was in
the saddle.

Vandenberg, despite his renewed efforts against

the New Deal, remained unreliable.

1938 was uncertain.

The

ex-President began to think that the Committee of 100 held
the card to his political future.

Brown to Hoover, December 20, 1937, K-16.
^-^Hoover to A. Brown, December 29, 1937, K-16.

CHAPTER VIII
A MIXED VERDICT
Republicans of all factions were determined to alter
their party's image and to revitalize the organization
during 1938.

Glenn Saxon, a professor of economics,

served

as Director of the Research and Editorial Division of the
party.

He analyzed topics, collected statistics,

and with

the aid of other researchers suggested party p roposals.
Under Chairman Hamilton's direction, the national h e a d 
quarters published the Republican Reporter and a propaganda
pamphlet entitled Promise and Performance.

Both works were

partisan.'1'
By January,
Dr. Glenn Frank,

1938, the Program committee crystallized.

a former President of the University of

Wisconsin, was named Chairman.

Although his selection pro

vided little political glamour, he enjoyed the support of
several factions.

For his own part, Frank promised that the

Committee would make an honest audit of N e w Deal policies,
restate Republican philosophy as it related to contemporary

-*-C. A. H. Thomson, "Research and the Republican
P a r t y , " Public Opinion Quarterly, III (April, 1939), 306313.
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problems, and suggest a comprehensive program.
On January 5, Hoover accepted a seat on the Republi
can Program Committee.3
of opinion.

Its membership embraced a diversity

Laborites, business leaders, lawyers, newspaper

men, politicians, ethnic and racial minorities, liberals and
conservatives served.^

Within two months, rumors circulated

that a compromise platform had been accepted.

Although

voluntarism and individual initiative were praised, and
responsible government demanded, the Committee endorsed
government action in numerous areas.

Although many writers

noted a "liberal" tone and a rejection of Hooverism in the
Committee's proposals, liberal Congressmen, significantly,
delayed its publication until long after the November
election.
Reports continued to circulate that Hoover was
attempting a 1940 comeback.

Columnist Roger Babson charged

the ex-President with seeking an illusive goal.

He thought

that Hoover should be satisfied with the vindication already
received "from thinking people."

Any effort to regain the

2Johnson, Willkie, 22-25.
^Hoover Collection, LXVI

(January 5, 1938),

Item

2404.
^Ronald Bridges, "The Republican Program Committee,"
Public Opinion Quarterly, III (April, 1939), 299-305.
Johnson, Willkie. 22-25.
5lbid.; Bridges, "The Republican Program Committee,"
Public Opinion Quarterly, III (April, 1939), 299-305.

presidency, h e said, was doomed.^
Landonites,

confident that Hamilton had defected to

the ex-’President's camp, urged a change in the chairmanship.
They promoted Governor Kohler of Wisconsin for the job.^
The National Chairman,

aware of the pot-shots from his Kansas

colleagues, was equally dismayed at the attacks from the
conservative wing of the party.

Hamilton,

steer a middle course between the various

ever trying to
factions, was

growing w e ary at the constant attacks on himself.
he wrote,

To Hoover,

"I have battled the intrigues of the man who[m]

I

nominated as President of the United States and of Colonel
Knox.

I cannot fight you too and have no desire to do s o . "

He pleaded for H o o v e r 's acquiescence concerning the appoint
me n t of Pranklyn Waltman as Director of Publicity.

He

realized that Waltman had attacked both of them in the past
but contended that the reporter's anti-New Deal bias could
prove an asset to the party.

Attempting to sweeten the

bitter pill, Hamilton noted Landon's opposition to Waltman's

^"Babson's Confidential Forecasts, 11 March 28, 1938,
K — 130.
^Johnson, W i l l k i e , 25-27.
O'Laughlin to Hoover,
December 13, 1937, Box 44, O 'Laughlin Papers, had warned
H.H. that Landon, Knox, and Vandenberg were trying to take
over the p a rty organization and were pushing for a new
chairman and the emasculation of the national committee.
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appointment.®
Speaking to the San Francisco press. Hoover blasted
Roosevelt's reorganization bill as a "power grab."
mean, he said,

It would

"the reintroduction of the spoils system" and

would give executives control of the civil service.

On the

following day he spoke of "The Challenge to Liberty."

His

greatest concern remained a "planned economy."9
Although H o o v e r 's attention focused more and more on
foreign policy in 1938 and afterward, he remained attuned to
local political developments and even courted the favor of
certain state governors.

The ex-President particularly

tried to develop close ties with Michigan's Wilbur Brucker.
The Governor,

independent of the Vandenberg mantle,

con

tinually expressed admiration for Hoover's efforts to revive
the Republican Party.
On May 15, in Oklahoma City, Hoover enunciated an
eleven-point program for recovery.

It embraced his tradi

tional ideas of a balanced budget, deflation, reduction of

^Hamilton to Hoover, April 2, 1938, and April 9, 1938,
K-147.
Hamilton sent a portfolio of information on Waltman
to H.H. and continued to hope H.H.'s opposition was dis
solving.
Hamilton disclosed some backstage maneuvers by
Landon to force a change in the chairmanship.
Hamilton to
Hoover, June 29, 1938, K-147.
^Hoover Collection, LXVI (April 7, 1938), clipping
from the San Francisco H e w s . Article, Newsweek, XI (April
11, 1938), 11.
-^Brucker to Hoover correspondence, 1937-1938, K-16.
Of special interest, see Brucker to Hoover, April 30, 1938,
and Hoover to Brucker, May 4, and May 9, 1938, K-16.
Hoover
even invited Brucker to Palo Alto for a visit.

relief, and his usual assortment of remedies.

Concerning

the forthcoming November election, he predicted Republicans
would gain seventy-five Congressional s e a t s . ^
By the summer of 1938, Republicans, gaining confidence
in their November chances, perceived a certain uneasiness in
the Democratic camp.

Aside from the President's attempts to

purge his own party of its conservative congressmen, the
federal government accelerated its PWA and WPA activities on
the economic as well as the political front.

Lester Dickin

son, attempting a senatorial comeback in Iowa, expressed
amazement at the new six million dollar PWA allocation for
Iowa which, he said, was recovering as rapidly as any of the
farm states.

12

To many men, the worst example of federal intervention
in a state election was in Kentucky.

According to one

astute political observer, Roosevelt, anxious for the reelection of his Senate Majority Leader, Alben Barkley,
exploited WPA funds and workers to an unprecedented extent
in securing Barkley's renomination in a tight primary fight.
More than any other case, Kentucky, he said, underlined the
need for the Hatch Act which would restrict the political
activity of federal employees.

•^Hoover, Further Addresses, 349-353.
T i m e . XXXI
(May 16, 1938), 13. New York Times, May 22, 1938, 1.
^ D i c ^ i n s o n to Hoover, June 11, and June 23, 1938,

K-29.
■^Stokes, Chip Off Mv Shoulder, 534-539.
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Despite the many Democratic mistakes, the Republican
Party remained so bitterly divided that it was uncertain if
it would rally by November.

Even in Kansas, Landonites

fought several other factions over candidates and issues.
John D. M. Hamilton,

fresh from a re-endorsement by the

National Committee, was anything but upset at the defeat of
a Landonite for the Kansas Senatorial nomination. ^
Hyde wrote his Chief that an amazing revelation had
occurred at a recent Chicago party.
manager,

He spoke of a Knox

somewhat inebriated, who had informed the gathering

that Frank Knox was taking "pot-shots" at the ex-President
because they would be leading rivals in 1940.

Knox, he said,

apparently enjoyed Landon's support and now wanted a Hoover
disavowal concerning any future nomination.-*-®
Hooverites were perturbed at Congressional failure to
place new government jobs under the civil service.

They

noted that the percentage of federal employees under the
codes had declined from eighty-one to fifty-seven per cent.-*-®
Ashmun Brown informed Hoover that Roosevelt would probably
succeed in buying enough votes to keep a decisive margin in

^Hamilton to Hoover, June 29, 1938, K-47, informed
the Chief of the Committee's endorsement of his handling of
the Chairmanship. Hamilton to Hoover, August 15, 1938,
K-47, discussed the factionalism in the Kansas GOP
l^Hyde to Hoover, June 1, 1938, K-61.

-*-®Literary Digest, July 8, 1938, 5.
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the new Congress.

1

Hoover, however, remained optimistic

about the party's chances although admitting that economic
conditions would greatly effect the totals.

Like Brown, he

was shocked at public apathy and the lack of indignation at
the "moral degeneration and demagogery" evidenced at the
1O
national level.
In July, Will Irwin, on behalf of Liberty Magazine,
interviewed the Chief on "What America Must do Next."
Hoover seemed to show a new dimension in his concern over
the fourteen million unemployed, the "new depression," and
the "rubber-stamp" congress.

To Hoover, it seemed clear

that a Republican victory in November was necessary for the
nation’s future.'1'®
Republican finances remained short throughout 1938
despite the feverish activities of the national headquar
ters.^®

The ex-President attributed the scarcity of funds

to the nomination of so many "me-too" candidates.

None

theless, Hoover attempted to search for contributions to the

Brown to Hoover, July 13, 1938, K-16.
**-®Hoover to A. Brown, July 28, 1938, K-16.
■^®Will Irwin, "What America Must do N e x t , " Liberty
Magazine, July 16, 1938, Hoover Collections, LXVII (unnum
bered) .
^ H a m i l t o n to Hoover, July 21, 1938, K-47.

2^Hoover to Hamilton, August 27, 1938, K-47.
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campaigns of the more attractive candidates.^2
The ex-President displayed a special interest in the
efforts of two Hooverish candidates in Montana.

John G.

Brown, Hoover's Montana leader during the late 1930's,
assured his Chief that the election of the two congressional
candidates would provide "a foundation for 1940.
Hoover, campaigning in Montana in August, urged a
radical change in Congressional membership as a necessary
step in the restoration of an independent legislature.

He

predicted that a Republican congress would regain the
traditional powers over the purse, offer responsible legisla
tion, and halt federal bureauc r a t i z a t i o n . ^
Reporter Larry Sullivan researched many issues for
Hoover.

After analyzing the 193S primaries,

Sullivan

asserted that anti-New Deal Democrats posted forty-five per
cent of the totals.

Many of these voters, he reasoned, were

convertible if the Republicans capitalized on New Deal
?c
mistakes and flaws.
The Sullivan report reinforced Hoover's
own conclusions.

22Hoover to John G. Brown,
8, 1938, K-16.

September 14, and October

23noover to Brown, September 14, and October 8, 1938,
K-16, noted the shortage of funds at the national level and
urged the Montana leader to secure more local contributions
for the two congressional candidates.
J. G. Brown to Hoover,
September 16, and September 27, 1938, K-16, reported progress
and optimism for November.
^ H o o v e r Collection, LXVI
Gateway, Montana press comments.

(August 6, 1938), Gallatin

25gu llivan to Hoover, August 13, 1938, K-132.
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On September 28, the ex-President spoke in Kansas
City concerning "Morals in Government."

Hoover, in complete

sincerity, announced that it was time "to take the gloves
off."

He blasted New Dealers for their attitude that "the

end justifies the means."

He charged them with using a

double standard in their political and private morality.

For

six years, he said, they had practiced "an alphabetical
moral:

GEEAA— Get Elected Anyhow Anyway."

To him, New

Dealers had encouraged a systematic degeneration in their
creation of over 400,000 political jobs, outside the civil
service.26
Hoover scoffed at the idea that the Roosevelt Adminis
tration was the first to recognize human misery and seek to
alleviate it through public works and relief.

Admittedly,

he said, it had concentrated all activities in Washington,
expanded relief activities during every six months prior to
a national election, and made unprecedented use of relief
funds and workers in a Kentucky election, but this did not
entitle it to two more years at the trough.

Never before,

he said, had political machines enjoyed so much license.

26Hoover, Further Addresses Upon the American Road,
1938-1940 (New York, 1940), 3-6. Hereinafter cited as Hoover,
Further Addresses. As Richard Hofstadter, Age of Reform,
310-3 25, notes, the old Progressives were deeply disturbed
at the New Deal methods— its lack of concern with monopoly
and political machines, its neglect of moral tones, its
attack on sacrosanct institutions such as the Courts, its
very opportunism.
Like Hoover, the old Progressives were
concerned with such fundamentals as citizenship, conscience,
morals, service, and duty.
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Never before, he contended, had the national government
acted in such dishonesty as to tinker with the currency,
abandon the gold standard, repudiate debts, and stir class
hatred.^
The ex-President urged the adoption of a positive
program which would encourage honest government, re-estab
lish moral methods,
financed,

localize relief even if federally

and end the patronage system.

He called for the

passage of the Hatch Act which New Dealers, he contended,
were emasculating.^®
By mid-October, Hoover, enroute to New York, perchanced on former brains-truster Raymond Moley.

While the

two men were talking, a steward, recognizing the ex-Presi
dent, volunteered to tell the latest FDR joke.

Hoover,

"glowering at [him], rumbled 11 d o n 11 like stories about
p

Q

Presidents. 1"4,3

Despite his aversion to jokes about his

successor, he continued his aggressive attacks on Roosevelt's
policies.
On October 17, the ex-President spoke at Hartford,
Connecticut, on "Undermining Representative Government."
For the most part, the Hartford speech was a repetition of

^ Ho o v e r ,

Further Addresses, 6-17.

2®Hoover, Further Addresses, 17-18.
Larry Sullivan
wrote H.H. that the Kansas City address gave "back-bone" to
the GOP.
L. Sullivan to Hoover, September 29, 1938, K-132.
^Moley,

After 7 Years. 301.
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his "Morals in Government" effort of September.

He called

the 1938 election a "conflict between two ideas of life."
He spoke of a "creeping collectivism that is steadily eating
away the vitalities of free enterprise."

He reiterated the

need for an independent legislature which would check the
accelerating executive powers.

He warned of "sinister aggres

sions of personal power," and of the President's efforts to
stuff the courts, purge honest men from their jobs if they
dissented,

and control elections through government doles

and employees.

Hoover urged the election of an independent

Congress if democracy was to be maintained.
The Hartford speech underlined the fact that Hoover
had not deviated from his traditional opinions concerning
the depression and recovery.
bureaucracy,

He blamed the planned economy,

and regimentation for the "new" depression

following Roosevelt's recovery acts.

Again Hoover employed

weighted words which evoked strong emotions.31

Other

Republican leaders followed his line of reasoning.
Landon,

George Aiken,

Even

and McNary began using more and more

of the Hoover l i n e . ^
Public opinion polls reflected the growing reaction

SOnoover, Further Addresses, 21-37.
^ I b i d .; Herring, Politics of Democracy, 251-252.
•^Boskin, "Politics of an Opposition Party," 150-153,
173-174. Many GOP leaders attempted to label FDR as a
dictator.
Their confidence in their attack accelerated as
his political mistakes surfaced.
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to Washington policies.

Fifty-three per cent of the people

claimed that they were conservative,
liberal.^

forty-seven per cent,

Silas Strawn anticipated the defeat of six or

seven "New Delirium" Congressmen in Illinois a l o n e . ^
Winding up his campaign activity, the ex-President
addressed the Joint Republican Organizations at Spokane,
Washington, on November 5.
areas:

He returned to one of his favorite

"The Economic Consequences of the New Deal."

He

reiterated the need for a restoration of free enterprise,
the one alternative to planned economy.
choosing their calling,

Only free men,

acting on their own initiative,

and

securing the just rewards of their efforts, he maintained,
could revitalize the American economy, solve unemployment,
and raise living standards.

He vigorously defended the

■3 r:

American System.

Again Hoover admitted that limited regulation was
necessary,

that reform and correction of minor abuses were

inevitable.

Too, he reiterated his belief that "we do not

need to sink the ship just to drown the rats."

He praised

the American System and its achievements up to 1929.
system, he said, was sound.
adjustments.

To him,

it only needed minor

In a revealing moment he stated:

■^Hadley Cantril
(Princeton, 1951), 576.

The

"It is

(ed.). Public Opinion, 1935-1946

*^S. Strawn to Hoover, October 24, 1938, K-132.
•^Hoover, Further Addresses,

38-41.
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recognized by every authority that depression was overcome
and recovery begun the world over in the early summer of
1932."

He continued to believe that America's surge forward

had been halted by the election.3®
As the ex-President berated Roosevelt's hodgepodge
recovery efforts and a multitude of New Deal "sins," he said:
"It mixes all the stimulating drinks on the bartender's
shelf.

This does not make for sobriety."

FDR's Court plan,

his party purge, and his election tactics had "a faint odor
of totalitarian government."
New Deal economic policies.

Hoover verbally destroyed the
Sarcastically, he said,

"Santa

Claus can reign throughout the year and never pay his
bills."

Yet, he noted that Europe had recovered while

America floundered around with a "planned economy."3^
Since to Hoover, New Deal methods, whatever the
humanitarian purpose, were faulty, he urged a return to the
right road.

The prerequisites to real recovery, he said,

were the American System, constitutional methods, national
morality, and an independent Congress.

"Give us the election

of a new Congress of independent m e n , 11 he said,
America come back."

-DO

"and watch

Ashmun Brown praised his Chief's

3®Ibid., 41-43. H.H. was being loose with the facts
at this point, for very few men outside his inner circle had
accepted the 1932 recovery thesis.
3?Hoover, Further Addresses, 43-47.
OQ

t

Ibid., 48-57. H.H. emphasized that his program
would not be a step backward, but a step in the right direc
tion.
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address as a superlative effort.

To Brown, it showed that

sound reasoning and intellect the country so badly needed.

oQ

3

Republicans were better organized in 1938 than at any
election for a decade.

Hamilton, as an aggressive Chairman,

had assured an analysis of regional opinion.
trotting tours had boosted p a r t y morale.

His glove-

Too, Roosevelt

assisted the GOP cause in his attack on the Supreme Court
and his attempted "purge" of his own party.

Nor did the

economic "recession," as Democrats called it, hurt Republi
can efforts.^®
The November election wa s a stinging setback for the
New

D e a l e r s.41

Postmaster General Farley termed it "the

great turnover."

Ay

,

t

,

Republicans exceeded their own predic

tions as they gained eighty-one new House seats, eight
Senate seats,

and fourteen

g o v e r n o r s h i p s .

43

3^ a . Brown to Hoover, November 7, 1938, K-16.
40Milton Plesur, "The Republican Congressional Come
back of 1938," Review of Politics, XXIV (October, 1962),
525-562.
According to Plesur, Republicans would probably
have regained the White House in 1940 except for World War
II.

CXLVII

4^-paul Y. Anderson, "What The Election M e a n s , " Nation,
(November 18, 1938), 527-528.

^^Miiton Plesur, "The Republican Congressional Come
back of 1938," Review of Polit i c s , XXIV (October, 1962),
525-562.

43Ibid.; uew York Times, November 13-14, 1938, 1.
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Republicans were elated at the r e t u r n s . ^

Hoover was

especially pleased with the re-election of Governor John
Bricker in O h i o . ^

Lester Dickinson lost in his bid for a

comeback in Iowa but by such a close margin that he wired
Hoover that the foundation for a 1940 campagin was l a i d . ^
Hooverites across the country saw the November returns as
vindication of their Chief and as a "personal victory.
Even Chairman Hamilton wired the ex-President that "no one
man has done more" for the p a r t y . ^
Hoover found encouragement in his supporters' notes
and was motivated "to keep in this battle."

Encouraged by

the November returns, he hoped that by 1940 they could "end
this episode in American life in its destructive aspects."1
^9

^ R e e d to Hoover, November 10, 1938, K-107; J. G.
Brown to Hoover, telegram, November 9, 1938, K-16, praised
H.H.'s victory.
"You are still our leader."
Spangler to
Hoover, November 11, 1938, K-127.
Dickinson to Hoover,
November 22, 1938, K-29.
Broom to Hoover, November 7, 1938,
K-15.
^ H o o v e r to Bricker, telegram, November 9, 1938, K-14.
^ D i c k i n s o n to Hoover, November 22, 1938, K-29.
Although the Iowan referred to the party's 1940 campaign,
his letter was worded in such a way that H.H. could and prob
ably did read it to mean another Hoover campaign.
^^Spangler to Hoover, November 11, 1938, K-127.
J. G.
Brown to Hoover, telegram, November 9, 1938, K-16.
Broom to
Hoover, November 7, 1938, K-15, urged his Chief to continue
his "courageous mission."
^ H a m i l t o n to Hoover, November 9, 1938, K-47.

^ H o o v e r to A. Brown, November 12, and November 16,
1938, K-16.
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He thought that the returns necessitated a conference of
Republican leaders concerning future p o l i c y . ^
To Hooverites, the November election proved the
rightness of their cause and foretold the demise of the New
Deal.

51

Too, Republican victory negated any realignment of

conservatives in a new coalition party.

For the first time

in his career, Franklin D. Roosevelt was faced by an almost
viable "loyal opposition."^2

interestingly, despite its

rejection of Hoover's leadership and even his depression
thesis, the GOP adopted the Hoover line in its increasingly
vigorous anti-New Deal attack.

Republicans bemoaned the

concentration of power in the executive office, the imbal
ance of powers,

the attack on the courts, the weakening of

legislative power, the "purge" of the party, the planned
economy, regimentation, bureaucracy, political machines, the
destruction of the civil service,
mistakes.

and other New Deal

Republican activity fanned the hopes of H o o v e r ’s

much coveted vindication and kept alive his glimmering poli
tical desires.

Grasping at every straw, the ex-President

dreamed of a political resurrection.

^ H o o v e r to Reed, November 14, 1938, K-107.
to Spangler, November 14, 1938, K-127.

Hoover

^ R e e d to Hoover, November 10, 1938, K-107; J. G.
Brown to Hoover, telegram, November 9, 1938, K-16; Spangler
to Hoover, November 11, 1938, K-127; and Broom to Hoover,
November 7, 1938, K-15.
-^James T. Patterson, "The Failure of Party Realign
ment in the South, 1937-1939,11 Journal of Politics. XXVII
(August, 1965), 602-617.

CHAPTER XX
"GRAYNESS IN THE AFTERNOON"
Theodore Roosevelt once remarked,

"We cannot expect

to escape a certain grayness in the afternoon of life— for
it is not often that life ends in the splendor of a golden
sunset."-*-

In many ways, the decade of the 1930's was the

afternoon of Herbert Hoover's life.

This became especially

evident when the Republican revival of 1938 whetted his
false hopes of a political resurrection.

The ex-President,

long isolated from political realities, genuinely believed
that he was again available for public service.

Ignoring

the diminishing ranks of his personal legions, he misread
every favorable Republican omen as a personal tribute.
He failed to see that many of the political letters
he now received were courtesy responses.

He refused to

recognize that lieutenants such as Robert A. Taft and Earl
Warren had completed their political apprenticeship,

arrived

at age, and wanted to try their own wings.

Thus, when T a f t , .

after analyzing GOP congressional strength,

informed the

Chief that the GOP minority was strong enough to prevent any

1954),

I j o h n M o r t o n Blum, T h e R e p u b l i c a n R o o s e v e l t
161. H e r e i n a f t e r c i t e d a s B l u m , R e p u b l i c a n

velt.
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further radical legislation passing the Senate, Hoover
anticipated Taft's continued deference to his old war-time
chief.

It soon became evident that Taft had his own

ambitions and did not relish an indefinite subservient role.
As Lincoln's Birthday approached, Republican polit
icos rolled out their most effective machinery.

On February

12, Hoover, returning to the stump, addressed the National
Republican Club in New York City.
State of the U n i o n . "

He spoke on "The Real

Again, he aimed at a rebuttal of the

President’s State of the Union message.
As usual, Hoover lamented the confused state of the
nation with its economic disorder, rising debts, accelerating
class divisions, coercion, collectivism,
power politics.

immorality, and

Yet, he sounded a new note of optimism.

He

said that elections no longer could "be controlled by govern
ment subsidies."

He perceived a growing independence on the

part of the judiciary and the legislature.
the future," he said,
organizations,

"Programs for

"are rising daily from county and state

from our youth and women's organizations,

from our Republican leaders and our Program Committee."4
Hoover reaffirmed his principles and defended his
record.

Although he used the old stock phrases of

2Taft to Hoover, January 23, 1939, K-135.
cantly, Taft said, "I am learning the ropes."
% e w York Times, February 13, 1939, 1.
Further Addresses, 59-58.
4Ibid., 59-64.

Signifi

Hoover,
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condemnation in describing the New Deal, his past bitterness
was missing.

Perhaps his ne w optimism resulted from a belief

that the 1938 election had checked the radicalism of the New
Deal.

In the future, he would deal primarily with foreign

policy.

The New Deal,

importance.

it seemed,

was fading in political

Of

all the speeches Hoover made in 1939, only
c
three dealt primarily with domestic policy.
Hoover's
unusual silence was the best barometer in measuring N e w Deal
activity.
Rank and file Hooverites continued to idolize their
hero and encourage his

"evangelistic efforts" to convert

"the heathen in

the East."

would recall to

service

Too,they hoped that the public

"the one man capable of the leader

ship" demanded b y the critical times.®
By the spring of 1939, Hoover,
for convention delegates,

conscious of the drive

sent friendly telegrams to every

Republican conclave at the state and local level.?

His Iowa

5 I b i d . Aside from his Lincoln Da y Address, H . H . , on
June 4, 1939, spoke on "The Clash of Economic Forces Wi th
Intellectual and Spiritual L i b erty," and on June 12, 1939, he
spoke on the "Confusion in Words and Public Action."
^Ashmun Brown to Hoover, March 28, 1939, K-16.
Louis
Fellhauer to Hoover, February to November, 1939, K-36, often
used religious imagery and h eavy moralism.
Fellhauer saw
Hoover as "a guiding spirit."
^Hoover Collection, LXVIII, telegrams, Hoover to A.
Reed Millar, February 6, 1939, Hoover to Maurice Cole, F e bru
ary 6, 1939, Hoover to Mrs. Earl Moulton, February 6, 1939,
Hoover to Theodore S. Turner, February 6, 1939, and Hoover to
Mrs. Jeanne Carpenter, February 6, 1939.
These leaders
represented local or state conclaves in Idaho, Michigan, New
M e x i c o , and W a s h i n g t o n .
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leader, Harrison Spangler, wrote the Chief that a Dewey boom
was underway and was even catching on in Iowa.®
In Ohio,

Senator Taft was the apparent favorite

despite Governor Bricker's popularity.

N e w Hampshire's

George Moses described Taft as "deficient in personality or
oratorical ability."

Moses regretted that his state would

have "such a small delegation at the convention."
President,

in complete agreement with Moses,

The ex-

expressed fear

that the party h a d a difficult task ahead of it.^

To

Hoover, nominating the "best man" was the impossible task.
In June, Hoover made two public addresses on the con
fused state of the nation,

the dangers to liberty,

and the

necessity of defending America's traditional ideology.
Although muted in their denunciation of the N ew Deal,

the

speeches afforded the ex-President some publicity and an
opportunity to speak with Tennessee and Indiana Republican
leaders.^

He also forayed into M i n n e s o t a . H
►

Following Hoover's conference with Colorado GOP

®Spangler to Hoover, April 19, 1939, K-127.
®Moses to Hoover, April 28, 1939, and Hoover to Moses,
May 5, 1939, K - 9 5 .
l°Hoover Collection, LXIX, June 4, 193 9, and June 12,
1939.
Palo Alto T i m e s , June 5, 1939.
Further A d d r e s s e s .
197-208, and 208-215.
On June 4, H.H. spoke at Arrowgate,
Tennessee, on the "Clash of Economic Forces with Intellectual
and Spiritual Liberty."
On June 12, at Richmond, Indiana, he
spoke on "And What is Liberalism?"

^ H o o v e r Collection, LXIX, Minneapolis Tribune. June
15, 1939.
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leaders in August, Drew Pearson,

controversial news analyst

and a sharp Hoover critic, broadcasted an incendiary speech
from the University of Chicago in which he accused the exPresident of "buying Southern delegates to the 1940 Republi
can Presidential Convention."

An infuriated Hoover denied

the charges and accused Pearson of vicious slander.

12

As speculation on another Hoover candidacy mounted,
Nathan MacChesney,

the Chicago lawyer who had served as a

liaison between Hoover and Knox since 1935, agreed to survey
the situation.

MacChesney kept Knox informed of Hoover's

political activity throughout the summer of 1939.

The

lawyer assured Knox that Hoover was not "buying up delegates"
as Pearson had charged but that the Chief was "in touch with
leaders throughout the country."

Apparently, Hoover was

reinforcing his position to the point that he would have "a
very large voice in the ultimate selection of a candidate,
if not a controlling one."

MacChesney informed Knox that

Hoover was a "stronger candidate than Taft" despite their
1
mutual weaknesses. -1

Within months, MacChesney endorsed a

more available candidate— Senator V a n d e n b e r g . ^

^-2Hoover Collection, LXIX, Colorado Daily Sentinel.
August 6, 1939.
2MacChesney to Knox, August 11, 1939, Box 43, M a c 
Chesney Papers, is especially important.
^ B y December, MacChesney endorsed Vandenberg and
agreed to serve as a political adviser and strategist to the
Senator.
See the MacChesney-Vandenberg correspondence, Box
42, MacChesney Papers.
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As periodicals and newspapers printed an increasing
number of articles on Hoover, his record, his role in shaping
the New Deal, and certain disagreeable facts, the ex-Presi
dent wrote ashmun Brown urging an exposure of the "smear
efforts."

To Hoover, the nation needed enlightenment on the

"whole art, theory and science of smearing" as practiced by
the New Dealers.

lr

By December,

articles on Hoover abounded in a cross-

section of magazines and newspapers.

Speculation on his

presidential ambitions increased.

Newsweeh reported that a

hundred delegates favored Hoover.

His,

it said, would be

“the deciding voice" at the GOP convention.^-®

Time noted

the feverish activity of Ben S. Allen in organizing Repub
lican cells of twenty or more members at the county level.
The cells spread Hooverian ideas among the youth of the
party.

They disseminated criticisms of the New Deal.

Sig

nificantly, Republican charges of bureaucracy, coercion,
e;xploitation, inefficiency,
acceptance.

and socialism gained wider

Although their hero remained "poison at the box

office," his refusal to become an "Elder Statesman" was
significant.^-7
By early 1940, Hoover and Vandenberg were the leading

l^Hoover t o A. Brown, A u g u s t 16, 1939, K-16.
^®"Hats
{ D e c e m b e r 11,

Clutter

the

GOP R i n g , ' 1 N e w s w e e h . XIV

1939), 15-16.

17Time, XXXIV (December 18, 1939), 14-16.
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candidates advocating "all-out war on the New Deal."

The

majority of Republicans, however, hesitated to embrace such
a strategy.'*'®

On February 12, Hoover addressed the Nebraska

Republican Organizations on "Our Most Important Domestic
Issue."

To Hoover, unemployment was the crucial problem.

He said that relief could not go on forever,
prise must be restored,

that free enter

and that only a free economy would

lead to "genuine recovery.
To Hoover,

there was a "border line in the activities

of free government."

He thought that the Administration had

violated that border and thus abetted bureaucracy, coercion,
and inefficiency.
monopoly.

He charged the Ne w Deal with promoting

To him, government policies were so contradictory

that there was now an abundance of "sand in the gears."
Hoover called for a reversal of the "drift toward State-ism"
and a "return to the American System.

Lawrence Sullivan's

The Dead Hand of Bureaucracy popularized many of Hoover's
arguments.^
As Congressman Joe Martin, the Republican House leader,
noted,

it was obvious that "Hoover would have welcomed the

-*-®Rauch, New D e a l , 235.
See "GOP Grooms Its Dark
Horses as Third Term Bogs Democrats," Newsw e e k . XV (February
12, 1940), 15-16.
-’•^Hoover, Further Addresses. 69-75.
I bid., 76-81.
^ L a w r e n c e Sullivan, The Dead Hand of Bureaucracy
(New York, 1940), 30, 35, 162-163.
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nomination, but events did not shape the course that w a y . " ^
A California group urged a "draft Hoover" drive in 1940.
The anxious ex-President refused to sanction it.

As four

years earlier, he felt an open quest for the nomination would
be undignified.
convention.

Again, his hopes depended on a deadlocked
He continued to avoid reality.

By 1940 there were numerous attractive Republican
candidates in the field.

There were at least two serious

contenders who represented the Hoover viewpoint.

Despite

his disavowals, the "canny" Senator Vandenberg was interested.
Too, he adopted the Hoover strategy and hoped for a dead
locked convention.

Critics labeled him a sphinx, a chameleon,

a compromiser, and a man whose ideas changed "every twentyfour hours."

24

Willkie boosters scoffed at hrs disinterest

and pointed to the Senator's repeated entries into presi
dential primaries, as well as his quest for delegates at the
state l e v e l . H o o v e r ,

22Martin,

Willkie

mv

too, later remembered Vandenberg's

First Fifty Years in Politics, .159.

23Johnson, Willkie, 82. Warren Moscow, Roosevelt and
(Englewood Cliffs, 1968), 27-28.

2^Milton S. Mayer, "Men Who Would Be President,"
Nation, CL (May 11, 1940), 587-590.
Johnson, W i llkie, 70.
Willkie, 33.

Moscow, Roosevelt and
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"endeavors in four Conventions to be nominated President."2®
Whatever his liabilities, Vandenberg remained a constant
possibility.
Senator Taft openly sought the nomination.

He reached

an accord with Governor Bricker and enjoyed the complete
support of the Ohio delegation.
Southern delegations.

He also gained support from

Many Hooverites drifted into the Taft

camp by convention time.

Sadly, the ex-President continued

to advertise his own willingness.

97

'

The only other major candidate in the early running
was Tom Dewey, N e w York City's famous district attorney.

By

early spring, he had emerged as the J'front runner*
Although Dewey openly courted Hoover, he failed to get an
official endorsement.

The ex-President, however, did say

that Dewey "had fired the imagination of the American
y o u t h . 1,29

26inside the cover of his personal copy of the Private
Papers of Senator Vandenberg1, H.H. wrote and signed the follow
ing inscription:
"This book is totally false to History.
It
really a) starts after Vandenberg sold himself to the inter
nationalists b) supresses his long and violent isolationism
c) never mentions his relations with Herbert Hoover d) m i s 
represents his endeavors in four Conventions to be nominated
President." Hoover's copy of this book is found in the
Hoover Presidential Library at West Branch, Iowa.
27Moscow, Roosevelt and W i l l k i e , 26-28.
Republicans, 454.

Mayer, The

28Ibid., 453-454.
Moscow, Roosevelt and W i l l k i e . 2628.
"Primary Season Puts Roosevelt and Dewey Off to Good
Start," Newsweek, XV (April 15, 1940), 15-16, stated that
Dewey's Wisconsin victory eliminated Vandenberg.

29Joyner, The Republican Dilemma. 14.
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On February 16, 1940, the Republican Program Committee
finally released its long-awaited report on A Program For A
Dynamic America.

The hundred-page paper offered an alterna

tive policy to the N e w Deal.30

While it permitted a grass

roots participation and expression,
criticism of the New Deal.

it was muted in its

It accepted the necessity of

relief and expressed hope that government intervention was
temporary.

The tract concluded,

"If the understanding is

right and if the people verify it, the party of opposition
O1
returns reinvigorated from minority to majority status."
The report was ominous in its search for a middle ground
which would allow a broader base for the next Republican cam
paign.

Yet, it was to the right of Congressional thinking

as evidenced by the solons' opposition to its publication
until after the 1938 elections.
By the end of the month it was obvious that there
must be another candidate for the nomination since all the
leading contenders were non-interventionists in foreign
affairs.

The opening for an internationalist was soon filled

by Wendell Willkie.

He enjoyed the support of National

30$jew York T i m e s , February 17, 1940, 1. Republican
Program Committee, A Procrram For A Dynamic America (New
York, 1940).
Raymond Moley, "Perspective: The Glenn Frank
Report," N ewsweek. XV (March 4, 1930), 56, saw it as an
"impressive document," a realistic, objective, program.
3^A Program For A Dynamic America, 109.
Boskin,
"Politics of an Opposition Party, 11 247.
Raymond Moley,
"Perspective," N e wsweek, XV (March 4, 1940), 56.
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Chairman Hamilton and thus readily gained control of the
inside organization.
obvious

that

32

As

the door was

the

convention

approached

it was

open.

Encouraged by the activity of so many candidates,
Hoover became convinced of the probability of a deadlocked
convention.

Newspapers and periodicals repeatedly forecast

a deadlock and the selection of a dark horse candidate.
Although polls and delegates indicated that Dewey, Taft,
Vandenberg,

and Willkie were the favorites, Hoover consis

tently headed the second

c h o i c e s .

^3

The ex-President, determined to nurse such strength,
stepped up his activity and sent his lieutenants out to look

^Moscow, Roosevelt and Willkie, 29, 64-67.
"Willkie
Boom," Newsweek, XV (May 13, 1940), 30. Raymond Moley,
"Perspective: Willkie," Newsweek. XV (May 20, 1940), 72.
New York Times. May 1, May 3, 1940, 1, discussed a
Dewey-Taft standoff. New York Times, May 17, 1940, 15,
published the latest Gallup Poll which showed a Dewey, Taft,
Vandenberg, Willkie, Hoover preference. New York Times,
June 3, 1940, 1, predicted a GOP deadlock with H.H. a darkhorse possibility.
It pointed to his control of the Cali
fornia delegation. New York Times, June 9, 1940, 2, carried
the "draft Hoover" proposal of a Palo Alto group. The
unauthorized move was led by educators who praised H . H . ’s
"sheer ability, organizing genius, and statesmanship." New
York Times, June 12, 1940, 23, reported the latest Gallup
Poll which showed a Dewey, Willkie, Taft, Vandenberg, and
Hoover order.
"GOP Puzzle," Newsweek, XV (June 17, 1940),
40-41, forecast a tight race. Raymond Moley, "The Republi
can Choice," Newsweek, XV (June 17, 1940), 72, anticipated
a deadlocked convention and saw H.H. as a real possibility.
Of H.H., he said, "He remains the best informed public
figure" and "time has placed [him] in a kindlier light."
"GOP Moves on Philadelphia to Pick the Man and Issue, "
Newsweek, XV (June 24, 1940), 31-32, after the big four,
saw H.H. with his "unpredictable strength" as a definite
candidate.

261
for additional support.

On May 1, Walter Newton sent Larry

Richey a list of the Dakota, Wisconsin,
gates.

and Minnesota dele

The Chief hurriedly sent all of them autographed

copies of his Further Addresses Upon the American Road.
openly courted their good will.34

He

^s late as June, Hoover

acquired a confidential summary of delegate names, attitudes,
and favorite candidates from the Georgia, Alabana, Kentucky,
and Tennessee delegations.

The ex-President had long

enjoyed the support of Southern Republicans, and Carlyle
Littleton reassured him of his widespread popularity among
the Dixie delegations.35
Hoover was encouraged when Republican candidates
adopted his tactic of denouncing New Deal methods.

Even

Wendell Willkie, the alleged liberal of the front four, was
criticizing Roosevelt and endorsing certain Hooverian
p r i n c i p l e s .

36

such tactics only reinforced Hoover's

34jjjewton to Richey, May 1, 1940, K-97.
35carlyle S. Littleton to Hoover, June 21, 1940, K-97.
Littleton even advised H.H. how he should approach certain
Southern delegates.
36willkie bemoaned the abandonment of "free enter
prise, " the extension of bureaucracy, the decision making by
"non-elected commissioners," and charged the New Deal with
retarding recovery. He blasted FDR's promises and perform
ance on inflation, deficit spending, and unemployment. Ne w
York T i m e s . May 12, 1940, 2. Willkie charged the New Deal
with an anti-business attitude, with bureaucratic restric
tions, and the destruction of the economy.
He said that the
"Holy Order of the New Deal has set itself and the party
above country." New York Times, May 25, 1940, 8. Willkie
attacked FDR's power and concluded, "we have been unfaithful
to liberty; we have confused liberty with license." To him,
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conviction that he was available in the event of the antic
ipated deadlock.
As the convention opened, Hoover stock began to climb.
John L. Lewis, addressing the NAACP, startled the nation
with his endorsement of the Hoover depression-recovery thesis.
The labor leader praised the Hoover Administration for its
1932 efforts and lambasted the "chronic ills" of the New
Deal which had retarded real recovery ever since.

To Lewis,

the depression would end only with a change of administra
tions.^

The New York Times reported increasing Hoover

support among the Empire State's delegation.3®

In the final

Gallup Poll, Dewey led with forty-seven per cent to Wi l l k i e 1s
twenty-nine per cent, but Hoover's six per cent placed him
close behind Taft and Vandenberg, who polled eight per
cent.^

Although admitting that Hoov e r ’s delegate strength

was weak at the moment, U . S . News noted his influence in
every geographical area.

There was increasing speculation

concerning his activity and possible candidacy.4®

the New Deal had created class conflict.
June 1, 1940, 7.

New York Times,

37New York T i mes, June 19, 1940, 16. Lewis, a strong
Roosevelt booster in 1936, had fallen out with the Presi
dent and openly supported the GOP.
3®New York T i mes, June 20, 1940, 20, concluded that
H.H. ran behind only Willkie and Dewey.
3 ®Ibid., June 21, 1940, 17.
40U.S. N e w s , VIII (June 14, 1940), 20. New York
Times. June 22, 1940, 1, and New York Times, June 23, 1940,
1- 2 .
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Any Hoover candidacy depended on a rousing address
and a deadlocked convention.

The "stop-Willkie move" which

surfaced on convention eve could aid Dewey but,

according to

the New York T i m e s , only underlined the fact that Herbert
Hoover was "a decided threat to the candidates already in
the field."

At the least, it held, Hoover could determine

the final candidate.

California was openly working for a

"blitzkrieg," and Nebraska and Pennyslvania were rumored to
be accelerating the "move for former President H o o v e r . " ^
Although he did not recognize it, Hoover was in the
"afternoon" of his political influence.

He had suffered

from the deaths of his more astute lieutenants, had lost con
trol of the party's Executive Committee, and had consistently
refused the post of elder statesman.

Although other candi

dates and factions paid the proper deference, they resented
his interference and resisted his overtures for the nomina
tion.

Even a deadlocked 1940 GOP Convention would have a

multitude of attractive, more available alternatives.
refused to face reality.

Hoover

He sapped the last of his political

strength in a futile effort at another nomination and elimi
nated the last Hooverites from party councils.

The remnants

^ Ibid., June 25, 1940, 1, IS. Also see N e w sweek,
XVI (July 8, 1940), 13, concerning the California efforts.
U.S. News, VIII (June 21, 1940), 12-15, speculated that
Joseph N. Pew, who controlled Pennsylvania's seventy-two
votes, would lead the move to the Hoover standard after the
preliminary balloting.
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of his band joined Taft.

42

The thirty-two votes the ex-

President received on the third ballot at the convention
served as his final curtain call.4^
As in 1936, Hoover was the "principal invited orator
of the convention."

As usual, he delivered a biting speech.

He warned that America was at the crossroads and that "upon
this Party again rests the responsibility for the freedom
and prosperity of men for the next two generations."

Again,

he defended his own record and denounced intellectual dis
honesty.
emotion."

America, he said,

"must summon reason to control

To him, calm realism was what the nation

needed.44
Urging a war against the New Deal, he told Republicans
that they "must battle for the greatest cause entrusted to
the government of mankind."

Liberty, he said, was threatened.

Too, he indicted the New Deal for delaying recovery, promot
ing economic confusion,

for dividing the country along class

lines, and for obstructing equality of opportunity.

46

In calling for a "regeneration of America," the exPresident recalled traditional American mores and values,
especially the "belief in God" and the "belief in the right

42Johnson, Willkie, 82.

Moscow, Roosevelt and Willkie,

28.
43

Twenty-Second Republican National Convention
ington, 1940), 290.

44Ibid.. 115-133.

45Ibid.

(Wash
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to plan one's own life."

Man, he said, had a soul and must

seek its fullest expression.

To Hoover, the GOP could

restore ideals and "hold up the lamp of liberty."
closed with a challenge:
fight?"46

"Republicans!

Are you prepared to

The ex-President's ovation was warm and enthus

iastic but it lacked the emotion of 1936.
stampede to his standard.

There was no

Although Hoover buttons surfaced

to the floor of the convention,
dent,

Hoover

and although the ex-Presi

speaking through ex-Senator Dave Reed, voiced his

willingness to accept a draft, the Hoover boom reminded one
reporter of a "wet firecracker."47

To many delegates,

Wendell Willkie was "the only winning candidate."48

The

next evening, on the sixth ballot, Willkie became the
Republican nominee.49
Hoover's participation in the 1940 campaign was

46l b i d ., 131-133.
47N e w York T i m e s , June 26, 1940, 1, 16, headlined,
"Hoover Bids For Nomination to Fight New Deal." H.H. was
the "new active contender." Ne w York T i m e s , June 27, 1940,
3, carried Reed's disclosure of H.H.'s willingness to run.
N e w s w e e k , XVI (July 8, 1940), 7, 13-18, discusses "AntiHoover Tricks," which H.H.'s supporters disclosed.
They
found a plot to prevent the ex-President from "stampeding
the convention” through the tampering of loudspeakers.
Newsweek replied that it was the radiators which destroyed
his effectiveness in the sweltering, over-heated convention
hall.
T i m e . XXXVI (July 8, 1940), 12-13, described H.H.'s
address as his finest, most intelligent effort but thought
that his mush-mouthed delivery had undercut it.
48T i m e . XXXVI

(July 8, 1940), 12-13.

4 % e w York T i m e s . June 28, 1940, 1.
velt and W i l lkie. 93-95.

Moscow, Roose

limited.

His speeches dealt mainly with foreign policy.

There were two exceptions.

The first came on October 24, at

Columbus, Ohio, where he spoke on "The Third Term."

Hoover

noted the "unwritten provision in our Constitution" which
barred a third term.

In a restrained voice, the ex-Presi-

dent, while absolving Roosevelt from aspiring to a dictator
ship, warned of excessive personal power and gigantic polit
ical

machines which threatened legislative and judicial
Kf)

independence.J

Hoover repeated his charges concerning the Adminis
tration's "intellectual dishonesty" in its talk of recovery,
its effort "to pack the Supreme Court, 11 its purging of
Congressional party members, and its minimizing the true
extent of federal bureaucracy and power.

Hoover urged

change through the election of Wendell Willkie.-’-1On November 1, 1940, at Salt Lake City, Hoover made
his final campaign address on "The Major Issues."
cleverly ridiculed the New Deal.

He

He spoke of "Mr. Roosevelt

lively crusade for bigger and better production of falsifica
tion."

He challenged the public to compare the President's

promises with his performance.
propaganda, policies,

He lambasted New Deal

and failures.

He warned that the

nation was moving toward National Socialism. ^

^®New York T i mes, October 25, 1940, 1. Hoover,
Addresses Upon the American Road. 1940-1941, 224-239.
51Ibid., 230-239.

52ibid., 240-255.
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Referring to his own past experience, Hoover felt
qualified to discern the type president America needed.
Willkie, he said, was preeminently qualified.
change had arrived.
restored.

The time for

American spirit, he concluded, must be

To Hoover, America needed "a man who is truly

devoted to the American Dream."53

On Election Day, the

voters again rejected Hoover's advice and reelected Presi
dent R o o s e v e l t . ^
To Hooverites,

the Chief, even in 1940, remained "the

brainiest and ablest and most really patriotic figure of all
the national figures.”

He was the sane and sound commander.

Ashmun Brown even speculated that "a wise Providence is
sparing you for an even more important and responsible task
in the service of all mankind . . .

in the dark days

ahead.1,55
World War II submerged the emotion and political
vituperation of the 1930's.

It even quelled the N e w Deal.

Yet the question of how an ex-President might escape a
"certain grayness in the afternoon of life1' remains unsolved.
Most retiring Presidents have,

for a time,

53Ibid., 254-255.
3i% e w York Times, November 6-8, 1940, 1.
35A. Brown to Hoover, July 9, 1940, K-15.

sought
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seclusion.^6

Yet,

as Theodore Roosevelt noted,

"there is

not one among us in whom a devil does not dwell; at some
time, on some point, that devil masters each of us; he who
has never failed has not been t e m p t e d . M e n

of energy,

men whose record or convictions have been challenged,

and

men whose egos have suffered, have particularly found retire
ment difficult.^®

After leaving office, Roosevelt admitted

that "an ex-President does not do enough good to counter
balance the disadvantage of his taking any part as regards
public questions."

59

Yet, like the apolitical John Quincy

Adams who had found that political activity had become "as

^ V 7illiam Howard Taft was relieved at his escape from
office.
Henry F. Pringle, The Life and Times of William
Howard T a f t , IX (New York, 1939), 843-847-852.
Theodore
Roosevelt tried, for awhile, to maintain silence.
Blum,
Republican Roosevelt, 146, 142.
Grover Cleveland wanted the
quiet life. Allan Nevins, Grover Cleveland (New York, 1932),
738, 745, and Charles W. Stein, The Third Term Tradition
(New York, 1943), 124.
John Quincy Adams sought seclusion
and tried to maintain public silence.
Samuel Flagg Bemis,
John Quincy Adams And The Union (New York, 1956), 154-155,
185-195.
Herbert Hoover, as noted in Chapter III of this
work, at first sought sanctuary.
57 Blum, Republican Roosevelt, 161.
CO
Blum, Republican Roosevelt. 142; George A. Lipsky,
John Quincy Adams (New York, 1950), 44, discusses Adams as
confident, egotistical, and inflexible.
Bemis, A d a m s . 209,
describes Adams as "set on some sort of political comeback,
big or little." H.H.'s post-presidential career closely
compared to that of Adams and Roosevelt.
All three had
strong personalities, certain psychological needs, boundless
energy, and a devotion to a set of principles.
S^Blum, Republican Roosevelt. 146.
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much a necessary of life as atmospheric air,"^0 Roosevelt
decided to pursue political activity after the presidential
years.

So it was with Hoover.
In contrast to the aggressive roles of Adams, Roose

velt, and Hoover, other ex-Presidents lived an active but
apolitical life.

Grover Cleveland and William Howard Taft

are the best examples.

Although both men left Washington

under a cloud of disfavor, and although both men were
devoted to principles which were under steady attack, their
personalities permitted them to find a happy, useful life
outside politics.

Interestingly, both men lived long enough

to recover popular f a v o r . C o n c e r n i n g the political
activity of ex-Presidents, Taft wryly suggested the use of
"chloroform or lotus fruit.
Most ex-Presidents,

since the late nineteenth century,

^Lipsky, A d a ms. 40.
^Blum,

Republican Roosevelt. 146-147.

6^in retirement, Taft returned to law practice, served
as a professor of law at Yale, and fulfilled his life-long
ambition by serving as Chief Justice of the Supreme Court.
Pringle, Ta f t . II, 847, 852, 856-868, 926-950.
For his
championing of judicial reform and independence see pp. 9941029. Cleveland took on the role of educator and found con
tentment as a family man.
Yet, he maintained an interest in
politics, privately criticized Roosevelt, and hoped that his
party would "reaffirm old principles which the times demand."
There were efforts to run him in 1904, but he resisted the
pleas and stated that his decision was "unalterable and con
clusive." Nevins, Cleveland, 745-747, 754-755.
Also see
Charles W. Stein, Third Term Tradition. 134-135, 138.

^Pringle, Taft. II, 845.

have written articles for periodicals during their early
years of retirement.^4

Historian Thomas A. Bailey says that

the former chief executives have attempted to "rig the
record" with articles,
records.®^

speeches, memoirs,

and personal

To Bailey, the three most active ex-Presidents,

John Quincy Adams, Theodore Roosevelt,

and Herbert Hoover,

especially tried to write their own version of history.

In

trying to improve their own image, they also vigorously
defended their records and exceeded good taste in criticizing
their successors.
The three most active ex-Presidents had much in common
Each witnessed a decline in his party's fortunes; each was a
poor looser; each was stung by the criticism of his opponents
each was hypercritical of his successor; each was confident
of his own rightness; each desired vindication; each sought
a political comeback; each had a sense of duty; each saw h i m 
self as a leader of the whole nation; and each used the
rhetoric of a moral teacher in his emphasis on soul, morality
conscience, duty, law, and justice.

fi7

S ^ e v i n s , Cleveland, 737; Blum, Republican Roosevelt.
143; Pringle, T a f t . II, 847-868; Bailey, Presidential Great
ness , 119-121, includes Coolidge and Hoover.
65Ibid., 119-121.
^ B a i l e y , Presidential Greatness, 117-121.
In this
vein, Cleveland was also very critical of President Roose
velt. Nevins, Cleveland, 754.
^ L i p s k y , A d a m s . 41-45; Bemis, Adams, 154-156, 196,
209-210, 280-296, 474, 529; Blum, Republican Roosevelt. 142161.
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Fortunately,

time favored Hoover.

He outlived that

"grayness" of life and emerged as an elder statesman in a
second post-war era.

The last role was tailored for his

abilities and interests.

By putting aside politics, he

devoted his talents, recalled his vast experience,

and exer

cised his administrative techniques in drawing up the guide
lines for an extensive reorganization of the executive branch
of government under Presidents Truman and Eisenhower.

The

Hoover Commission Reports served as a significant political
contribution and a touching memorial to his deepest reform
ideas.68
With age, Hoover mellowed.

The cutting knife of his

earlier bitterness proved less lethal.

By the 1950's,

Democrats as well as Republicans offered him accolades.
Even former New Dealers treated him kindly in their memoirs
and journalistic accounts of the 1930's.

Yet, the complex

puzzle that was Herbert Hoover necessitates fitting in
political pieces,

long missing.

68Hoover Commission Report:
U. S. Commission on
Organization of the Executive Branch of Government (New Y o r k ,
1949), viii, includes an introduction by H.H. which states
that the objective of the commission was "to assist those
who work to make a lasting reality of . . . a Government
which will forever be the servant, not the master, of our
people."
Laurin L. Henry, Presidential Transition (Washing
ton, 1960), 681-682, labels the second Hoover Commission as
more conservative in its endorsement of government activity
and administrative reform.
According to Henry, it tried to
remove government from the business field.
Also see Neil
MacNeil and Harold W. Metz, The Hoover Report, 1953-1955
(New York, 1956), for an area by area analysis.
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Hoover was sometimes a tragic figure, sometimes a
ludicrous one, but always a political one.

Although he

preferred the role of "philosopher," he was capable of
playing politics and was more political-minded than his
critics or friends admit.

As he often professed, he had a

distaste for politics and never played the game with ability.
Nor was his personality suited for such a role.

Nonetheless,

he carried on a copious correspondence— frequently with
political aims— anxiously inquired into local politics,
courted political power brokers, offered and sought advice,
developed strategy and tactics at the local and national
level, outlined a platform of principles, published political
articles and books,

sought jobs for political friends, kept

tabs on congressional leaders, exerted pressure and some
times control over the national party organization, rallied
dissidents,

fragmented his own party, defined issues, defended

his own record, tried to lead his party, and eventually trans
mitted most of his ideas to the largest bloc if not the
majority of the party.
motives,

He continually spoke of apolitical

ideas, and the nation's needs.

He used the

rhetoric and maneuvers of a politician.
Throughout the 1 9 3 0 's, Hoover made one last political
effort.

His personal frustration, his need for vindication,

and his detailed philosophy of American Individualism moti
vated his determined, often bitter, defense of his ideas and
record.

Possessing an extreme sensitivity to New Deal weak

nesses or inconsistencies, he enjoyed the role of a Jeremiah.
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He wanted to persuade the public of his rightness.

He looked

forward to battle with his antagonists.
More than any other conservative leader, Hoover illus
trates Richard Hofstadter's thesis that conservatives and
reformers reversed their ideological roles in the 1930's.
Like reformers of the past. Hoover, as leader of the oppo
sition, expressed concern over moral decay, malignant corrup
tion, regimentation, the eclipse of liberty, and a dark
future.

However, he played the role for political as well as

personal reasons.
sistent, cutting,

His attacks on the New Deal were pe r 
and shrill, although partly a reflex action

to the attacks from his opponents.

Too often, however, his

own criticism was politically calculated, extravagant, and
vituperatively personal.
There was a certain irony in his onslaught, for he
sincerely believed many of his wildest charges.
had lived abroad too long.

Perhaps he

Revolution, conspiracy, corrup

tion, and other ’’evils11 evoked sharp images in his mind.
had a genuine fear of mass revolution.

New Deal phrases

evoked special nuances, even hidden meanings,
lectual framework.

He

in his intel

Inevitably, his denunciation of the "new

path" entailed emotion, bitterness, and panic.

Much of his

analysis was as biased and unobjective as that of his own

^ H o f s t a d t e r , Age of Reform, 317-318, says that during
the N e w Deal, reformers stressed the practical, the necessary,
and the facts, whereas conservatives, shocked at the rapidity
of change, focused on traditional ideas, sound principles,
the constitution, morality, and liberty.
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critics.
In his better moments, he emphasized ideas.
his homilies concerning the duties of citizens

Many of

(or "soldiers"

as he called them) acquired a certain sacredness among his
followers.

His lieutenants shared his inspiration,

moral values,

and determination.

character,

They encouraged his "new

c r u sade."
His political environment, his coterie of lieuten
ants,

and his isolation emasculated his realism, even his

judgment.

He failed politically,

even by his own standards.

The GOP defeats of 1932, 1934, 1936,

and 1937 were personal.

Too, the party rejected him in 1936, it rejected his
lieutenants in 1938, and ignored his availability in 1940.
Yet, his own influence was considerable inside the hierarchy
and with rank and file Republicans.

He was a force to be

reckoned with and his party rivals, his Ne w Deal antagonists,
and news analysts testified to his strength in their con
stant recognition of his activity and possible leadership.
Although his criticism was often more embarrassing to
his own stature than to his targets,

it was frequently

logical, sometimes realistic, and on occasions, positive.
He unmasked some dangerous flaws in the New Deal.
to the need for a change in methods.

He pointed

Whatever the correla

tion, many of his arguments were adopted b y his party,
on occasions, by the nation.
NRA,

and,

He was an early critic of the

the Court Plan, and electioneering by government

employees.

Although the Republican Program Committee was

275
less than he hoped, it did provide a grass roots expression
and participation in defining Republican ideas.

Many

successful GOP candidates of 1938 won because of an anti-New
Deal campaign.

Hoover continually maximized whatever politi

cal strength he possessed.
If Hoover had used another strategy in the 1930 's
would he have been more successful in fighting the New Deal?
Given his personality and experience there was no other
strategy possible.

However, looking at other GOP figures,

what strategy worked better?

What Republican leader

eclipsed Hoover 's influence in the 1930's?
except Roosevelt?

What Democrat

What man, stigmatized as the architect of

the Depression, and possessing such an elaborate ideological
framework, could have scored a comeback?

Nor can the per

sonality of his chief antagonist and the popularity of the
New Deal be ignored.
unavoidable.

Hoover's frustration and failure were

In the "grayness of the afternoon" he proved

to be a sore loser.

As the 1930's closed, he withdrew from

the political arena— permanently.

The vindication he sought

was unattainable.
With the passing of time, however, many of Hoover's
theses have gained wide acceptance.

Historians now accept

the international nature of the Great Depression, the fact
that unemployment remained around ten million throughout the
1 9 3 0 's, and that only World War II led to the recovery which
the New Deal had failed to foster.

Even former New Dealers

have questioned the wisdom of FDR's interregnum attitudes,
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the waste, corruption and inefficiency within New Deal
agencies, and the expansion of executive power.
Today,

as in the 1930's, bureaucracy is recognized as

a Leviathan and political morality is debated, businessmen
express concern over the coercion, regimentation, and the
loss of a "free economy,” and the disenchanted speak, in
Hooverian terms, of an individualism,
and liberty.

"equal opportunity,"

Again the words carry connotations and loaded

meanings.
Hoover remains relevant because of the role of ideas
in his political action.

Environment and education gave him

an acute sense of values.

Because he saw all issues in moral

terms, compromise was a sin.

An unusual set of circumstances

led him to the pinnacle of power at the very moment a man of
his instincts was least capable of governing.

Despite the

change through which he lived, Hoover logically, but
unrealistically, defended the past through the political
media.

At last he played to the emotional element in man,

but denied he was so doing.

At last he utilized the politi

cal tools without comprehending the art.

But then, like

Thoreau's individualist, Hoover heard a different drummer
and marched to the tune h§ heard.
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